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EDITOR’S NOTE
The ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law publishes three
issues every year. The Fall issue is typically a compilation of articles
concerning emerging topics in international law. In the first issue published
this year, Volume 23 Issue 1, calls for the promotion and development of
international law in varying global challenges.
This Issue begins with “Post-Brexit: A Continuum for State
Sovereignty” authored by Morad Eghbal and Dr. K.C. O’Rourke. The vote
for the United Kingdom (U.K.) to leave the European Union (E.U.) reflected
a deep sense of national sovereignty and pride, and a public suspicion of the
costs of a E.U. partnership. In 2016, British citizens voted to exit the E.U.
This has impacted global markets, including the British pound. In this piece,
Eghbal and Dr. O’Rourke propose a typology that reflects a transition as the
U.K. confronts its role as a sovereign State in the twenty-first century.
Student author, Christina Strompf, discusses the origins of organized
crime and its impact on the global economy in the second piece—“Guilty
Until Proven Innocent: A Comparative Analysis of Organized Crime Laws
in the United States, Italy, Japan, and Ecuador”. Ms. Strompf examines each
country’s laws to combat organized crime while noting the differences in the
legislation, and makes an intriguing suggestion that could benefit each nation
and its citizens’ wellbeing.
“The Correlation Between Wiretapping and Terrorism: A Comparative
Analysis of American and European Societal Views on Government
Surveillance” authored by fellow student Lora Plemondon comments on
wiretapping techniques and popularity as a result of terrorism prevention in
the United States, Russia, Italy, and France.
Next, Professor Yuri Mantilla, urges for action to stop terrorist
organizations like ISIS from further committing any more crimes against
humanity. “ISIS Crimes Against Humanity and the Assyrian People:
Religious Totalitarianism and the Protection of Fundamental Human
Rights,” is a powerful call to the global community to become involved and
contribute in preventing and punishing these acts of horror against the human
people.
International law is as necessary in domestic courts as it is in
international courts. Author—Emeralda Colombo, stresses the need for
international law in adjudicating environmental concerns affecting the
Alaskan people of the Kivalina island in her award winning piece “Enforcing
International Law in U.S. Courts: The Law of the Sea Convention at Play in
Kivalina.”
On behalf of the Journal I want to thank the authors for providing us
with such great material, our Junior Staff and Senior Staff’s work, the
Editorial Board for its diligence, Professor Donoho for his great supervision,
vii

and Marissa Doctrove for all her help and guidance through every obstacle
we encountered.
Finally, I want to thank the 2016–2017 Executive Board for its hard
work and commitment to the Journal. I am lucky to have worked with such
intelligent and dedicated individuals. To my dear friends, my two sisters and
my parents, thank you for your patience and support, I love you all very
much.

Paola Palma
Editor-in-Chief 2016-2017
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POST-BREXIT: A CONTINUUM FOR STATE
SOVEREIGNTY U.K.’S CHALLENGE TO
BALANCE LEGITIMACY, CAPITAL
DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN NEEDS
Morad Eghbal* and K.C. O’Rourke**
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I. INTRODUCTION
Both sides of the Brexit campaign were very nationalist in their
outlook suggesting that profitable preservation of a capitalist economy was
paramount based on a conservative sense of nationalism and sovereignty.1
*
Morad Eghbal, is a principal researcher at The Riess Institute and consultant in private
praxis. In his previous academic career he served as Deputy Director of the Center for International and
Comparative Law at the University of Baltimore and also as the inaugural director of the law school’s
graduate law program, the L.L.M. in the Law of the United States (L.L.M.-LOTUS); taught legal,
ethical and historical studies, international management, organizational behavior, and principles of
marketing, and international business transactions, international finance, comparative and comparative
constitutional law at several universities and Trial Advocacy at Howard University School of Law. He
holds BA and MA degrees from George Washington University, a Juris Doctorate from Howard
University, an LL.M. in Transnational Business Practice from McGeorge School of Law and a number
of graduate certificates from Inns of Court School of Law (U.K.), Paris-Lodron University in Salzburg
(Austria) and Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest (Hungary).
** Dr. K.C. O’Rourke, JD, M. Div., LL.M.; holds a Doctorate of Juridical Science [SJD; The
Crossroads of Globalization and Rule of Law] with dual Masters of Law [LL.M.; International Law and
Business; Government Law & Regulation] from Washington College of Law, American University,
Washington, DC., USA; O’Rourke has taught as adjunct faculty at Washington College of Law; holds a
Juris Doctorate from Drake University Law School; and serves in the core executive leadership circle at
The Bridging Institute in Maryland; Interdisciplinary comments are welcome and encouraged at e-mail:
GeoNOMOS777@gmail.com.
1.
John Browne, U.K.’s Minister Commits to Successful Brexit, TOWNHALL FINANCE (Aug.
5, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://finance.townhall.com/columnists/johnbrowne/2016/08/05/U.K.s-primeminister-commits-to-successful-brexit-n2201876; see also Danica Kirka, U.K. Central Bank Tries to
Soften Brexit Shock on Economy, AP:
THE BIG STORY (Aug. 4, 2016, 1:24 PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1f1f6bc759e945f0b366f5c7e4b74cdc/U.K.-central-bank-help-economythrough-brexit-stimulus.
While cheaper money will help households and companies, the cost of loans is
already very low and is not their primary concern right now, economists say.
Businesses in particular are worried about whether to make investments or hire in
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The ongoing debates concerning the United Kingdom’s (U.K.) future
relationship with the European Union (EU) continue amidst the rapid
cabinet changes and the political rhetoric of newly appointed U.K. public
officials.2 The post-Brexit campaign analysis shows that both the Leave
(Brexit) and Remain campaign relied on widespread publicly disseminated
negative scare tactics rather than on positive arguments for solidarity or for
sharing in support of each respective side on the actual issues. Both sides
were rigidly nationalistic in their outlook, relentless in their agnosticism of
the facts, and persistent in demonizing the opposition.
Analysis of voters’ demographics and news-consuming habits offer
potential clues as to why Brexit passed:3 Those who supported Brexit were
Britain without knowing what the country’s trade relationship with the EU will
be.
Nives Dolsak & Aseem Prakash, Here’s What Many Journalists Missed When Covering the
Brexit Vote, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2016/08/04/heres-what-many-journalists-missed-when-covering-the-brexit-vote/
(Welfare
states have policies that help free trade’s losers. The political scientist John Ruggie called this system
for cushioning blows from the international economic system “embedded liberalism” arguing that the
interventionist domestic welfare state made possible today’s liberal trade order. But these kind of
policies are eroding. Winners aren’t compensating losers. In fact, firms like Apple that have gained
enormously from globalization are using complex financial arrangements to escape taxes. Wealthy
individuals are doing the same. Economic inequality is increasing dramatically in a “winner-take-all”
society. Mainstream media coverage that focuses on racism and xenophobia rather than economic loss
and inequality may not be taking these shifts adequately into account. Larry Summers famously insisted
in 2005 that financial markets cannot fail. Yet more recently he noted the Brexit vote should be a
‘wake-up call for elites everywhere’ on the need to ‘design an approach, approaches to economic policy
that hear the anger that’s being expressed in this vote.’” The real issue in BREXIT was “what did the
British average voter get, when and how from EU integration?”).
2.
See United Kingdom, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (last updated July 28, 2016)
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/United_Kingdom (explaining that the United Kingdom is
constituted, or composed of four constituent governmental entities, England, Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland which together make up the United Kingdom of Great Britain. With the Brexit vote
now, this governance arrangement would continue as one nation State or if the arrangement would be
discontinued for the U.K., internally as several sovereigns. This article presupposes this arrangement
will continue. If it were discontinued, then it must be presumed that the United Kingdom would, as a
unit of governance, have to dissolve into these constituent governmental entities which then, in turn,
would either become independent nation-states in their own right and elect to join the EU, or else
reconfigure a different and perhaps new arrangement with “Mother Britannia.”).
3.
Will Youmans, The Brexit Vote and the Crisis of Sovereignty, GULF NEWS (June 25, 2016,
5:19 PM), http://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/the-brexit-vote-and-the-crisis-of-sovereignty-1.1852328
(Brexit is a sort of martyrdom in the name of a restored state sovereignty. This is
of course a matter of perception. How much sovereignty did Great Britain
actually sacrifice? Euro-sceptics trotted out a litany of grievances, often to mock
the over-specificity of EU regulations. It would be hard to accept that the U.K.’s
fate was actually much worse or unable to navigate the global economy as a result
of its belonging. Those mystified by the vote show contempt for the Brexit

2016]
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older and as a general observation, less educated formally. Brexit voters
tended to earn less money and where significant numbers appeared to work
in non-skilled trades, many lacked formal job qualifications. In other
words, these voters were not able to compete in a global economy that had
“trickled down into” the U.K. over the last forty years.4 According to some
reports, these voters appeared to be reluctant to adapt to rapid social
changes that integration into the global economy often requires as domestic
markets shift rapidly.5 Domestic labor markets and work opportunities
decision. Some deride it as a demonstration of one of the major shortcomings of
democracy, namely when uninformed electorates make crucial decisions which
affect those to be governed. Referenda are among the most democratic means of
direct, collective decision-making. There are rightful concerns that public
deliberation beforehand was confused, media coverage was agnostic to facts, and
mistrust of expertise was absent. Either way, Brexit produced a confused desire
by the majority of Brits for fortifying state sovereignty. It will not fix the
underlying problems of economic stratification, withered public safety nets and a
national pride injured by its lost investments in imperialism and colonization.
The State model in general has failed to address the increasingly transnational
problems of the world today, including a growing global economic inequality,
mass migration, climate change and the whimsical destruction wrought by the
transnational finance networks. It is easy to pin these on the institutions like the
EU, but many border-defying problems are the direct result of past State
actions—the same powers of national sovereignty Brexit supporters seek to
bolster.”).
4.

Id.
(the neoliberal premise of free trade bringing about wealth creation for all did not
manifest. Ordinary working people are left to feel they paid the cost of U.K.
national honor—of which the State is the protector—for questionable, partial,
material benefits, which were disproportionately distributed to those who were
already well-off. The riches of Brussels went to those who profit the most from
trade, banking, finance and so on. Social and economic stratification has such
reproductive tendencies, and only further cement resentment. The rising sense of
national pride, one ridden by angst about the state of the changing world, might
appear irrational. But it betrays the underlying reason. An observer might miss it
if they value the outcome in economic terms and political outcomes alone).

5.
S.A. Ramirez, Taking Economic Rights Seriously After the Debt Crisis, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.
REV. 713 (2011); see generally DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2011); MURRAY MILGATE & SHANNON
C. STIMSON, AFTER ADAM SMITH: A CENTURY OF TRANSFORMATION IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY (Princeton Univ. Press 2009); PAUL KRUGMAN, TRADE AND WAGES RECONSIDERED
(Princeton Univ. Press 2008); PHILLIP MCMICHAELS, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE (Sage Pub.
2008); PETER NOLAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM:
THE CONTRADICTORY CHARACTER OF
GLOBALIZATION (Anthem Press 2008); INO ROSSI, FRONTIERS OF GLOBALIZATION RESEARCH:
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES (Springer Pub. 2008); RAWI ABDELAL, CAPITAL
RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE (Harvard Univ. Press 2009); RONALD FINDLAY &
KEVIN O’ROURKE, POWER AND PLENTY: TRADE, WAR AND THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE SECOND
MILLENNIUM (Princeton Univ. Press 2009); BARRY K. GILLS & W. R. THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION

4
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change because of decisions made in corporate boardrooms rather than by
national legislatures and in parliament through a democratic and public
debate process. Brexit voters had concluded they were being left behind by
both the economic pressures and the social ramifications (e.g., immigration
mandates) of U.K.’s European Union membership.6 Adding up these
interconnected demographics, it is not difficult to understand that Brexit
reflected a larger, more deep-seated citizen angst about the fragile state and
legitimacy of U.K. sovereignty.
The public perceptions that influenced the urban Brexit voting patterns
carried with it some immediate and interesting mandates, not the least of
which will be substantive in terms of addressing U.K. security followed
shortly thereafter by significant internal planning and parliamentary review
of the U.K.’s sovereign obligations that accompany its global contractual
partnerships, Common Market participation, international trade agreements,
and international treaties on human rights.7 Transition in how exactly the
GLOBAL HISTORY (Routledge 2006); JOHN BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM
(Yale Univ. Press 2005); CHAMSY EL-OJEILE & PATRICK HAYDEN, NEW CRITICAL THEORIES OF
GLOBALIZATION (Palgrave MaCmillian 2006); JAN AART SCHOLTE, GLOBALIZATION: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (PALGRAVE MACMILLIAN 2005); JURGEN OSTERHAMMEL & NIELS PETERSSON,
GLOBALIZATION: A SHORT HISTORY (DONA GEYER, TRANS.) (Princeton Univ. Press 2009); RICHARD
H. ROBBINS, GLOBAL PROBLEMS AND THE CULTURE OF CAPITALISM (Pearson 3d ed. 2005); ROBBIE
ROBERTSON, THE THREE WAVES OF GLOBALIZATION: A HISTORY OF DEVELOPING GLOBAL
CONSCIOUSNESS (Zed Books 2002); BARRY SMART, ECONOMY, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY: A
SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF NEO-LIBERALISM (Open Univ. Press 2003); JOSEPH STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Norton 2003); PETER A. HALL & DAVID W. SOSKICE,
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (Oxford Univ. Press
2001); MARTIN KOHR, RE-THINKING GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES (Zed
Books 2001); MOHAMMED A. BAMYEH, THE ENDS OF GLOBALIZATION (Univ. of Minnesota Press
2000); DEAN BAKER, GERALD EPSTEIN, & ROBERT POLLINS, GLOBALIZATION AND PROGRESSIVE
ECONOMIC CHANGE (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998); CHRISTOPHER CHASE-DUNN, GLOBAL FORMATION:
STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (Rowman & Littlefield Pub. 1998); JOHN M. KEYNES, GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (Create Space Indep. Pub. Platform 2011).
AND

6.

Youmans, supra note 3.
(sovereignty is the passionate almost personal concern of nationalists, patriots and
ordinary citizens everywhere. The notoriously irresponsible British tabloids
agitated for such sentiments over the past four decades. Sovereignty, as the
highest political authority, was a key word in the Brexit debate, especially for
those calling for Leave votes. This is odd. What does national sovereignty mean
for average people who have no command of the state’s instruments and are not
of an economic class to determine how the state works? This presumes a rational
basis).

7.

Id.
(the bargain underpinning the EU is that compromises in national sovereignty
through accession to regulatory compliance will bring economic and social
benefits. Creating a common economic market that could rival the American
economy would be a boost to lift all boats. Yet while greater access to markets
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U.K. plans to meet these global mandates will simultaneously raise
considerable domestic pressure by U.K. citizens for more elected official
transparency as the State reviews how it proposes to integrate its available
capital resources (both public and private) once the U.K. begins to function
outside its EU partnership.8
After almost a half-century of being part of a different vision, the U.K.
now plunges into a new period of political transition, uncertainty, and
public contestation. But now, the necessity of securing legitimacy with its
own citizens, U.K. lawmakers and public officials are confronted with
somehow redefining the operation of U.K.’s sovereignty while they
simultaneously negotiate an amicable EU separation and divorce settlement
under Article 50.9 The operative mandates for this “re-legitimization”
and labor migration accelerated within the EU, public austerity measures
produced cutbacks in domestic-level social programs, education and health.
These public austerity measures are now at the forefront of domestic political
review. For many working people, the benefits of EU membership did not appear
to outweigh the stagnation in quality of life they experienced, combined with the
loss of security).
8.
Steven Swinford, Theresa May Pledges to Fight Injustice and Make Britain ‘A Country
That Works For Everyone’ In Her First Speech as Prime Minister, THE TELEGRAPH (July 13, 2016, 8:53
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.U.K./news/2016/07/13/theresa-mays-pledges-to-fight-injustice-and-makebritain-a-count/.
(BREXIT supporters continually cited a number of reasons for leaving the EU
including independence and injuries to British national pride that Brussels
routinely imposed on the U.K. so much so that this over-regulation from outside
the borders of Great Britain appeared to prioritize foreign corporate interests
while forcing Britain to take particular refugees, especially from Syria and
Eastern Europe, that created a general fear about cultural and religious
disharmony).
(note that these essential capital resources are currently available to the U.K. as its rights and
benefits of EU membership but will need to be analyzed and carefully discussed precisely because the
public spectrum of Brexit citizen political demands are significant and dominantly focused on creating
measurable and concrete domestic-based solutions that address access to education, employment and
healthcare).
9.
See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, http://www.lisbontreaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/
title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon] (noting that any Member State
may decide to withdraw from the Union (EU) in accordance with its own constitutional requirements so
long as the Member State notifies the European Council of its intention. This notice triggers a set of
guidelines from the European Council to negotiate an agreement with that State for arrangements of the
withdrawal and is to also take into account the framework for the future relationships of that State with
the EU. The final agreement must have majority approval of the European Council members and the
consent of the European Parliament. The Treaties between the parties cease from the date of entry of
the negotiated agreement (Article 218(3) or failing an agreement, two years after Article 50 notification
is given by the State, unless the European Council unanimously decides to extend this time period.); see
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process is reflected in the Brexit vote by U.K. citizens who somehow felt
that British sovereignty was manipulated, bruised, or perhaps even
surrendered unnecessarily.
A brief glimpse into the political enormity of this transition for the
U.K. appeared in the early statements by the new Prime Minister Theresa
May. May essentially provided reassurances that she would heal the
nation’s divisions and build bridges to help the least privileged. She
publicly stated that her government would deliver Brexit and refocus its
priorities on people whose needs were greatest: “[w]hen we make the big
calls we will think not of the powerful but you,” she said. “When we pass
new laws, we will listen not to the mighty but to you. When it comes to
taxes, we will prioritize not the wealthy but you. When it comes to
opportunity, we won’t entrench the advantages of the fortunate few—we
will do everything we can to help anybody, whatever your background, to
go as far as your talents will take you.”10 Obviously, with the Brexit vote
also Nick Barber, ET AL., Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable Role, U.K.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ASSOC. (June 27, 2016), https://U.K.constitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nickbarber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/
(arguing that the Prime Minister alone is unable to trigger withdrawal from the EU under TEU; Prime
Minister must be authorized to do so by statute in order that the declaration is legally effective under
domestic law and complies with the preconditions of triggering Article 50); Miranda Butler, The
Implications of Brexit: Who Is Sovereign Now?, SOLICITORS JOURNAL (July 26, 2016),
http://www.3harecourt.com/assets/asset-store/file//MBBrexitSJ.pdf (discussing what Brexit vote entails
for U.K. parliamentary sovereignty and for U.K. influence in international issues; considers whether
U.K. constitutional law requires not only government’s use of ‘crown prerogative’ but also a
parliamentary vote in favor of leaving EU; looks like increased participation of Scotland and Northern
Ireland in U.K. decision making and future of U.K. as sovereign State in international law; citing case
R. v Secretary for the Home Department EX.P Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 A.C.513, Independent
[April 6, 1995]).
10.
Toby Helm, Theresa May’s First Pledge as PM Was for A “One-Nation Britain.” Can
She Deliver?, THE GUARDIAN (July 16, 2016, 6:45 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/
jul/16/theresa-may-one-nation-britain-prime-minister (suggesting that the core problem is that, as yet, no
one in it (new British cabinet) knows what Brexit means, and what it will entail. May’s cabinet is split
between the likes of Hammond, who insists that whatever happens the U.K. must retain as much access
to the single market as possible, and others, such as Davis and Johnson, who seem to believe the U.K.
can thrive outside the single market if it has to, and this is the price the country has to pay to extricate
itself from the EU’s commitment to free movement of labor in order to control immigration); see
Swinford, supra note 8 (noting that Theresa May has directly addressed working-class Britons who are
"just managing" to cope with life as she vowed that her Government will not "entrench the advantages
of the privileged few." In a searing speech outside Downing Street May pledged to "fight against the
burning injustices" of poverty, race, class and health and give people back "control" of their lives; she
vowed to "prioritise" tax cuts and legislation for working-class voters rather than the "mighty"; her
speech, setting out her vision as a "One Nation conservative”, marked a clear attempt to distance herself
from David Cameron's premiership and appeal directly to disenchanted Labour voters. She said that for
an "ordinary working class family" life is "much harder than many people in Westminster realise" as she
sought to heal the national divide after the EU referendum. Her speech highlighted her clear intention to
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behind her government, Theresa May will be in a unique position to foster a
more structured plan that intentionally re-defines the role and function of
State government within its overall domestic operation.11
Her early comments suggest there will be a quasi-public debate that
takes a long view and will be framed by widespread domestic program
development. May speaks of marshalling various capital resources and
domestic programs around economic marketplace issues, social safety
networks, labor issues, job creations, and individual capability development
as the country strives to fight against burning social injustices. The balance
espoused by Ms. May points to a much more deliberate approach in the
State’s development and utilization of economic capital,12 social capital,13
reach out to Labour voters who feel alienated by Jeremy Corbyn in a move which could put the Tories
in power for a decade. After arriving in Downing Street, May said that her "mission" as Prime Minister
will be to make Britain "a country that works for everyone." She also vowed to “forge a bold new
positive role” for Britain outside the European Union).
11.
See Karen A. Cecilia O’Rourke, The Crossroads of Globalization, Human Rights, and
Rule of Law: Creating A Legal Culture of Human Rights Designing A Geonomos Model for the State
(2012) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Washing College of Law, American University) (on file with
the American University Library system) (the irony of Brexit as a historical event, is that contrary to
public anecdotal comments that Theresa May is a “new Thatcher”, Prime Minister May is thankfully not
Margaret Thatcher, and hopefully does not feel compelled to bear the Thatcher political standard.
Recall that it was Margaret Thatcher (U.K.) and Ronald Reagan (U.S.A.) who created, embraced and
implemented the neoliberal paradigm [c.1980-2010] for global capitalism [better known as “trickledown economics” or The Washington Consensus] which has proven to be disastrous to State
sovereignty, domestic program funding, and State oversight of the private sector capital movement both
in domestic markets and in the global economy).
12.
See Glyn Holton, Economic Capital, GLYN HOLTON (Aug. 11, 2016),
https://www.glynholton.com/notes/economic_capital/. (economic capital is the quantum of risk capital,
assessed on a real basis, which an enterprise requires to cover the risks that it is running or collecting as
a going concern, such as market risk, credit risk, legal risk, and operational risk) (it is the amount of
money which is needed to secure survival in a worst-case scenario. Firms and financial services
regulators, i.e., representing the nation-state should then aim to hold risk capital of an amount equal at
least to economic capital. Typically, economic capital can be calculated by determining the amount of
capital that a firm needs to ensure that its realistic balance sheet stays solvent over a certain time period
with a pre-specified probability. Therefore, economic capital is often calculated as value at risk. The
balance sheet, in this case, would be prepared showing market value (rather than book value) of assets
and liabilities and thus economic capital is distinguished in relation to other types of capital which may
not necessarily reflect a monetary or exchange-value. These forms of capital include natural capital,
cultural capital and social capital, the latter two represent a type of power or status that an individual can
attain in capitalist society via a formal education or through social ties. O’Rourke, supra note 11, at
278–79).
13.
See Paul S. Adler et al., Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept, 27 THE ACAD. OF
MGMT. REV., 17–40 (2002), http://www.csee.wvu.edu/~xinl/library/papers/social/social_capital.pdf (the
term Social Capital generally refers to (a) resources, and the value of these resources, both tangible
(public spaces, private property) and intangible ("actors," "human capital," persons and people) but is in
the GeoNOMOS© to be distinguished from human capital, (b) the relationships among these resources,
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and human capital14—three essential resources that every nation State
including the U.K. already possesses. The post-Brexit appeal made by May
seeks to shape a different foundation for the twenty-first century U.K. as
she speaks about a social contract between government and those it seeks to
govern that represents a more flexible continuum for State sovereignty—
one that secures public decision-making, individual liberty, citizen
opportunity and economic stability. Every one of these espoused efforts
moves the public debate for defining the operative scope of British
sovereignty on to a twenty-first century continuum—a continuum that is
more relational in the domestic sector and more actively functional in the
international sector. It is an effort that strives to meet the modern demands
of the nation State without a retrenchment to an older view of an absolute
sovereign autonomy of the Westphalian model of the nation State that
prevailed before and after World War II. As a recognized global leader, the
U.K. is in an unusual position in the next few years to design this new
and (c) the impact that these relationships have on the resources involved in each relationship, and on
larger groups. The focus of social capital is generally as a form of capital that produces public goods for
a common good); see also P. BOURDIEAU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRAC. (Cambridge University
Press, 1972); L.J. Hanifan, The Rural School Community Center, 67 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF
POL. AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 130–138 (Sage Publications, Inc., 1916); L.J. HANIFAN, THE COMMUNITY
CENTER (Boston: Silver Burdett & Company, 1920); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT
AM. CITIES 138 (Random House Inc.,1961) (stating that “If self-government in the place is to work,
underlying any float of population must be a continuity of people who have forged neighborhood
networks. These networks are a city's irreplaceable social capital. Whenever the capital is lost, from
whatever cause, the income from it disappears, never to return until and unless new capital is slowly and
chancily accumulated.”); James Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J.
OF SOCIOLOGY SUPPLEMENT S95–S120 (1988), http://courseweb.ischool.illinois.edu/~katewill/forchina/readings/coleman 1988 social capital.pdf; Barry Wellman & Scott Worley, Different Strokes from
Different Folks: Community Ties and Social Support, 96 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 558–88 (1990),
http://www.bebr.ufl.edu/sites/default/files/Wellman%20and%20Wortley%20-%201990%20%20Different%20Strokes%20from%20Different%20Folks%20Community%20.pdf; Samuel Bowles &
Herbert Gintis, Social Capital and Community Governance, 112 THE ECON. J. 419–36,
http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~bowles/SocialCapital.pdf.
14.
See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87(3) Q. J. OF ECON. 355–74 (1973),
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirkb/teach/pdf/spence/1973%20job%20market%20signalling.pdf (human
capital is a term popularized by Gary Becker, an economist from the University of Chicago, and Jacob
Mincer that refers to the stock of knowledge, habits, social and personality attributes, including
creativity, embodied in the ability to perform labor so as to produce economic value. In the alternative,
human capital is understood as a collection of resources—all the knowledge, talents, skills, abilities,
experience, intelligence, training, judgment, and wisdom possessed individually and collectively by
individuals in a particular and defined population. Such resources are the total capacity of the people
that represents a form of wealth which can be directed to accomplish the goals of the nation or state or a
portion thereof); see also Michael Spence, Signaling in retrospect and the Information Structure of
Markets, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 434–59 (2002), http://classes.maxwell.syr.edu/ecn611/spencenobel.pdf;
Gary Becker, Human Capital, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON. (Sept. 29, 2016),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/HumanCapital.html.
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continuum of sovereignty and to model its operation both domestically for
its citizens and internationally with a more effective set of economic
organizing principles that balance the ongoing global expansion of
capitalism.
II. WHY A NEW TYPOLOGY FOR STATE SOVEREIGNTY?
The world in relation to the operation of sovereign States has changed
dramatically in the last half of the twentieth century as demonstrated by the
end of traditional colonialism—de jure, if not also de facto—and the sheer
number of newly emerging nation States claiming and being accorded
sovereignty.15 Traditional notions of sovereignty established by the Treaty
of Westphalia (1648)16 are simply no longer fully applicable or realistic as
the State legitimizes its function in the twenty-first century. States,
including the U.K., have voluntarily agreed to cooperate in the interests of
global capitalism, human rights, and world peace across a variety of global
partnerships by signing charters, private and public sector investment
contracts, and a wide variety of public treaty agreements.17 As a result, a
recognizable and functional international “community of States” has been
established and the U.K. is fundamentally a part of that community in
addition to its membership in the EU regional configuration of States; a
community which it cannot “leave,” no matter what, but a community
which it may be able to influence and re-shape more productively and going
forward in time through more active and engaged participation.
Furthermore, as global economic organizing principles have also
changed over time, the ongoing function of State sovereignty was altered
even into the early twenty-first century.18 As part of this dynamic process,
dominant States such as the U.K., continued to give up parts of the
traditional scope of State sovereignty in exchange for what was perceived
as the ongoing mutual benefits of these economic market partnerships in
both the public and private international arena.19
15.

See generally O’Rourke, supra note 11.

16.
See Treaty of Westphalia, YALE L. SCH. (Aug. 15, 2016), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
17th_century/westphal.asp (the Treaty of Westphalia originally was signed in 1648 to stop the religious
wars of the seventeenth century by securing a domestic jurisdiction and a defined geographic boundary
for emerging nations, thus offering protection for nation States); O’Rourke, supra note 12, at 236; Aloun
A. Preece, The Rise and Fall of National Sovereignty, 8 INT’L TRADE AND BUSINESS L. REV. 229
(2003),http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/IntTBLawRw/2003/9.html.
17.

See O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 9, 11.

18.

See generally O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 2.

19.
See Understanding the WTO Basics, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (the basis of a “common law of
humanity” emerged after the end of the Cold War in the 1980s followed the emergence of independent
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The idea that how sovereign States conduct themselves is a dynamic
phenomenon in constant flux requires a parallel consideration that there will
be another set of transitions required in this century as the defined role,
legitimacy, responsibility and operational function of a sovereign State
continues to change. The changing global realities of the last forty years
point to the evolution of a continuum of State sovereignty for this century,
one that coordinates cooperation both in addressing the legitimacy of its
citizen’s concerns and in designing a new global market paradigm.
As nation States entered the early twenty-first century, two
predominant debates ensued. The first debate included a cadre of global
politicians and world order scholars arguing that the dominance of
international organizations and their scope of authority meant the nation
State was “dead.” World governance would soon become inevitable in a
cosmopolitan sense of global political and legal evolution.20 Traditional
notions about State sovereignty would simply merge into a world
governance model. Others suggested that State was not dead but would
remain a viable architect of world order well into the twenty-first century.21
The second debate presented new typologies for State sovereignty
suggesting an evolution in the expression of State sovereignty was
emerging.
This second debate relied on State collaboration and
interdependence that would require a more interactive and relational
definition of how States expressed their sovereignty. New functional

States in Eastern Europe who were active in the United Nations and demanded equity and fair access
into the global marketplace and international finance as well. The World Trade Organization was
created in 1995 as an evolution of the multilateral General Agreement on Tariff and Trade of 1948.
These global trading contractual agreements between States coupled with many regional trade
agreements in the late twentieth century continued to erode the Westphalian notion of an absolute form
and unilateral expression of State sovereignty. However, while cooperative behavior increased between
sovereign States and seemingly eroded the authoritarian and more traditional Westphalian model of
sovereignty, the endorsement of equality among sovereign States is also foundational to the United
Nations Charter and other global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
and the World Trade Organization); see O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 82, 237.
20.
See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (Harvard University Press, 2000); see
also Peter Hay, Supranational Organizations and United States Contract Law, 6 VA. J. INT’L L. 195
(1996); Patrick Tangrey, The New Internationalism: The Cessation of Sovereign Competency to Supernational Organizations and Constitution Changes in U.S. and Germany, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 395 (1996);
HAROLD JONES, INT’L MONETARY COOPERATION SINCE BRETTON WOODS (2000) (explaining how IMF
as one international organization has loan terms requiring a country engage in trade liberalization under
neoliberal paradigm as well as in various domestic budget and credit restraints); JEREMY RABKIN, LAW
WITHOUT NATIONS?: WHY CONS. GOV’T REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (Princeton University Press,
2005).
21.

See O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 343, 410–11.
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typologies for the State could no longer simply be based on a traditional
Westphalian authoritarian exercise of unilateral power.22
In the last decades of the twentieth century, numerous
recommendations for a new sovereign State typology were presented. Jack
Donnelly proposed a new typology (a four sectioned rectangular box) that
balanced State authority and State capabilities with sovereign rule and the
State’s scope of domination as it intersected effective components of formal
sovereignty and material/normative weaknesses.23 Francis Deng and Helen
Stacey suggested two different typology arrangements for sovereignty as
responsibility24 and relational sovereignty.25 Deng’s typology analyzed a
range of both internal and external State factors and then, correlated these
factors with a new international standard of responsible sovereignty as an
irreversible process.26 Helen Stacey suggested that a new typology of
relational sovereignty was emerging where the sovereign would be judged
by how well and by what means the State concretely and continuously
“cares” for its people.27 A fourth typology by Julian Ku and John Yoo
discussed a popular sovereignty based on the idea that people in a sovereign
State govern themselves through Constitutional structures and institutions.28
22.
GIANLUIGI PALOMBELLA & N. WALKER, RELOCATING THE RULE OF L. (Hart, 2009); see
Rebecca Bratspies, Perspectives on the New Regulatory Era, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 575 (2009); see also Eric
Engles, Transformation of the International Legal Order, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23 (2007); James
Rosenau, Three Steps Toward a Viable Theory for Globalization, in FRONTIERS OF GLOBALIZATION
RESEARCH: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES 307–15 (Inno Rossi ed., 2007); Elke
Krahmann, National Regional and Global Governance: One Phenomenon or Many?, 9 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 323 (2003), https://stackofideas.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/national-regional-andglobal-governance-one-phenomenon-or-many-elke-krahmann.pdf; Brad Roth, The Enduring
Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1017 (2004); Paul Kahn, The Question of
Sovereignty, 40 STAN J. INT’L L. 259, 260–68 (2004); PAUL KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE
(Princeton University Press 2005); Clair A. Cutler, Critical Reflctions on the Westphalian Assumptions
of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT’L STUD. 133 (2001);
MICHAEL FOWLER & JULIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER AND THE SOVEREIGN (Routledge 1995) (for historical
notions of sovereignty); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: PARTS ONE AND TWO (Bobbs Merill Co., 18th
ed. 1958); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Penguin Books, 1st ed. 1968); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOV’T (Prentice-Hall, 1st ed. 1953).
23.
Jack Donnelly, State Sovereignty and Human Rights 3–4 (June 2004) (forthcoming paper
prepared for working papers).
24.

Francis Deng, Frontiers of Sovereignty, 8 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 249 (1995).

25.

Helen Stacey, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STANFORD L. REV. 210 (2009).

26.

Deng, supra note 24, at 250–77.

27.

Stacey, supra note 25, at 218–22.

28.
Julian Ku & John Yoo, Globalization and Sovereignty, 31 Bᴇʀᴋᴇʟᴇʏ J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 210, 211
(2013) (noting that sovereignty is in decline but the decline in national sovereignty is not desirable since
State maintains decision-making and individual liberties. Suggesting a new form of popular sovereignty
with shift away from Westphalian models to the right for people to govern themselves through

12

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 23:1

In this construct, the State can legitimately share sovereign power with its
citizens without compromising the whole system.29
The typology presented in this article builds on concepts noted above
and points to yet another evolution in how sovereign States function in this
century. It is an interactive typology called a continuum for sovereignty,
one that is based on a framework of liberty and ensures the State remains
the primary architect of world order.30 The GeoNOMOS© operates
interactively on two levels as a State secures its legitimacy within a
geographic boundary for the very people it is trying to govern and then,
shapes the global market partnerships that it intentionally seeks to
undertake. (See diagram below). This typology offers sovereign stability,
operational flexibility and addresses the two primary functional components
of any twenty-first century State, including the U.K.: (i) one component
redefines how the sovereign State functions to create and sustain a civil
society within its own domestic sphere (vertical axis) by addressing the
specific needs of its populations who will live and work most of their lives
within the geographic boundary of that State, and (ii) one component that
seeks to redefine how the sovereign State functions and engages within its
own international sphere (horizontal axis) by engaging with the public and
private sector global marketplace and foreign investment sector, public
sector international institutions, and an international community of States.31
institutions of the Constitution and its structures. Popular sovereignty is flexible to maintain national
sovereignty and assumes State can share sovereign power without giving up entire system; popular
sovereignty can co-exist with globalization and governance issues in ways that the rigidity of
Westphalian system could not. State turning automatically to international organizations inconsistent
with reliance and continued power of nation States; by referring to structural provisions of Constitution,
e.g, separation of powers, promotes state level democratic governance and incorporates the gains of
international cooperation).
29.

Id. at 218.

30.
O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 212 (noting a continuum is referenced as the basis of this new
typology for sovereignty because it represents a more flexible set of options given the range of
possibilities in terms of how an individual State interacts with some sense of legitimacy on behalf of the
people it is governing and interacts as a member of the international community of States; there is no
limit to the possibilities offered as part of this proposal for a continuum of State sovereignty so long as it
operates within a framework of liberty. See diagram and discussion detailed in this commentary. See
definition of continuum at http://merriam-webster.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2016)).
31.
Id. at 15 (stating without a doubt, the rapid and uncontrolled movement of private sector
global capital and public sector capital and domestic finances in and out a State’s legal boundaries also
bear witness to these relational components of State sovereignty within the international sphere of the
equation. The same flexibility of global movement never seemed to occur on the side of development or
utilization of social and human capital. While economic capital was and remains highly mobile and
unregulated, most human labor (human capital) is bound by State geographic boundaries and people’s
life circumstances and citizenship rights are dictated by those State boundaries. This is the domestic rebalancing that appears to be in demand as a result of Brexit vote in the U.K. and that is espoused by
Theresa May’s ideal of “one Nation conservative.” There is an imbalance expressed and experienced by
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Often the functional role and legitimacy of State sovereignty lies
dormant until a conflict like Brexit emerges. Then the sovereign powers as
well as State legitimacy or State authority arise, are challenged, and need to
be redefined. As with the Brexit vote, these demands are now made not
upon a set of elected individuals but upon the U.K. in toto and acting as a
sovereign nation State. This legitimacy crisis cannot be ignored. In fact,
given the charged atmosphere around the Brexit vote, there appears to be a
growing sense of citizen entitlement just as the U.K. strives to determine the
proper balance of sovereign accountability for building a different kind of
civil society that May defines as “one Nation conservative” apart from the
European Union. An expanded level of U.K. legitimacy will need to secure
a new set of global market organizing principles that move beyond the
neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–2010) notion of “trickle-down” global
economics.
The typology for a continuum of State sovereignty presented here
contributes to support this ongoing conversation concerning the post-Brexit
dialogue and the U.K. secession process by suggesting the premise that the
U.K. as a nation State must remain a primary architect in shaping not only
its own civil society but also in modeling a new world order for this
century. A civil society inspired by Prime Minister May will be more
economically inclusive, one hopefully based on a new paradigm for global
capitalism that does not leave large groups of U.K. citizens out of its
intended benefits; one that supports a sense of equity in sharing tax burdens
from all sectors within the State; and one that provides opportunity, access
to education and advancement in jobs for all.32
Rodrik argues that the blind spot of the capitalist globalization process
in the neoliberal era (c.1980–2010) consisted of deep and rapid integration
the U.K. citizenry active in the Brexit campaign that the benefits of economic capital development have
not trickled down to the social settings and human capital development in places where most U.K.
citizens live every day).
32.
Id. at 74–75 (this neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–2010) of global capitalism routinely
required tremendous State reductions in domestic program development, public services, and public
sector program funding as a calculated cost for continued access to global market development, foreign
direct investment programs, and participation in world financial institutions that provide necessary
access to public and private economic capital. Ms. May will be in a unique position to soften some of
the past structural damage done domestically in the U.K. by this neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–2010) and
has a citizen mandate to do so now as evidenced by the Brexit vote—by her own statements, May
appears willing to address damages that have accumulated over time from the neoliberal economic
paradigm of the 1980s, the benefits from which apparently have not “trickled down” to regular U.K
citizens who in Brexit challenged State legitimacy and demanded broader State commitments to
domestic concerns, programs, and citizen quality of life issues. The balance that needs to be struck
between U.K.’s domestic program design and U.K.’s international obligations and global market
participation is daunting but possible to address if the underlying basis of U.K. sovereignty can be reconfigured prior to the completion of Article 50 negotiations on a transition agreement).
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in the world economy coupled with the idea that the required institutional
underpinnings could catch up later at the domestic level of the State.33
With respect to how (in what manner) the U.K. might develop and utilize
its considerable economic capital which is part of the proposed continuum
of State sovereignty, Rodrik supports a basic principle that markets always
require other social institutions (domestic level) to support legal
arrangements and global market stabilizing functions so there can be fair
redistribution, taxation, safety nets, and social insurance.34 As the U.K.
adjusts its legal arrangements and market functions in the post-Brexit
period, careful review of several basic principles could be beneficial in
several ways.
First, the singular neoliberal focus of the past era that relied on global
market development to support concentrated economic growth and/or to
secure private sector foreign direct investment inside the State should raise
caution in the U.K. as well given the widespread documentation of the
uneven implementation and results of the neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–
2010) within the capitalist globalization process.35 This issue is evidenced
in the general dissatisfaction with notions of “trickle down” benefits to
U.K. citizens that have not predictably or consistently occurred and is
certainly one of the problems underlying the Brexit vote.
Second, Rodrik concludes a State has the right to protect its own
institutions, social arrangements, and regulations so that globalization
becomes an instrument for achieving the goals that a society seeks:
prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life.36 It has been the uneven
33.
Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 231–42, 245 (discussing a dominant role for the nation State in
relation to the principles of democratic decision-making which is the foundation for the international
economic architecture; noting that when States are not democratic this scaffolding collapses and one
cannot presume a country’s institutional arrangements reflect the preference of its citizens); see
generally Mɪʟɢᴀᴛᴇ, supra note 5.
34.
Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 240 (setting out a series of statements in support of a State’s right
to protect their own social arrangements, regulations and institutions; and suggesting that trade is a
means to an end, not an end in itself so that globalization should be an instrument for achieving the
goals that a society seeks: prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life).
35.
O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 1 (The legitimacy of the neoliberal paradigm (c.1980-2010)
for the globalization process has increasingly been challenged as the 2008 global recession continues
and as global financial institutions are still forced to wrestle with the regulatory boundaries of a global
market, the growing/ongoing financial and political instability of State governments (Greece, Italy,
Spain, Egypt, Ireland, Portugal and more), equity issues in the global political economy, and the
growing demands to create a more humane paradigm for capitalist globalization.).
36.
Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 241 (setting out a series of statements in support of a State’s right
to protect their own social arrangements, regulations and institutions; and suggesting that trade is a
means to an end, not an end in itself so that globalization should be an instrument for achieving the
goals that a society seeks: prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life); O’Rourke, supra note 11, at
279 (noting that when States are not democratic this scaffolding collapses and one cannot presume a
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application of the neoliberal paradigm (c. 1980–2010) that has tragically
limited State sovereignty in a variety of contexts as reflected in the U.K.
Brexit vote, and now will require a re-balancing process in terms of global
trade as a means to an end and not an end in and of itself.37 This rebalancing process within the U.K. points directly to a debate on its domestic
social arrangements and its use of globalization as a blunt tool to achieve
prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life. A structured but more
transparent internal U.K. functional review could witness a major nation
State prioritizing a new definition and role for State sovereignty in the
twenty-first century—a continuum for sovereignty operating within a
framework of liberty.
Third, the proposed GeoNOMOS© typology designs a single core
function for the State both in relationship: a) to its citizens (vertical axis)
from whom it seeks legitimacy in order to govern, and, b) to its engagement
in the global marketplace (horizontal axis) from an intentionally crafted
long term strategic and sustainability perspective. Applying the new
typology proposed here suggests that the U.K. would be better positioned to
develop a flexible Article 50 transition strategy and a new set of economic
organizing principles that consistently balance all the three capital resources
(economic, social and human capital) needed for the sustainability of the
State’s institutions, social arrangements, and State regulations.38
From the opening statements of Theresa May, it appears there will be
significant future emphasis on “one nation for all” and not just the rich and

country’s institutional arrangements reflect the preference of its citizens; concluding that nondemocratic States must play by a different, less permissive set of rules in the global marketplace).
37.
Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 241; see generally JOHN GRAY, FALSE Dᴀᴡɴ: THE DELUSIONS
CAPITALISM (1998) (providing a detailed step-by-step review and analysis from the State’s
perspective outlining how a neoliberal set of global economic organizing principles functioned to
destroy domestic level public sector budgets by transferring assets wholesale to the private sector as a
pre-condition for market access, locked out democratic legislative oversight through private sector
contracts, and more. These dramatic restructuring to align neoliberal constructs shifted priorities for
short term economic wealth not long term legal arrangements and market regulations that would support
nation States goals of fair distributions, taxation, safety nets and social insurance. In other words,
globalization was not a means to an end as Rodrik has suggested it should be, it was the end game—rule
of law chased after globalization instead of the other way around—A new emphasis re-balancing
process could design State level rule of law legal arrangements first, and out of that process, then
position the State to design a new set of economic organizing principles).
OF

38.
Holton, supra note 12; Adler, supra note 13, at 17–40; BOURDIEAU, supra note 13;
HANIFAN, supra note 13, at 138; JACOBS, supra note 13, at 138; Coleman, supra note 13, at S95–S120;
Wellman, supra note 13, at 558–88; Bowles, supra note 13, at 419–36; Spence, supra note 14, at 355–
74, 434–59 (forms of Capital, in this commentary for references and very brief definitions of three
forms of capital noted in this new typology; this commentary suggests that every State has these three
forms of capital and the differences in how States define their function is directly related to the amount
of each form of capital that the State manages and oversees as a sovereignty entity).
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powerful.39 There will be public and private resources and opportunity to
redefine how the State relates to its citizens in more concrete and practical
ways.40 It is the hypothesis of this article that all this, when and if it occurs,
can only occur and be successful within that which the GeoNOMOS© seeks
to describe below more fully and to define schematically. Embracing a
continuum of sovereignty based on a framework of liberty while working to
secure a single core function as the diagram outlines prior to completing
Article 50 negotiations, would provide the U.K. with the flexibility to
manage its political and economic risks within both its domestic sphere and
international sphere where the U.K. must continue to operate in this
century. This typology could embrace both the best of U.K. history and the
challenges of a workable EU exit strategy.41
39.
Theresa May’s Tory leadership launch statement: full text, INDEPENDENT (June 30,
2016),
http://www.independent.co.U.K./news/U.K./politics/theresa-mays-tory-leadership-launchstatement-full-text-a7111026.html.
40.
Id.; see generally O’Rourke, supra note 11 (in the tradition of political thought
sovereignty is conceived as a social contract. In democratic states both parties, the state on the one side
and its citizens on the other, are bound to this bargain. In return for giving up power to the State, as
citizens, we are conferred rights, which prevent States from abusing this power that we have given them.
This social contract, then, involves two parties—people the State seeks to govern and the State).
41.
See generally ANATOLE KALETSKY, CAPITALISM 4.0: THE BIRTH OF A NEW ECON. IN THE
AFTERMATH OF CRISIS (Public Affairs, 2010) (an extensive literature review has informed the
development of the proposed continuum of State sovereignty including the State’s single core functions
as outlined and its direct partnership with its people as part of the radical transformation of the twentyfirst century State. This cumulative literature search to support the creation of a continuum for State
sovereignty includes but is not limited to the following work); see Steven Menashi, Ethno-nationalism
and Liberal Democracy, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 57 (2012); GIANLUIGI PALOMBELLA & NEIL WALKER,
RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW (Oxford Hart Publishing, 2009); Timothy William Waters, The
Momentous Gravity of the State of Things Now Obtaining: Annoying Westphalian Objections to the
Idea of Global Governance, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 25 (2009); Peer Zumbansen, Law After the
Welfare State Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of Relexive Law 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 796
(2008); IVAN MANOKHA, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT (Palgrave
2008); James Rosenau, Three Steps Toward a Viable Theory for Globalization, in FRONTIERS OF
GLOBALIZATION RESEARCH: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES (Inno Rossi ed.,
2007); SASKIA SASSEN, A SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION (W.W. NORTON, 2007); Eric Engles, The
Transformation of the International Legal Order, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23 (2007); John Alan Coahan,
Sovereignty in a Postmodern World, 218 FLA. J. INT’L L., 907–08, 913 (2006); Tanja A. Borzel &
Thomas Risse, Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of International
Governance, in EDGAR GRANDE & LOUIS W. PAULY, COMPLEX SOVEREIGNTY: RECONSTITUTING
POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (University of Toronto, 2005); Paul Kahn, The
Question of Sovereignty, 40 STANFORD J. INT’L L. 259, 260–68 (2004); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton University Press, 2004); Brad R. Roth, The Enduring Significance of
State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1017 (2004); Eric A. Engle, The Transformation of the International
Legal System: The Post-Westphalian World Order, 23 W. L. R. 23 (2004); Krahmann, supra note 19, at
323; see Richard Falk, Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia, 6 J. ETHICS 311, 320–45
(2002); A. Clair Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and
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III. A CONTINUUM OF SOVEREIGNTY BASED ON LIBERTY
The GeoNOMOS© represents a graphic schematic depicting the next
evolution for State sovereignty because it differentiates three important
principles. One, it posits conceptually that for all human activity, enterprise
and undertakings at the level of the State, liberty represents the outer
boundary (dotted line box) of any and all such endeavors.42 Beyond this
framework of liberty nothing can, nor does exist, and all activity with the
State falls within the four corners of this frame defined by liberty as the
State’s outer boundary. Two, the GeoNOMOS© distinguishes, in contrast
to other models which seek to develop an economic/legal model, or some
other models for nation States from times long past, that the nation State
and the nation State alone can function as a legal guarantor. It alone can
vouchsafe liberty both toward the individual and also toward other nation
States and supranational organizations who operate with semigovernmental character. The nation State alone can hold supranational
organizations accountable to some form of law and legal process. It is the
nation State alone that can protect individual human rights against the
onslaught of global commerce and the overreach of global international and
inter-governmental networks. It is the nation State alone that can exercise
jurisdiction legitimately. Three, the GeoNOMOS© remains dynamic and
ever evolving through the intense interaction of three forms of capital (e.g.,
social capital, human capital and economic capital) as the single core
function and purpose of the nation State. It is the State consistently
functioning at the center of these three forms of capital that will secure a
balance between these three essential resources to the benefit of the
individual (those persons the State seeks to govern) as it stabilizes its
domestic function (vertical axis) and its international function (horizontal
axis). All of this activity occurs and is grounded within the framework of
liberty.43
Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT’L LAW STUD. 133 (2001); STEPHEN KRASNER,
COMPROMISING WESTPHALIA IN D. HELD & A MCGREW, THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER
(Polity Press, 2000); Eric M. Ulsner, Producing and Consuming Trust, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 569 (2000);
MICHAEL FOWLER & J.M. BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN (Routledge, 1995); LESTER
THUROW, THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM (Brealey Pub, 1996); James S. Coleman, Social Capital and the
Creation of Human Capital, AM. J. SOC. S. 95 (1988); Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 42 AM. J.
INT’L L. 20 (1948); JEAN BODIN, THE SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (1932).
42.
O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 312 (to be distinguished as “freedom from” factors like
oppression, slavery, prejudice and racism, and from “Liberty” as the quintessential element which
enables where freedom does not).
43.
Id. at 107 (in this typology, a failed nation-State can be described as a nation-station where
the boundaries of the three forms of capital have become disconnected, i.e., the nation-state has been
forced into one or the other circle, but cannot be in all three circles. More importantly, such a State has
become unable to keep and preserve the necessary areas of overlap between these three forms of capital.
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Liberty is that quintessential element necessary in human existence
which is the fertile ground to allow the most productive, creative and
mutually beneficial human endeavors and interactions to flourish and to
bring benefits to all, and the absence of which tends to dampen the
manifold expressions of all those truths people collectively hold to be selfevident. It is grounded in the rule of law, to be distinguished from
freedom,44 and requires a steadfast juxtaposition and weighing of individual
and communal rights, benefits, obligations and privileges without which no
human civil society can function. In the GeoNOMOS©, the existence of
liberty further forms a steel-belt of support and reassurance to all of human
community and its guarantor can only be the nation State, for both
individuals and supra-national entities (international institutions and
transnational corporations) lack the necessary legitimacy to guarantee
liberty’s existence.
There is no doubt that liberty in this framework will be a highly
contested topic and hotly debated not unlike rule of law is, and it should be
so both nationally, regionally and transnationally.45 T.H. Green defines
liberty as the capacity to do things, not the mere absence of restraint and,
thus, liberty actively includes a moral value and certain social elements that
are enjoyed in common with others.46 While there is no agreement even
among the many schools of republican legal thought, liberty here is defined
primarily as non-domination by the State, and includes human rights, civic
virtue and the creation of a common good.47 These basic characteristics of
a liberal republican theory are incorporated within the GeoNOMOS© as part
of the participatory government, supported by an interventionist State
whose single core function continuously reflects and balances the
development and utilization of all its essential capital resources. This
participatory function at the core of the State includes a rule of law that
reflects the principles of mutual benefit, liberty and human dignity.

An exemplification of a more successful nation State would be reflected by a highly dynamic and ever
evolving tri-circular area where the State exists at the core of these three overlap areas which it times
grow and at times shrink, but always remain connected throughout the passage of time based on other
socio-political and legal developments).
44.
Id. at 312 (to be distinguished as “freedom from” factors like oppression, slavery,
prejudice and racism, and from “Liberty” as the quintessential element which enables where freedom
does not).
45.

Id. at 365.

46.

DAVID MILLER ET AL, THE LIBERTY READER, 23 (2006).

47.
SAMANTHA BESSON & JOSE LUIS MARTI, LEGAL REPUBLICANISM, NATINAL & INT’L
PERSPECTIVES 3 (2009); NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW, AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY
(Oxford 2007); DAVID MILLER ET AL, THE LIBERTY READER, 224–25 (2006); ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO
CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, 121–22 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2002).
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The proposed continuum of sovereignty reflects a social and highly
interactional process based in part on the Law Merchant in a society of
economic traders, and espouses that the ‘rule of law’ will have meaning
only from within the social context reflected by the interaction of
institutions, procedures, and values depicted at the core of the
GeoNOMOS© where the single core function of the State is secured and
secure.48 The social context of a liberty framework is intentionally created
to protect the continuum of sovereignty since there can be no State
legitimacy and no State-related activity conducted outside the framework of
liberty.
The manifestations or functioning of liberty are influenced by four
cornerstones: choice, capability and resource development, justice, and
equity, and by the constant and continuing interaction of three forms of
capital: economic, social, and human capital. These forms of capital are
found to exist in every form of human society, or human association, albeit
to differing degrees and at different levels of development, but can be
discerned and even measured to be present and functioning in a state of
association and in a state of flux.
From within this global framework of liberty and moving along this
continuum of State sovereignty, each State secures its single core function
(sovereign capacity) to manage a wide range of possibilities because all
domestic and international actors must also function within the State’s
framework of liberty.49 The framework of liberty is anchored by four
corners, two on the lower end of the diagram depicting equity and justice
and two on the upper end of the diagram depicting elements that support the
principle of human dignity—individual autonomy/choice and individual
capability/resource development (see diagram). It depicts an actual
relationship that can be measured along the continuum between the State
and the people it seeks to govern. This exists because quantitative
measurable outcomes for the qualitative work the State undertakes at its
single core function designs a more accountable and transparent expression
of its State sovereignty.
The continuum for sovereignty depicted systematically as the
GeoNOMOS© shows the U.K. at its single core function of the State
consistently balancing the essential three capital resources. The U.K.
already has possession of all these capital resources and it has the authority
and stability to engage with the integrated vision espoused by Prime
Minister May. The operational components of a continuum of sovereignty
align with the driving force behind the Brexit vote and point to a public

48.

See generally O’Rourke, supra note 11.

49.

Id. at 331.
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citizen mandate for the U.K. to secure “one Nation conservative” as
Theresa May has proposed.
The U.K. initiates this dynamic process with a thorough, hard-nosed,
and unvarnished review of all of its capital resources and the various stages
of development and utilization. It begins to secure an integrated single core
function for the State by subsequently combining with the principles of
liberty and human dignity to form a new typology which the GeoNOMOS©
represents. The continuum for sovereignty is designed to reflect more
accurately the nature, needed flexibility and new functionality for the U.K.
as it seeks to balance consistently its domestic role and its international role
within its Article 50 transition. The opportunity for the U.K. in modeling
this continuum of State sovereignty places emphasis on upholding the rule
of law so that economic and global market participation follow the law and
not the other way around where law chases after and reacts to economic
organizing principles.
The continuum for sovereignty proposed above also follows Rodrik’s
insight by suggesting that the State must simultaneously integrate and
balance all three forms of its essential capital resources as its single core
function as a matter of legitimacy.50 Functioning from within a framework
of liberty, the State operates along a vertical axis (representing U.K.’s
domestic function) and along a horizontal axis (representing U.K.s
international function) (see diagram). The U.K. is in a position to design
and implement a strategy for the post-neoliberalism era that supports its
domestic stability (vertical function) and its international market
participation (horizontal function).
In this manner, the U.K.’s single core function engages at the center of
three overlapping circles (three forms of capital) and the center of the
intersection of a vertical axis and a horizontal axis inside the GeoNOMOS©
Model.51 (See diagram attached). This single core function incorporates
three essential building blocks that belong to every nation State—economic
capital, social capital, and human capital—all of which must remain interconnected and continuously balanced in order for the State to maintain
legitimacy as sovereign as to its function.
A very brief explanation follows on these three essential building
blocks that form the State single core function. Economic capital can be
defined as the amount of risk capital assessed on a realistic basis which a
nation State requires in order to remain solvent over a period of time.
Economic capital can be calculated.52 It is an open question whether
rigorous risk analysis is or can be a necessary and required function of
50.

Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 242.

51.

Jᴜʟɪᴀɴ Kᴜ & Jᴏʜɴ Yᴏᴏ, supra note 28, at 210–11.

52 .

Id. at 278.
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government. Yet, it can be reasonably presumed that it is part and parcel of
any and all economic and commercial enterprise.52 Governments have no
business to function and act as commercial enterprises just as much as
business and commercial enterprises lack and perhaps should lack the
legitimacy and authority to act and function as a government (quasigovernment).
Social capital is understood as a stock of resources that an individual
can control by how they invest their time in community organizations,
educational institutions, religious organizations and neighborhood
networks.53 It represents a form of trust and reciprocity that is developed
within social networks in any given culture. Economic capital and human
capital are also forms of capital but they are generally more fungible in the
sense that these two forms of capital are linked to private goods. Social
capital which has an individual characteristic tends to aggregate and
represents a collective or public good as part of a civil society. Human
capital is a hybrid consisting of both quantitative and qualitative aspects.
Human capital in this schematic focuses first and foremost on the individual
and, then, on how that individual reaches maximum levels of
capabilities/resource development and individual autonomy in order to
contribute to society in ways that the individual actually can choose to
develop his or her human capital.
If a State disconnects the economic capital function from the core
function of the development and utilization of human capital or social
capital, the State essentially implodes; it fails.54 Likewise, if a State
concentrates only on human capital development without a balanced
program for economic capital development and utilization, it is out of
balance and more likely than not, will also fail. The key parameter here is
balancing the forms of capital within the framework of liberty because the
four corners of the liberty framework as described anchor the State in
perpetuity.

52.

See generally O’Rourke supra note 11.

53.
See generally Bratspies, supra note 22; RICHARD SANDBROOK ET AL., SOCIAL
DEMOCRACY IN THE GLOBAL PERIPHERY: ORIGINS, CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS (Cambridge University
Press 2006); PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION, WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT, 52–61(Oxford University Press 2007); James Q. Wilson, Bowling with
Others, Commentary Magazine (last visited Oct. 15, 2016), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/
articles/bowling-with-others/; Janos Berok, Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Sector, 64–70
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD] (2005); ERIC M.
USLANER, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST (Cambridge University Press 2002); Joel Sobel, Can
We Trust Social Capital, 15 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 139, 139–45 (2002); ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (Simon & Schuster 2000); PIERRE
BOURDIEU, THE FORMS OF CAPITAL, 47 (W.W. Norton, 1986).
54.

O’Rourke supra note 11, at 283.
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What might take place in conditions when all the three forms of capital
become disjointed and lose connection, instead of remaining interconnected
as the GeoNOMOS© model suggests that they are? In essence, we are
describing failure of a nation-State, although it is conceivable that, at times,
one form of capital may separate from the other two forms (even if
temporarily, and for a short or extended period of time).
When social capital dis-associates, the nation State ceases to function
as nation State, waste and attrition in every form tend to increase because of
a decrease in a common and shared consciousness for a collective or public
good. Such conditions tend to push human existence and with it the human
condition to the very fringes of human association (or, in this case,
disassociation) and all human activities whether driven by Individual
Choice, Capability and Resources, Justice, or Equity (all four corners which
are proposed as anchors for the framework of liberty) of the GeoNOMOS©
tend to be severely challenged and strained.
When economic capital disassociates, such disassociation usually
occurs at costs which can be quantified and measured, and the metrics
compared. Economic capital tends to be risk averse, but also riskdependent. When stress and strain bring about conditions of risk such that a
disassociation of economic capital occurs, we tend to speak of capital flight,
and because the entire global market place has evolved financially in a
global network also, money quietly can move at a blink of the eye and with
relative ease.55 The absence of money and economic capital tends to cause
markets to contract and the impact of heightened, unsustainable risk tends
to cause unrest, shortages and deprivation of every kind within a nation
State—such developments push the nation-State rather quickly to the brink
of complete, societal collapse beyond the framework designed to protect
liberty, choice, capability/resource development, justice, and equity.
Human capital is the realm where disassociation is perhaps felt the
most as the decline and absence of both quantitative and qualitative aspects
of this form of capital tend to cause humans to flee from strife, war, and
civil unrest to seek a chance at opportunity. It also affects citizens in States
who seek to re-define liberty and to re-establish a measure of functional
stability, to find job opportunities or new job skills through education, and
to re-build and sustain communities and social networks.
By definition, all three forms of capital as understood against the
backdrop of liberty are co-equal in value which can result in communal
activities from an aggregation of distinct individual pursuits. But without
community and social networks, the context for such activity fails and such
activity tends to become fragmented, opportunistic and focused inward at a
time when its focus ought to be outward, directed toward community and to
55.

See O’Rourke, supra note 11.
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giving shape to such community for the benefit of protecting individual
rights.
The intentional and consistent integration and balance between all
forms of capital is required so State level public sector institutional
development and utilization reflects strong economic capital but also
simultaneously addresses aspects of social capital such as trust, mutual
benefit and reciprocity. This integration creates the continuum for State
sovereignty. The integration at the single core function of the State
operates in tandem with human capital and with mandates for individual
choice as well as individual capability/resource development, e.g.,
employment, education, human rights, and opportunity.
All these
interrelated factors are functionally and politically tied to the four anchors
of the framework of liberty.56
As noted earlier in this text, the neoliberal paradigm (c. 1980–2010)
developed so rapidly that it left many domestic level institutions unable to
maintain their functioning much less adapt to the rapid and crushing
changes that occurred in the global marketplace and in their domestic
economy. The continuum for sovereignty secures the operational role of the
State and from within its single core function, all capital resources remain
interrelated and interactive as well. Ongoing decision-making processes
made from within the core function of the State reflect issues from within
the domestic and international spheres (intersecting axis) of State activity
but are also secured within the framework of liberty in support of a rule of
law that secures justice, equity, and the principles of human dignity
[individual choice as well as capability/resource development]—the very
principles that Prime Minister May espouses in the Brexit transition.
The four anchors on the framework of liberty reflect a standard of
conduct that together support the principles of human dignity, reciprocity,
and mutual benefit. (See diagram attached). Finally, since it is axiomatic
in this Model that nothing can exist outside the framework of liberty, the
U.K. is in a very unique position in history to redefine how actors from
private and public sectors intersect with its national interests. In this
continuum of sovereignty, all actors, whether domestic or international,
private or public, must function from within the framework of liberty, and
all State and non-State actors must function in accordance with the conduct
standards that support the framework of liberty.
IV. CONCLUSION
Now that Pandora’s Box has been opened, two dominant questions
have surfaced related to the post- Brexit aftermath:57 (i) What new form of
56.

Id.

57.

Id.

24

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 23:1

British sovereignty will be redefined, recreated, resurrected under its
negotiated Article 50 transition; and, (ii) What market form of economic
organizing principles for global capitalism will be advanced under the
banner of U.K.’s new form of sovereignty? In the U.K., where a nation
State seeks to address new levels of citizen frustration, public disapproval,
and civic engagement, the operational definitions from the 1940–1990s
regarding the legitimacy and the expression of national sovereignty are
outdated and perhaps no longer adequate for how the State must function in
the twenty-first century.
The complexity of U.K. inaugurating the actual secession process
through the invocation of Article 50 would hopefully reflect matters of best
practices and follow a structured period where a more transparent but
internal dialogue process, cost-benefit analysis, and necessary political
contestation had already occurred. The Brexit campaign itself cannot alone
fulfill this domestic-level dialogue process and planning obligation since it
was conducted mostly on the perceptions of people with a general
agnosticism of the facts. This interim transition period cannot merely be
about the shift in political parties at Downing Street either. It will need to
be a well-reasoned and detailed fleshing out of a political-legal and socioeconomic vision, one that is mapped out long before the secession
agreement package is negotiated by the U.K. and presented to the European
Council and European Parliament for approval.
If there is a positive light at the end of this tunnel for U.K. transition
under Article 50, it is the realization that the post-Brexit context is ripe for
the creation of a new twenty-first century continuum for State sovereignty.
The U.K. could choose not to fall back on the out-dated, but persistent
Westphalian notions of how a nation State “ought” to organize and operate
in the world today and step onto a continuum for State sovereignty based on
using all of its core capital resources to secure liberty. The U.K. could
intentionally move beyond the neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–2010) of global
capitalism by defining a more “humanizing” paradigm based on a new set
of economic organizing principles akin to those proposed by Rodrik and
others. In doing so, the U.K. steps forward as a world leader espousing a
framework of liberty that redefines and secures the single core function of
the nation State in the twenty-first century: to ensure participatory
democracy and individual rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“[T]he ‘relative power’ of criminal networks will continue to rise, and
some countries could even be taken over and run by these networks.”1 The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines “organized crime” as “any
group having some manner of formalized structure and whose primary
objective is to obtain money through illegal activities.”2 The FBI believes
that even if key individuals within these organizations are removed, “the
depth and financial strength of the[se] organization[s] often allow it to
continue.”3
When people think of organized crime, usually, they have an image of
Marlon Brando sitting in a dark room at a large desk portraying Vito
Corleone in the movie “The Godfather.”4 In “The Godfather”, Corleone is
a notorious mob boss who orders “hits” on people and the members of his
“family” participate in carrying out these hits as well as various other illegal
activities.5 Throughout the film, Corleone speaks at length about family,
friendship, business, and loyalty and shows the true influence the mafia has
on society and the stigma that is associated with mafia affiliations.6 One of
Corleone’s famous quotes illustrates this point: “[i]t’s true I have a lot of
friends in politics, but they wouldn’t be so friendly if they knew my
business was drugs instead of gambling which they consider a harmless
vice. But drugs, that’s a dirty business.”7 This image, although not far
from the truth, portrays a problem that society has faced since the
1.
KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RES. SERV., R40525, ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES: TRENDS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 15 (2010).
2.
Organized Crime, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/
organized-crime (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) [hereinafter FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION].
3.

Id.

4.
Biography for Don Vito, INT’L MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/character/
ch0000791/bio (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
5.
The Godfather Plot Summary, INT’L MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0068646/plotsummary?ref_=tt_stry_pl (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
6.

Id.

7.
The Godfather Quotes, ROTTEN
/godfather/quotes/ (last visited Oct 15, 2016).

TOMATOES,

https://www.rottentomatoes.com/m
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nineteenth century.8 Organized crime groups have both a local and global
presence through use of the Internet and other technology.9
When analyzing different countries around the world, it is important to
note that although the United States, Italy, Japan, and Ecuador have
similarly structured governments, the laws that are in place to combat
organized crime vary greatly. 10 Interestingly, only Italy, Japan, and
Ecuador have recently codified changes to their organized crime laws while
the United States has simply broadened the scope of existing laws. 11
Nevertheless, these laws have a major impact on the citizens that call each
country “home.”
A. The Roots of Organized Crime and the Mafia
1. Japan
The origins of the Mafia date as far back as 1612. 12 Surprisingly,
these roots are not from Italy but rather Japan.13 The Japanese Mafia, today
known as the “Yakuza”, trace its origin to the “Kabuki-mono.” 14 The
Kabuki-mono was a group of rogue samurai who would terrorize citizens
for fun.15 Although the Kabuki-mono was the first formalized organized
crime group in Japan, the Yakuza drew its direct ancestry from the Machi-

8.

Origins of the Mafia, HISTORY (2009), http://www.history.com/topics/origins-of-the-

9.

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 2.

mafia.
10.
See generally North America: United States, The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2016); See generally South America: Ecuador, The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ec.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016);
see generally Europe: Italy, The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/it.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016); See generally East &
Southeast Asia: Japan, The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
11.
See William L. Anderson & Candice E. Jackson, Law as a Weapon: How RICO Subverts
Liberty and the True Purpose of Law, THE INDEP. REV. (2004), http://www.independent.org/
publications/tir/article.asp?a=215.
12.
Adam Johnson, Yakuza: Past and Present, ORGANIZED CRIME REGISTRY (1998),
http://orgcrime.tripod.com/yakuzahistory.htm.
13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.

Id.
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yokko.16 The Machi-yokko, skilled gamblers and Japanese citizens, took up
arms to defend their villages against the Kabuki-mono.17
“Yakuza” is a blanket term used to describe “Japanese gangsters.”18
Within the Yakuza there are approximately 3,200 organized crime groups.19
Approximately 1,400 of those groups are affiliated with one of the three
main organized crime groups in Japan.20 Today’s Yakuza have undergone
periods of restoration, occupation, and modernization and are still the
predominant organized crime group in Japan.21
2. Italy
Until the mid-nineteenth century, numerous foreign invaders
controlled Sicily, a Region of Italy.22 After years of foreign rulers, Sicilians
joined together to form the “Mafioso” to protect themselves from another
foreign invasion. 23 During its original formation, there was no criminal
intent associated with being a member of the “Mafioso.”24 It was not until
the end of the nineteenth-century that the “mafie” [sic] emerged.25 This
“mafie” is synonymous with the criminal organization people are familiar
with today, the Sicilian Mafia.26
3. The United States
Stemming from these Italian roots, the American Mafia rose to power
in the 1920s due to Prohibition and mass immigration into the United States
from Italy.27 Small criminal organizations existed before Prohibition, but
the enforcement of Prohibition legislation “facilitated the consolidation of
16.

Id.

17.

Johnson, supra note 12.

18.
Ben Bullock, What is the Origin of Yakuza, SCI.LANG.JAPAN, http://www.sljfaq.org/
afaq/yakuza.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
19.
JAPAN SUBCULTURE RESEARCH CTR., http://www.japansubculture.com/resources/yakuzaorganisations/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
20.

Id.

21.

Johnson, supra note 12.

22.

Origins of the Mafia, supra note 8.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.
Organized Crime, UNITED
h1596.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).

STATES

HISTORY,

http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/
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the power of criminal organizations.” 28 With the rise of federal
enforcement of Prohibition laws, the American Mafia organized
bootlegging operations both nationally and internationally. 29 These
organizations were typically found in neighborhoods that were specifically
ethnically dense.30 This occurred because immigrant populations tended to
settle in neighborhoods with fellow immigrants from the same place since
they all spoke the same or similar language.31
4. Ecuador
Unlike Japan, Italy, and the United States, Ecuador’s plight with
organized crime is fairly new. 32 Due to political instability and porous
borders, Ecuador has become vulnerable to the influence of organized
crime networks primarily from Peru and Colombia. 33 This influence
impacts Ecuador’s economy nationally as well as globally due to the import
and export of drugs.34
B. Relevance of Organized Crime Today
The topic of organized crime laws is particularly important because
the FBI reports that the global economic impact of organized crime’s
influence in all sectors of the economy is around one trillion dollars
annually.35 In 2009 alone, it was estimated that organized crime generated
$870 billion in profits.36 In order to make money, the mafia participates in
various illegal activities.37

28.
Organized Crime—History, LAW LIBR. AM. L. & LEGAL INFO., http://law.jrank.org/
pages/1624/Organized-Crime-History.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
29.

Organized Crime, supra note 27.

30.

Organized Crime—History, supra note 28.

31.

Id.

32.
Cristina Chuquimarca Mosquera & Bertha García Gallegos, Ecuador, INT’L INST. FOR
DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, ILLICIT NETWORKS AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 161
(2014).
33.

Id.

34.
Id.; U. N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, Transnational Organized Crime: The Globalized
Illegal Economy, UNODC, https://www.unodc.org/toc/en/crimes/organized-crime.html (last visited Oct.
15, 2016) [hereinafter UNODC].
35.

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 2.

36.

UNODC, supra note 34.

37.

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 2.
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Organized crime rings manipulate and monopolize financial
markets, traditional institutions like labor unions, and legitimate
industries like construction and trash hauling. They bring drugs
into our cities and raise the level of violence in our communities
by buying off corrupt officials and using graft, extortion,
intimidation, and murder to maintain their operations. Their
underground businessesincluding prostitution and human
traffickingsow misery nationally and globally.38

Contrary to media depictions and stigma associated with mafia
participation, it can be argued that if used correctly, the mafia could work in
conjunction with the government to shut down underground terrorist cells.39
Organized crime groups are seemingly the right individuals to defeat
terrorist groups because they show no reverence for laws and can
financially afford to hire well-trained soldiers.40 These groups can do what
the government cannot because “[d]emocracies are trammeled by too many
laws and rules safeguarding individual rights.”41
The idea of using the mafia to aid governmental forces is not far
fetched. There have been instances, both past and present, of the United
States Government using the Italian-American Mafia for assistance in
combating foreign and domestic terror.42 For example, during World War
II, the United States government worked with Charles “Lucky” Luciano, an
infamous Italian-born American mobster based in New York who is
credited for engineering the structure of modern organized crime in the
United States. 43 During his incarceration for extortion and prostitution,
Luciano offered to help in the war effort by using his criminal connections
in Italy to advance the Allies’ cause.44
The head of the Counter Intelligence Section, Captain Wallace S.
Wharton, asked for members of the New York mafia with ties to Italy so
the government could use formal connections that mafia members
established in Italy to ensure that the United States military would not be
38.

Id.

39.
Ross Hinds, The One-Eyed Mafia Boss who could Help Defeat ISIS, GRINBERG NEWS,
(Nov. 2015), http://www.grinbergnews.com/the-one-eyed-mafia-boss-who-can-help-us-crush-islamicstate/.
40.

Id.

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.
Lucky Luciano Biography, BIO. http://www.biography.com/people/lucky-luciano9388350#criminal-exploits (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
44.

Id.
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met with violence.45 Luciano suggested that the government send him to
Sicily to speak with the natives in the event that the Allies decided to
invade Sicily.46 The goal with sending Luciano to Sicily was to win over
the support of the Sicilian natives so that instead of fighting the United
States, they would support U.S. war efforts.47
Not only did Luciano travel to Sicily to calm the natives, he also
helped the United States military leaders with developing the most effective
attack plan.48 By using Luciano’s plan, the United States casualty rate was
far lower than that of the British who did not follow Luciano’s attack
plan.49
Another example of cooperation between the United States
government and the mafia occurred when ISIS threatened New York City.
Giovanni Gambino, the son of John Gambino a prominent Mafia figure
from “La Cosa Nostra”, fired back by stating that the mafia was ready to
fight ISIS.50 Gambino stated, “the rise of global terrorism gives the Mafia a
chance to show its good side.”51 Gambino goes further to state that “[t]he
Mafia has a bad reputation, but much of that’s undeserved.” 52 Sources
within the mafia stated that they are “better-positioned to provide security
than federal agencies like the FBI and [the] Department of Homeland
Security.”53
The purpose of this article is to discuss the different laws in place in
the United States, Italy, Japan, and Ecuador to combat organized crime and
how organized crime impacts the national and global economy. This article
will be broken down and analyzed by country. It will first discuss the type
of government each county has in place. It will then discuss the specific
types of both legal and illegal activities that each country’s organized crime
group participates in. There will then be a discussion of the laws in place to
combat organized crime and how these laws have changed over time to
45.
Tim Newark, Lucky Luciano and WWII’s Operation Husky, ST. MARTIN’S PRESS (July 9,
2011), http://www.thehistoryreader.com/modern-history/lucky-luciano-wwiis-operation-husky/.
46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.

Id.

50.
Clark Mindock, NYC Islamic State Plot: Italian Mafia Warns ISIS to Stay Away from
New York, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/nyc-islamic-state-plot-italianmafia-warns-isis-stay-away-new-york-2196169.
51.
Joe Tacopino, Mobster’s son: Tell us Where ISIS is and fuhgeddaboutit, N.Y. POST (Nov.
23, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/11/23/the-mafia-is-prepared-to-protect-new-york-city-from-isis/.
52.

Mindock, supra note 50.

53.

Id.
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adapt to the growing number of people involved in organized crime. Often
times, the type of organized crime a country’s people participate in dictates
the laws that are in place. Then, there will be a discussion of the overall
impact that the laws are having on participation in organized crime. Due to
the underground nature of organized crime, determining the impact of a law
is often difficult to measure because the number of individuals actively
participating in organized crime is not publicized. There will then be a
brief discussion of the impact organized crime has on the global economy
and its implications on international business. Lastly, there will be a brief
conclusion and opinion about what steps countries should take to remedy
this issue.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT ORGANIZED CRIME LAWS
A. The United States
1. Government
The United States has a federal presidential republic form of
government with a President at the helm.54 The President is up for election
every four years and cannot hold office for more than two consecutive
terms. 55 The government is made up of three branches: the Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial.56 The Executive Branch is administered by the
President where (s)he enforces the laws that Congress makes. 57 The
Legislative Branch consists of members of Congress who make the laws.58
The Judicial Branch, headed by nine Supreme Court Justices, interprets the
laws according to the United States Constitution.59
2. Organized Crime Groups
Because the United States has become so diverse, there are different
organized crime groups from around the world carrying out illegal activities
there. 60 Each group participates in different types of organized crime. 61
54.
North America: United States, supra note 10; South America: Ecuador, supra note 10;
Europe: Italy, supra note 10; East & Southeast Asia: Japan, supra note 10.
55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.
HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/
teacher_lessons/3branches/1.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) [hereinafter TRUMAN LIBR.].
58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.

FINKLEA, supra note 1, at 15–16.
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The primary groups are: Eurasian/Russian, Asian, Italian, and Balkan.62
The less popular groups include Middle Eastern and African.63
Eurasian and Russian groups participate in extortion, abduction,
human smuggling, prostitution, drug trafficking, theft, money laundering
and various types of fraud.64
Asian groups participate in drug trafficking (heroin) and human
trafficking.65 They are also involved in: money laundering; counterfeiting;
fraud; kidnapping; automobile, software, and clothing theft.66
Italian groups primarily deal in gambling, loan sharking, drug
trafficking, and money laundering.67
The Balkans participate in gambling, extortion, robbery, counterfeiting
currency, drug trafficking, human smuggling, real estate fraud, money
laundering, witness intimidation, and murder.68
Although they are less prominent, the Middle Eastern and African
groups are still participants in organized crime in the United States.69 The
Middle Eastern group participates in organized theft, financial fraud, money
laundering, and cigarette smuggling.70
The African group, particularly people of Nigerian decent who
participate in organized crime, participate in heroin trafficking, money
laundering, and various types of fraud, including: insurance; bank; auto;
healthcare; identity; and document fraud.71
3. Law and its Changes
In 1978, the United States Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO statute.72

61.

See id. at 17–20.

62.

Id. at 16.

63.

Id. at 20.

64.

Id. at 17.

65.

FINKLEA, supra note 1, at 18.

66.

Id.

67.

Id. at 19.

68.

Id. at 19–20.

69.

Id. at 20.

70.

FINKLEA, supra note 1, at 20.

71.

Id.

72.
Racketeering/RICO, FINDLAW, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-charges/racketeeringrico.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
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RICO focuses on:
[P]rohibit[ing] conducting the affairs of any ‘enterprise’ (defined
broadly to include just about any form of human endeavor)
through ‘a pattern of racketeering activity’ (defined as two or
more criminal acts from an extremely broad list, that are related
to each other, that [persist] or threaten to persist over a period of
time).73

The RICO statute has a procedural effect rather than a deterrent effect
because the statute was not put into place to deter organized crime activity
but rather to assist prosecutors in charging individuals with RICO
violations.74 By defining the commission of a series of distinct crimes as a
single offense, RICO avoids “a variety of traditional, procedural,
evidentiary, and jurisdictional rules that tend to discourage prosecuting
separate offenses together.”75
An example of RICO’s procedural effect is how the statute “includes
as ‘predicate acts’ . . . such crimes as murder, robbery, bribery, and arson,
which normally are violations only of state law, thus permitting them to be
investigated and prosecuted by federal officials in federal court.” 76
Wording the statute this way also impacts organized crime groups that
operate in multiple states. 77 Normally, these offenses would have to be
prosecuted separately in the state that they occurred.78 However, because
the RICO statute defines these offenses as “‘part of a single pattern’ the
entire pattern can be prosecuted together as a single crime in any federal
district where one of the predicate acts occurred.”79
The penalties for violation of the RICO statute are fairly harsh. There
is both a fine and imprisonment if an individual is found guilty of a RICO
violation.80 The maximum punishment that a person can be sentenced for
on a single RICO charge is “imprisonment for twenty years (life if any of

73.
Gerard E. Lynch, Rico, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (2002), http://www.encyclopedia.com/
history/united-states-and-canada/us-history/rico#3403000224.
74.

Id.

75.

Id.

76.

Id.

77.

Id.

78.

Lynch, supra note 73.

79.

Id.

80.

Id.
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the predicate acts charged, such as murder, would permit such punishment),
and a fine of $250,000.00 or twice the proceeds of the offense.”81
In addition to a fine and imprisonment, there is also a punishment of
“forfeiture of property.”82 This means that there is a “mandatory penalty . .
. of not only any proceeds or property derived from the proceeds of the
crime but also of any interest the defendant holds in the enterprise or any
property of any kind that provides a source of influence over the
enterprise.” 83 The mandatory forfeiture has a significant impact on a
defendant’s case because RICO allows the government to get a restraining
order before trial begins to freeze the defendant’s assets that are subject to
the forfeiture.84
Title 18 Section 1963 of the United States Code Annotated states:
A temporary restraining order under this subsection [18 U.S.C.A.
§1963 (2)] may be entered upon application of the United States
without notice or opportunity for a hearing when an information
or indictment has not yet been filed with respect to the property,
if the United States demonstrates that there is probable cause to
believe that the property with respect to which the order is sought
would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under
this subsection and that provision of notice will jeopardize the
availability of the property for forfeiture. . . .85

Mandatory forfeiture causes issues for defendants because it could
hamper the defendant’s use of property to obtain adequate legal counsel.86
In a 2003 case, U.S. v. Saccoccia, Saccoccia’s criminal defense attorneys
were required to turn over the attorney’s fees Saccoccia paid them because
“the fees [were] property subject to forfeiture.”87 The district court granted
the United States’ motion to compel to retain the attorney’s fees and the
attorneys appealed.88
The Court of Appeals vacated the forfeiture award against the
attorneys and remanded the case because defendants must forfeit “tainted”
property defined as property that is “(i) acquired by committing the
81.

Id.

82.

Id.

83.

Lynch, supra note 73.

84.

Id.

85.

18 U.S.C. § 1963.

86.

Lynch, supra note 73.

87.

United States v. Saccoccia, 354 F.3d 9, 11 (2003).

88.

Id. at 9, 11.
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offense, and (ii) constituting, or derived from, any proceeds obtained,
directly or indirectly from its commission.” 89 “In the event that tainted
property is unavailable for forfeiture (as when it has been transferred to a
third party), the government may recover ‘substitute’ property.”90
Because the language of the statute is worded as such, it “does not
afford an avenue through which the government may reach a third party’s
untainted assets as a substitute for tainted assets which the third party has
already transferred prior to the date of forfeiture.” 91 The forfeiture,
however, “relates back” to the time that the property was obtained by the
violation and is not only recoverable from the defendant but also from
anyone else that the defendant gave that property to even if it was a bona
fide payment for legitimate goods or services.92
Unlike Italy, Japan and Ecuador, the United States is the only country
that has not codified any changes to the law since it was passed in the
1970s.93 The only aspect of the law that has changed, in practice, is the
statute’s expanded use to include not only organized crime participants but
also business owners.94 “For every John Gotti who is brought down by
RICO, many obscure business owners and managers are also successfully
prosecuted under this law.”95
Business owners can be charged with a RICO violation if the federal
government decides to target them and charge them under RICO. 96 This
expanded use began with former mayor of New York, Rudy Guiliani’s
prosecution of Michael Milken and other Wall Street figures in the 1980s.97
Because of this, today, federal prosecutors use RICO to win “easy
convictions and prison terms” for people who “run afoul of federal
regulations” during the ordinary course of business.98

89.

Id. at 12.

90.

Id.

91.

Id. at 13.

92.

Lynch, supra note 73.

93.

Anderson & Jackson, supra note 11.

94.

Id.

95.

Id.

96.

Id.

97.

Id.

98.

Anderson & Jackson, supra note 11.
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4. Impact of the Law
Critics of RICO argue that the statute has “little to no effect on
stopping or inhibiting crimes” but rather allows federal prosecutors to
“circumvent the constitutional separation of powers between the national
and the state governments.” 99 Some critics also call for RICO to be
repealed because it is not “serv[ing] as a shield for the innocent . . . [and] . .
. adds nothing of value in terms of new prohibitions of truly criminal
behavior, [but rather] . . . adds powerful weapons to the prosecutors’
arsenal.”100
A. Italy
1. Government
Italy’s government is a Democratic Republic that is headed by a
President who is independent from all three branches of the government.101
The President is elected every seven years by a college comprised of the
parliament and three representatives from each region of Italy. 102 The
President serves as a “focal point between the three branches of
government: he is elected by the lawmakers, he appoints the executive, and
is the President of the Judiciary.” 103 The President is responsible for
appointing a Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers. 104 The Prime
Minister and the Council of Ministers hold all executive power.105 Italy’s
Parliament is made up of two houses: the Senate of the Republic and the
Chamber of Deputies.106 These two houses perform identical functions due
to “full bicameralism.”107 The houses make the laws of the country and
establish the political guidelines that the Executive has to follow.108
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2. Organized Crime Groups

Italy has a number of crime families. 109 A study done in 2013 by
Università Cattolica and the Joint Research Centre [sic] on Transnational
Crime “estimated that mafia activities generate revenue of $33 billion,
mostly divided among Italy’s four major mafia gangs.”110 These families
participate primarily in sex exploitation; firearms trafficking; drug sales;
counterfeiting; gambling; usury (loansharking); and extortion. 111 The
Camorra, one of Italy’s wealthiest organized crime families, has been in
existence since the nineteenth-century.112 It is estimated that its revenue is
around $4.9 billion.113
The ‘Ndrangheta mafia is also one of Italy’s prominent organized
crime groups. 114 According to a study by the Demoskopika Research
Institute, in 2013, the ‘Ndrangheta made more than $48 billion through
drug trafficking and illegal garbage disposal.115 This is more money than
Deutsche Bank and McDonald’s combined and 3.5 percent of Italy’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP).116 The issue of organized crime is becoming so
severe in Italy that Pope Francis, the leader of the Catholic Church, called
on Italy’s mafia groups to “stop doing evil . . . [and] relinquish their bloodstained money . . ..”117
3. Law and its Changes
In response to recommendations from international organizations as well as
the high number of corruption scandals in recent years, Italy has devoted
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FORTUNE, (Sept. 14, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/09/14/biggest-organized-crime-groups-in-theworld/.
110.

Id.

111.

Id.

112.

Id.

113.

Id.

114. See Agnes France, ‘Ndrangheta Mafia ‘Made More Last Year than McDonald’s and
Deutsche Bank’, THE GUARDIAN, (Mar. 26, 2014, 3:21pm), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2014/mar/26/ndrangheta-mafia-mcdonalds-deutsche-bank-study.
115.

Id.

116.

Id.

117.

Id.

2016]

Strompf

41

significant efforts to deal with its rampant corruption issues.118 In 2014,
Italy codified Law No. 114 of 11 August 2014.119 This law
[i]ntroduced, in the context of contracts for certain listed services
particularly exposed to the risk of mafia infiltration . . . a general
duty for public administrations and public entities to obtain from
the service providers a declaration of non-involvement in
criminal proceedings for serious violations, including the crime
of mafia organization.120

In 2015, Italy again codified changes to its Criminal Code.121 On June
14, 2015, Italy enacted “Provisions on Crimes Against the Public
Administration, MafiaType Associations and False Accounting”
otherwise known as Law No. 69 of May 6, 2015.122 Italy’s major change
was to increase the scope of the statute that was already in place rather than
crafting an entirely new statute.123 The changes apply to “criminal conduct
against the state, organized crime activities, and false accounting
reporting.”124
This change increased the prison terms upon conviction for crimes
against the “public administration.” 125
These crimes include:
“embezzlement; corruption in the exercise of a public function; corruption
constituting an act contrary to official duty; corruption associated with
judicial acts; and undue inducement to give or promise a profit.”126 The
change also increased prison sentences for individuals found guilty of
participating in organized crime.127
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There was also a major change in the way courts grant parole.128 Now,
in order for a criminal defendant to qualify for parole, the criminal
defendant must: “deposit with the court an amount equivalent to the profit
generated by the crime or the amount unduly received by the public official
charged with the crime, without prejudice to the payment of further
compensation for damage caused to the public administration.”129
Additionally, the new law enforces a monetary fine against defendants
that is equivalent to the amount improperly obtained to the benefit of the
aggrieved public entity. 130 Lastly, the changed law increased prison
sentences for “organized crime activities carried out by three or more
persons when, among other situations, force or intimidation or weapons or
explosive materials are used.”131
4. Impact of the Law
It is too soon to determine if the changes in the law have impacted
Italy’s rate of participation in organized crime activities. According to the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD)
Economic Survey on Italy, “reducing corruption and improving trust must
remain a priority.” 132 It further reported that “Italy’s Prosecutors and
Judges are doing their best to prosecute bribery offenses, including those of
legal entities.”133 Because of this, it is believed that although there are still
obstacles facing Italy when dealing with organized crime, they can be
overcome.134
A. Japan
1. Government
Japan’s government is made up of three branches: the Cabinet
(executive), the Diet (legislative), and the Courts (judicial).135 The Prime
Minister is the head of the Japanese government and (s)he is appointed by
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the Emperor, who is the ceremonial head of state, through nomination by
the Diet. 136 The Diet is bicameral, consisting of the House of
Representatives and the House of Councillors [sic], which are responsible
for all legislative matters. 137 The Supreme Court of Japan consists of
fourteen judges that determine the constitutionality of laws.138 Most of the
money in organized crime comes from drug trafficking. 139 The second
most lucrative source comes from gambling and extortion. 140 Last, is
“dispute resolution.”141
2. Organized Crime Group
Japan’s “mafia” is known as the “Yakuza.” 142 In Japan, there are
twenty-one major Yakuza groups that comprise more than 53,000
members. 143 The three largest groups are: the “Yamaguchi-gumi”, the
“Inagawa-kai”, and the “Sumiyoshi-kai.” 144 These groups make their
money through both illegal activities as well as legitimate businesses. 145
The Yakuza groups claim that they are humanitarian groups because they
keep order in Japan.146 These groups are so well known and revered in
Japan that they have office buildings, business cards, fan magazines, and
comic books that detail their exploits.147
The Yakuza has control over Japan’s entertainment industry as well as
influence in construction, real estate, currency exchange, labor dispatch,
Internet technology, and financial industry. 148 They are also involved in
blackmailing company executives, politicians, and bureaucrats to maximize
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profits in their interest areas.149 “The United States Treasury Department
has labeled the Yamaguchi-gumi a transcontinental organized crime group
and even placed sanction on the second tier group that rules them” because
“[i]n order to conduct its criminal activities, the Yakuza has relationships
with criminal affiliates in Asia, Europe, and the Americas.”150
The Yakuza however, is not all bad. 151 Examples of the Yakuza’s
humanitarian side came after the 1995 Kobe earthquake and the 2011
Tohoku tsunami.152 After these natural disasters, the Yakuza were the first
to provide aid by using their “gang connections and efficiency to move
supplies to unaffected areas to the people in need of food, blankets, and
medicine.”153 They also opened up offices and facilities to people affected
and rented a helicopter for faster relief.154
3. Law and its Changes
Japan first enacted a law in 1991 to combat organized crime known as
the “Anti-Boryokudan Law.” 155 In Japanese, “Boryokudan” means
“violence groups.” 156 This law was put in place to regulate Yakuza
activity. 157 The Diet stated that in order for a group to be considered
“Boryokudan”, the group needed to meet three criteria. 158 The first is
“regardless of the group’s purpose, it must allow members to take
advantage of the gang’s influence in order to maintain their daily lives,
accumulate wealth or execute their business.”159 The second is “a certain
percentage of the gang members must have criminal records.”160 Lastly,

149.

Id.

150.

Id.

151. Justin Velgus, Yakuza: Kind-hearted Criminals or Monsters in Suits?, GAIJINPOT (Oct. 4,
2012),
https://injapan.gaijinpot.com/play/culture/2012/10/04/the-yakuza-kind-hearted-criminals-ormonsters-in-suits/.
152.

Id.

153.

Id.

154.

Id.

155. Edward F. Riley Jr., Criminalizing Yakuza Membership: A Comparative Study of the
Anti-Boryokudan Law, 13 GEO. WASH. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 801, 807 (2014).
156.

Id. at 808.

157.

Id. at 807.

158.

Id.

159.

Id.

160.

Riley, supra note 155 at 808.

2016]

Strompf

45

“the gang must be hierarchically organized under the control of an
individual representing the gang.”161
Even if all three of these criteria are met, the Commission that reviews
each group must hold a hearing so that members of the group, as well as a
“panel of witnesses” (lawyers), can make statements on the group’s behalf
before officially designating a group “Boryokudan.” 162 The initial
enactment of this law had minimal impact on the Yakuza or its
membership.163 In fact, it may have done more harm than good because
instead of the Yakuza operating in plain sight, this pushed the Yakuza
operations underground.164
In 2007, the Diet again made changes to the law.165 The 2007 changes
addressed “Yakuza rituals and the hierarchal nature of the Yakuza
organization.” 166 This change criminalized certain Yakuza recruitment
methods such as “finger-cutting” and “coerced tattooing” as well as
providing governmental support for individuals who were attempting to
leave the Yakuza.167 During this revision, the government did not revise
any of the penal provisions.168 The government believes that because of
this change in the law, Yakuza membership has decreased.169 It appears
however, that the Yakuza may have just made themselves less visible and
only reveal their Yakuza status when it is advantageous to do so.170
The most notable change occurred on July 26, 2012 when Japan
codified “Revisions of the Organized Crime Group Countermeasures
Law.”171 This revision allows police to designate organized crime groups
as “extremely dangerous” and then arrest any member of that group without
issuing a cease and desist order, if he (or she) makes unreasonable or illegal
demands towards an ordinary citizen.172 The changes in the law also allow
161.
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the Prefectural Centers under the Elimination of Organized Crime to start
legal procedures to forbid the Yakuza from using business offices if they
are deemed to be “extremely dangerous.”173
This change in the law comes as no surprise to the Japanese populous.
In addition to changes in the law, the Japanese Diet set up these
“Prefectural Centers” in order to “eliminate” the Yakuza.174 This reaction
was a direct result of a public outcry to rid Japan of the Yakuza after an
escalation of gang wars between various Yakuza factions.175
4. Impact of the Law
Although changes to the law were codified to make participation in
Yakuza more challenging, in 2015, the largest group of Yakuza, the
Yamaguchi-gumi, split into two main factions: the “Yamaguchi-gumi” and
the “Kobe Yamaguchi-gumi”.176 This split is incredibly dangerous because
it could create a gang war involving all twenty-one designated crime groups
in Japan. 177 The new faction has already set up alliances with other
organized crime groups.178 The last Yakuza split was in 1984 and caused
“several years of epic warfare marked with assassinations, attempted
bombings and gun battles . . . .”179
A. Ecuador
1. Government
Ecuador has a Representative Democracy system of government. 180
This government is comprised of three branches: Executive, Legislative,
and Judicial.181 The President serves as both the head of the state and head
of the government and is elected every four years.182 The Executive Branch
173.
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includes twenty-eight ministries.183 The Legislative Branch consists of the
national assembly and has the power to pass laws.184 The Judicial Branch is
Ecuador’s Supreme Court and is independent of the Executive and
Legislative Branches.185 The Supreme Court consists of the National Court
of Justice and the Constitutional Court of Judges. 186 There is an
autonomous electoral agency called the Tribunal Supremo Electoral. 187
Ecuador had a Congress until 2008 when President Rafael Correa dissolved
it. 188 Upon dissolving the Congress, Correa convened a “special
constitutional assembly” which wrote a new Ecuadorian Constitution.189
2. Organized Crime Group
Unlike the United States, Italy, and Japan, Ecuador’s organized crime
problem is fairly new.190 Although there is no exact date when organized
crime began in Ecuador, government figures show that in 2010, violence of
all crimes rose 15 percent in one year. 191 Murders alone have doubled
“over the last twenty years to nearly 19 per 100,000 residents.”192 Much of
this violence is attributed to the extensive issue of drug trafficking.193
Roughly a decade ago, drug trafficking in Ecuador was a “relatively
small law enforcement problem.”194 Due to Ecuador’s geographic location,
between Colombia and Peru, Ecuador has become the site of illegal drug
trafficking for international distribution. 195 “Mexican, Russian, Chinese,
and Korean drug mafia members regularly visit to arrange deals . . . [and] .
. . [g]rowing amounts of cocaine paste are brought [to Ecuador] to be
processed because of the Colombian government’s crackdown on illicit
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labs.”196 Ecuador is “vulnerable to transnational organized crime due to
weak public institutions, porous borders, and corruption.”197 It is estimated
that “ 200 tons of cocaine, or one-quarter of all that’s manufactured yearly
in Colombia and Peru, transits through Ecuador.”198 Ecuador also traffics
the chemical precursors for drugs other than cocaine or heroin.199 Chemical
precursors are compounds that are needed in the “synthetic or extraction
process of drug production.”200
3. Law and its Changes
Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution categorized drug abuse as a “public
health problem.”201 Because of the rise in addicts in Ecuador, on December
17, 2013, the Ecuadorian National Assembly passed a new Ecuadorian
criminal code. 202 The National Council for Narcotic and Psychotropic
Substances announced a new scale in order to differentiate between drug
users, micro-traffickers, and large-scale traffickers. 203 This was done in
order to identify the level a person was considered and to control prison
sentences. 204 The National Council for Narcotic and Psychotropic
Substances is an administrative institution that was set up to exclusively
“take charge of drug control.”205
Before the change in the law, “possession of anything up to one gram
of heroin and fifty grams of cocaine were considered ‘minimum’ and
essentially decriminalized. . . .” 206 Now, these quantities are considered
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“high” and come with a prison sentence.207 This was done to have a more
uniform system of sentencing.208
Surprisingly, in 2014, Ecuador released “500 drug mules or low-level
traffickers in a move aimed [at] alleviat[ing] prison crowding.”209 Initially,
Ecuador treated addiction like it was a health problem rather than a
crime.210 Recently however, the government appears to be recriminalizing
drug use.211 This is in opposition with the work Correra did in 2014. 212
Because of the new push to criminalize low-level drug offenders in 2015 by
Correa, Ecuador’s issue of prison overcrowding will continue to rise.213
4. Impact of the Law
Because the issue of organized crime and the recently codified laws in
Ecuador are so recent, there is not a wealth of information on the impact of
these laws. In 2016, Ecuadorian authorities “lashed out” against a recently
published drug report conducted by the United States State Department.214
The State Department’s 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, which discusses drug trafficking trends around the world, labeled
Ecuador as a “major transit country” and noted the “continuing presence of
transnational organized crime groups . . . [such as] . . . the Zetas, the
Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia . . . .”215 Ecuador’s Chief of Police stated that although this study
has been “accurate” in prior years, “recent police investigations had found
‘no links to such cartels.’”216 Ecuadorian officials also stated that in 2015,
the government seized eighty-tons of drugs and over 400-tons in the last
eight years. 217 Although both governments may be reporting accurate
statistics, there is speculation that due to recent tension between Ecuador
and the United States, these reports could be somewhat exaggerated to
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benefit each side’s point of view. 218 The passage of this new Criminal
Code does provide law enforcement with new tools for surveillance and
operations however, the “lack of regimented investigative training hinders
the ability to successfully prosecute transnational crime.”219
III. GLOBAL ECONOMY & TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
“Transnational organized crime is big business. In 2009 it was
estimated to generate $870 billionan amount equal to 1.5 percent of
global GDP. That is . . . the equivalent of close to 7 percent of the world’s
exports of merchandise.”220
In 2009, the General Assembly of the United Nations estimated that
the “value of illicit trade around the globe was estimated at $1.3 trillion and
is increasing.” 221 For criminal acts to be considered “transnational”, the
criminal actions must be “profit-motivated” and be “of an international
nature where more than one country is involved.”222
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the
most lucrative types of transnational organized crime are: drug
trafficking; human trafficking; smuggling of migrants; illicit trading in
firearms; trafficking in natural resources; illegal trade in wildlife; sale
of fraudulent medicines; and cybercrime.223 Almost all of these crimes
bring in over one billion dollars of revenue annually.224 A breakdown
of the types of crimes based on the estimated annual value they bring
shows that drug trafficking continues to bring in the most money
annually.225 In 2009, it was reported that the total value for drug
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trafficking was a staggering $320 billion.226 Calculated in that $320
billion is the $85 billion in the global sale of cocaine.227
This issue is not, however, only an economic one because
transnational organized crime also has a major impact on the local
governments and people living in these areas.228 Giving these criminal
groups such large sums of money allows them to have a “direct impact
on governance.”229 This allows for corruption and the “buying of
elections.”230 It also “destabilizes countries and entire regions, thereby
undermining development assistance in those areas.”231
These organizations “undermine development by eroding social
and human capital.”232 This means that in areas where there is a large
organized crime presence, skilled laborers are likely to leave work and
those seeking educational opportunities will be impeded from gaining
access to schooling.233 The presence of organized crime in a location
will also drive away both “foreign and domestic investors [because
they] see crime as a sign of social instability, and crime drives up the
cost of doing business.”234
Transnational organized crime also impacts legitimate businesses
when illegal goods displace the original products, because they are
made and sold at a much lower price.235 The impact of transnational
counterfeiting in the United States alone is astounding. “It is estimated
that 7 percent of our annual world trade$600 billion worthis
counterfeit or pirated; that fakes are believed to be directly responsible
for the loss of more than 750,000 American jobs . . . .”236 This does not
mean that just a few fake handbags are making their way around the
world.
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[E]verything from baby formula to medicine is counterfeited,
with tragic results; . . . counterfeiters and the crime syndicates
they work with deal in human trafficking, child labor, and gang
warfare; and . . . counterfeiting is used to launder money, and the
money has been linked to truly sinister deeds such as terrorism. 237

The issue of transnational organized crime groups manufacturing and
selling counterfeit designer goods is becoming such an issue that major
fashion houses have attempted to bring down these syndicates.238 Some
organized crime groups used online retail giant, eBay, to sell counterfeit
designer handbags. 239 As a result, Louis Vuitton sued eBay and was
successful because it showed that “ninety-percent of the Vuitton and Dior
items offered on eBay in the first half of 2006 were counterfeits.” 240
Although there are measures in place to protect these retailers from these
large-scale operations, these organized crime groups are now shipping in
“generic items” and then having people within the United States finish them
domestically.241 This will prevent border agents from detecting counterfeit
goods.242 Because of transnational organized crime, both local and federal
governments choose to increase public spending for security and policing
rather than putting that money toward helping their citizens.243
IV. COMPARISONS
While most of the United States, Japan, and Italy appear to be getting
increasingly stricter with their organized crime laws, Ecuador has
decriminalized possession of certain drugs like cocaine and heroin.244 This
is significant because Ecuador’s organized crime issue is emerging while
the other three countries have a history with organized crime. This would
lead someone to believe that Ecuador would be able to control its emerging
organized crime issue by enforcing stricter laws and not letting individuals
with minor drug offenses out of prison. Italy and Japan have increased the
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strictness of their laws by codifying changes and enforcing them while the
United States has just used the vagueness of the RICO statute to prosecute
more individuals not directly involved in organized crime.245
V. CONCLUSION
Through education, policing and legislation, the United States, Italy,
Japan, and Ecuador can continue to combat the issue of organized crime.
The United States needs to clearly define the RICO statute to provide
prosecutors with more definitive parameters. This would decrease the
amount of individuals that are being prosecuted under the statute for
offenses not related to organized crime. Clarifying the statute may,
however, cause an increase in organized crime behavior because
prosecutors are using ambiguities in the statute to indict and convict more
individuals. The legislature should also remove the clause in the RICO
statute that allows for mandatory forfeitures of property before someone
under RICO has been found guilty. Although the mandatory forfeiture is of
property obtained during the alleged illegal conduct, having this clause in
the statue deprives a defendant an equal right to competent legal
representation because their ability to find suitable counsel is thwarted due
to a lack of finances.
The United States should also look to the historic and present day
examples of successful cooperation between organized crime groups and
the government in order to utilize the mafia to combat terrorist cells that
threaten the United States. This may give organized crime participants
positive avenues to protect their country. It could also provide increased
information between crime organizations and the government to combat
planned attacks before they are carried out. This would decrease
government spending because non-governmental groups are using their
resources to combat terrorist groups.
Increasing prison terms appears to be a positive step to decrease
organized crime in Italy. However, the fact that people are incarcerated
longer does not necessarily mean that participation will decrease. The
mafia is an idea that is so ingrained in the Italian culture that it will be
difficult to rewrite history. Instead of codifying more laws, Italy’s
government should attempt to deal with the stigma, whether positive or
negative, associated with the mafia. One way to achieve this goal could be
to launch a campaign to discuss the impact of the mafia and to inform

245.

Lynch, supra note 73; Figueroa, supra note 121; Riley, supra note 155 at 813–15.
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citizens of the actual damage being done to Italy’s economy. Italians may
band together against the mafia and participation may decrease.
Japan’s recent change to its law has quite possibly done more harm
than good because this approach forced the Yakuza to move underground
and reorganize. Having the Yakuza underground could cause them to
become more dangerous because the government has less opportunity to
monitor Yakuza activity. If the Yakuza have offices, the government could
conduct searches of these locations and get a better handle on the activities
they conduct. It is also important for the government to watch Yakuza
groups due to the faction that just occurred. This faction could cause a
dangerous gang war in Japan. This gang war would threaten the safety of
not only the Japanese citizens, but also the economy because the Yakuza
are so entrenched in Japanese business.
The rise of drug use and sale in Ecuador is being exacerbated because
instead of increasing prison terms for drug use and distribution, Ecuador is
decriminalizing drug possession.
Instead of decriminalizing drug
possession, Ecuador should become stricter in its enforcement and
prosecution of drug offenders. Ecuador should also attempt to increase
border security to quell the import/export of drugs in and out of the country
and the countries around it. Ecuador should continue to work with the
United States, rather than against it, to manage the drug trade before it
spreads to other industries as well. Having a rampant drug trade tends to
increase crime and poverty. Ecuador needs to get this issue under control
before its citizens and economy suffer grave consequences.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

As the former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Louis
Freeh once said, “[a]sk the American public if they want an FBI wiretap
and they’ll say, ‘No’. If you ask them do they want a feature on their phone
that helps the FBI find their missing child they’ll say, ‘Yes’.”1 According
to reports, 2014 was the deadliest year of the twenty-first century as it
pertained to deaths from a direct result of terrorism with a total of 32,658
deaths; an increase of eighty percent from 2013.2 Wiretapping is defined
as, “a form of electronic eavesdropping accomplished by seizing or
*
Lora Esau is a second year law student at Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad
College of Law. Lora graduated in 2014 from Florida Atlantic University where she received her
Bachelor of Arts in Criminal Justice.
1.
Quote from Louis Freeh, LIBERTY-TREE.CA, http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote_blog/
Louis.Freeh.Quote.4006 (last visited on Sept. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Louis Freeh].
2.
Daniel Costa-Roberts, 4 surprising facts from the 2015 Global Terrorism Index, PBS.ORG
(Nov. 23, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/4-surprising-facts-from-the-2015global-terrorism-index/.
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overhearing communications by means of a concealed recording or
listening device connected to the transmission line.”3 Wiretapping is one of
the many tools used to conduct surveillance. This surveillance is conducted
domestically, as well as internationally; therefore, a citizen of a specific
country is not warranted from that country eavesdropping on his or her
conversations.4
Terrorism has increased, and has continued to do so over the last
fifteen years. Patterns have shown, that when tragedies occur, more
domestic and international surveillance occurs. Some of this surveillance is
conducted through wiretapping. Although there are laws in place for
wiretapping, the laws are not strict enough and tend to infringe on the
privacy of many individuals living within that country.
This article will focus on raising awareness and attention to domestic
surveillance, specifically wiretapping, the ease of obtaining a warrant for
such surveillance, as well as how the United States’ laws and frequent
wiretapping compare to other countries in Europe especially during times of
terror.
First, this article will give a brief overview of the structure of the
United States government, followed by an explanation of the laws used and
procedures in place to allow wiretapping. Next, this article will contain
background information about the structure of the three European
countries’ type of government—Russia, Italy, and France—followed by an
explanation of the laws and procedures in place for wiretapping to occur.
Additionally, this article will compare the four countries and applicable
laws, and discuss the correlation between terrorism occurrences and
domestic surveillance, with a focus on wiretapping. Then, this article will
discuss society’s opinion regarding whether they agree or disagree with the
government watching them. This article concludes with a brief recap of the
information shared on wiretapping and changes that should be made to the
wiretapping laws and domestic surveillance as a whole.
II.
A.

LAWS AND EVENTS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES

The United States

The most alarming statistic released from the United States Courts in
2015 stated, “[n]o wiretap applications were reported as denied in 2015.”5
3.
THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Wiretapping (last
visited Sept. 23, 2016).
4.
How the NSA’s Domestic Spying Program Works, EFF.COM, https://www.eff.org/nsaspying/how-it-works (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
5.
Wiretap Report 2015, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/wiretap-report-2015.
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This statistic is alarming because it shows that it is extremely easy to obtain
a warrant to wiretap and that judges generally will not deny such request.
Wiretapping in the United States began in 1857 when the telegraph
was invented, and furthered upon the invention of the telephone.6
The United States is a federal presidential republic.7 As such, the
powers of the federal government are limited, therefore allowing the states
to retain a degree of sovereignty, and giving the citizens the power to vote
and choose the individuals that will represent their government.8 The
Congress is a bicameral legislature, thus dividing the legislators into two
branches or houses—the Senate and the House of Representatives—and
giving each state the same number of seats regardless of population to
ensure equal representation in Congress of the smaller less-populated
states.9 The legislative branch enacts legislation and the executive branch is
charged with enforcing the law and carrying it out.10 The President of the
United States is the head of the executive branch.11 This article was written
during the final days of President Barack Obama’s second and last term.
In January of 2016, the estimated population in the United States was
322,762,018.12 While there may not have been nearly as many people
living in the United States when wiretapping first began, by 1934, Congress
realized it was time to pass the first federal wiretapping law upon rise of
multiple challenges pertaining to the admissibility of wiretap evidence as
being violations of the Fourth Amendment.13 The Fourth Amendment
establishes:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
6.
Howard J. Kaplan et al., The History and Law of Wiretapping, A.B.A. SEC. OF LITIG. 1, 2
(2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/sac_2012/291_history_and_law_of_wiretapping.authcheckdam.pdf.
7.
The World Factbook, C.I.A., https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/docs/notesanddefs.html?fieldkey=2128&term=Government%20type (last visited Sept. 23,
2016).
8.

Id.

9.
Senate Legislative Process, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/
briefing/Senate_legislative_process.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
10.
Branches of Government, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government (last
visited Sept. 23, 2016).
11.

Id.

12.
Robert Schlesinger, The Size of the U.S. and the World in 2016, U.S. NEWS: THOMAS
JEFFERSON STREET (Jan. 5, 2016, 4:05 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/robert-schlesinger/
articles/2016-01-05/us-population-in-2016-according-to-census-estimates-322-762-018.
13.

Kaplan et al., supra note 6, at 2–3.
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probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.14

The Communications Act of 1934 made wiretapping a criminal
offense and inadmissible in court.15 However, this law only lasted until
1960, when the government was unable to enforce laws that were in place
due to a large amount of criminal activity.16 The case that changed
everything was Katz v. United States. In Katz v. United States, the police
had placed an eavesdropping device on a public payphone to record the
telephone conversations of an illegal gambling operation which led to Katz
ultimately being arrested and convicted.17 On appeal, the Supreme Court of
the United States ruled seven-to-one that police action in this situation
violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court determined that Katz’s
expectation of privacy was reasonable under the circumstances; thus,
changing the original requirement of a “physical trespass,” previously
established in Olmstead v. United States.18 In Olmstead, the Supreme Court
held that the government did not violate Olmstead’s privacy because the
wiretaps were placed in the street, and therefore, did not trespass onto
Olmstead’s property and did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment.19
Today, constitutional challenges are limited because of 18 U.S.C. §
2518 which outlines in depth the procedure that a federal prosecutor must
take to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications.20 To obtain an
order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication, an application must be made under oath or affirmation to a
judge with jurisdiction over the matter, and include the following:
(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer
making the application, and the officer authorizing the
application; (b) a full and complete statement of the facts and
circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief
that an order should be issued, including (i) details as to the
particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be

14.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

15.

Kaplan et al., supra note 6, at 3.

16.

Id.

17.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348–49 (1967); see also Kaplan et al., supra note 6,

18.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; see also Kaplan et al., supra note 6, at 3.

19.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 466 (1928).

20.

Kaplan et al., supra note 6, at 3.

at 3.
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committed, (ii) except as provided in subsection (11), a particular
description of the nature and location of the facilities from which
or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a
particular description of the type of communications sought to be
intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted; (c)
a full and complete statement as to whether or not other
investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous; (d) a statement of the period of time for which the
interception is required to be maintained. If the nature of the
investigation is such that the authorization for interception should
not automatically terminate when the described type of
communication has been first obtained, a particular description of
facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional
communications of the same type will occur thereafter; (e) a full
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications known to the individual authorizing and making the
application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or
for approval of interceptions of, wire, oral, or electronic
communications involving any of the same persons, facilities or
places specified in the application, and the action taken by the
judge on each such application; and (f) where the application is
for the extension of an order, a statement setting forth the results
thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable
explanation of the failure to obtain such results.21

Although there were procedures in place that require the federal
prosecutor to obtain a court order prior to intercepting wire, oral, or
electronic communication, in 2001—shortly after the September 11th
terrorist attacks, the U.S.A. Patriot Act (Patriot Act) was passed. The
purpose of the Patriot Act was to expand and aid the government’s power in
anti-terrorism investigations while streamlining the process to obtain the
necessary warrants to wiretap.
Unfortunately, this proved to be
insufficient.22
In 2002, former President George W. Bush, expanded the authority by
approving wiretaps without warrants by authorizing a domestic spying
program designed to help prevent future attacks by conducting surveillance
amongst citizens’ phone calls, e-mails, and other forms of
21.

18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(a–f) (2012).

22.
See also Alex Markels, Timeline: Wiretaps’ Use and Abuse, NPR.ORG (Dec. 20, 2005,
12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5061834; see generally Larry
Abramson & Maria Godoy, The Patriot Act: Key Controversies, NPR.ORG (Feb. 14, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/patriotact/patriotactprovisions.html.
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communications.23 This law is still currently in place sans a few provisions
that have been removed.24 The first provision removed was section 215
which allowed the National Security Agency (NSA) to collect metadata on
millions of Americans and store the information for five years.25 Metadata
is defined as data which describes other data by providing information
pertaining to a certain item’s content.26 The second provision removed was
the law enforcement officer’s ability to have a roving tap, which means an
order that is continuous even if the suspect frequently changes
communication devices.27 As a result, law enforcement officers are now
required to get a new court order.28 Lastly, the government is no longer
allowed to use national security tools against “lone-wolf” terror suspects if
there is no connection found to a foreign terror group.29
There is no doubt, that when terrorism strikes, there is an increase in
domestic surveillance. The Paris attacks which occurred in November of
2015, triggered a plan from the FBI to increase domestic surveillance of
suspected ISIS sympathizers as a way to protect against potential threats in
the United States.30 Further, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) chairman had suggested to expand wiretap laws.31 Inaccurate news
reports on the Paris attacks stated that the attackers communicated via a
game console, PlayStation 4, which was not defined under the 1994
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).32 The
CALEA requires telecom companies, internet providers, and some online
voice services to build their networks in ways that allow simpler access for
authorities when it is necessary to lawfully intercept a suspect’s telephone
and online communication.33 The PlayStation 4 was not something that
23.

Markels, supra note 22.

24.
Jeremy Diamond, Patriot Act provisions have expired: What happens now? CNN.COM
(June 1, 2015, 10:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/30/politics/what-happens-if-the-patriot-actprovisions-expire/.
25.

Id.

26.

Metadata, TECHTERMS, http://techterms.com/definition/metadata (last visited Sept. 23,

27.

Diamond, supra note 24.

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

2016).

30.
Evan Perez, After Paris: More wiretaps of U.S.-based suspects, CNN (Nov. 15, 2015, 3:03
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/15/politics/paris-attacks-us-wiretaps.
31.
Brian Fung & Andrea Peterson, FCC chairman suggests expanded wiretap laws in
response to the Paris attacks, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-switch/wp/2015/11/17/the-fcc-suggests-expanded-wiretap-laws-in-response-to-the-paris-attacks/.
32.

Id.

33.

Id.
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was considered in 1994, and while the reports of communication via the
gaming console are allegedly untrue, the FCC chairman believes this is
something worth looking into in the event something were to take place in
the future.34
The 2016 shooting at Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, Florida has become
“the deadliest shooting rampage in U.S. history.”35 A recent interview that
was transcribed took place between FRESH AIR contributor Dave Davies
and Eric Lichtblau, who is a winner of the Pulitzer Prize for national
reporting for breaking the story of President Bush’s administration’s
warrantless wiretapping program, in which they discussed the Orlando
attack.36 This is an excerpt of the conversation which took place:
DAVIES: Let's start by talking about Omar Mateen, the shooter
in the massacre in Orlando. The FBI, we know, did investigate
him. What drew their attention to Omar Mateen?
LICHTBLAU: Right. They actually looked at him twice . . . .
They used an undercover informant to try and see whether he
was really planning anything. They did surveillance. They did
wiretapping. They interviewed the co-workers, obviously. They
extended the investigation past the six months that they were
originally allowed to go. And after about [ten] months, they
closed it down. They said they did not have enough evidence to
indicate that he was supporting terrorism or planned to act on his
earlier comments. And the FBI kind of threw up its hands and
closed the investigation.37

This is one example of where wiretaps were used domestically to thwart
potential terrorism and even though they investigated this person twice, an
attack was still successfully carried out years later.

34.

Id.

35.
CNN LIBRARY, Deadliest Mass Shootings in U.S. History Fast Facts, CNN (June 13,
2016, 8:27 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/us/20-deadliest-mass-shootings-in-u-s-history-fastfacts/.
36.
How The FBI's Wiretaps And Sting Operation Failed To Stop The Orlando Shooter, NPR
(June 29, 2016, 1:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/06/29/484006952/how-the-fbis-wiretaps-and-stingoperation-failed-to-stop-the-orlando-shooter.
37.

Id.
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European Countries
1.

Russia

Russia, formally a part of the Soviet Union, became independent in
1991 when the Soviet Union dissolved.38 Russia is currently a federal
multiparty republic with a bicameral legislative body. 39 This means that
Russia is made up of a federal state with a constitution and other units that
are self-governed.40 The government consists of two bodies the Federation
Council and the State Duma.41 The Federation Council currently has 170
seats and the State Duma currently has 450 seats.42 Russia has a head of
state which is the president as well as a head of government which is the
prime minister.43 The current president is Vladimir Putin and the prime
minister is Dmitry Medvedev.44 The estimated population of Russia in
2015 was 146.3 million people.45
Russia’s national system of lawful interception of all electronic
communication is The System of Operative-Investigative Measures
(SORM).46 There are a total of seven Russian investigative and security
agencies that have been granted the legal right to intercept phone calls and
emails; however, it is the Federal Security Service (FSB) who defines the
procedures that take place to intercept electronic communications.47 As
bizarre as this sounds, the FSB must obtain a court order prior to
intercepting the oral communications but they do not have to provide it to
any telecom providers.48 This means, that the FSB can obtain the court
order and immediately tap right into an individual’s line.49 The FSB

38.
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Russia (last visited July
22, 2016) [hereinafter About Russia].
39.
40.
22, 2016).

Id.
DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/federal-republic (last visited July

41.

About Russia, supra note 38.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.
Russia Population, TRADING ECON., http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/population
(last visited July 22, 2016).
46.
Andrei Soldatov et al., Russia’s Surveillance State, WORLD POL’Y J., Fall 2013, at 23
[hereinafter WORLD POL’Y].
47.

Id. at 24.

48.

Id. at 25.

49.

Id.
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requires telecom providers to pay for the SORM equipment and its
installation while having no access to the surveillance boxes.50
On August 12, 1995, a law was passed on operative searches and
seizures which gave the right to the FSB to carry some investigative
activities without prior judicial approval.51 Some of the activities included
were wiretapping telephones and monitoring other forms of
communication.52 The FSB was allowed to engage in these activities if
there was an emergency and serious crime was going to be committed, or if
Russia’s political, military, economic or environmental security were
threatened.53 A judge must be notified within twenty-four hours of any
action taken and within forty-eight hours either cease the surveillance or
have the appropriate court order to continue.54 The biggest flaw found in
this act, is the definition of what constitutes “security” and “emergency”
because without a fine line, it becomes subjective.55
In December 2010, a federal law was passed expanding the legal
grounds for wiretapping domestically in Russia.56 Receiving a report that
an individual is preparing to commit a crime is sufficient; they do not need
to back up those allegations.57 The transcript of the conversation will
remain even if the allegations hold no merit and may turn up later in
another criminal case in the future.58 Andrei Soldatov, who is a leading
security expert stated, “telephone and e-mail intercepts and recordings have
risen from 265,000 in 2007 to 466,000 in 2011 and that it is still on the
rise.”59 He also stated, “there is a lack of parliament oversight and it is
almost impossible to establish who is carrying out these wiretap operations,
even against opposition leaders.”60 In 2011, only 3554 wiretap requests, or

50.

Id.

51.
FSB Legislative Authority, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/
world/russia/fsb-legis.htm (last visited July 21, 2016).
52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56.
Irina Borogan & Andrei Soldatov, The Kremlin Is All Ears, MOSCOW TIMES (Dec. 28,
2012, 20:17), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-kremlin-is-all-ears/473703.html.
57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59.
Tom Balmforth, Spy vs. Spy: Wiretapping On The Increase In Russia, RADIO FREE EUR.
(July 16, 2012), http://www.rferl.org/content/spy-wiretapping-on-increase-russia-rival-security-services/
24647019.html.
60.

Id.
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one percent out of 466,152 were rejected.61 One of those wiretaps
conducted were of the Boston Marathon bombing suspect, Tamerlan
Tsarnaev.62 In 2011, Russia secretly recorded a telephone conversation
with his mother vaguely discussing jihad.63 There was another telephone
conversation recorded of the mother speaking to someone in Southern
Russia who is under FBI investigation for an unrelated case.64 The Russian
government allegedly told the FBI these individuals were religious
extremists.65 Lastly, by way of domestic surveillance, the Moscow Times
have reported that in January of 2016, Moscow has thwarted Islamic State
terrorist attacks in Russia as they had “operational control” over them from
the beginning.66
2.

Italy

“In Italy, you’re nobody if your phone isn’t tapped.”67 Italy’s leading
political provocateur and blogger Beppe Grillo stated, “this is a nation
where if you cannot be blackmailed, you will never get ahead.”68 Once a
monarchy government being ran by a king was replaced shortly after World
War II, on June 2, 1946, when the Italians voted in a referendum to replace
the monarchy.69 Today, Italy is now a republic government made up of two
legislative houses, the senate and the chamber of deputies.70 This means
that this government is ruled by representatives of the citizen body.71 Italy
has a head of state which is the president and a head of government which
is the prime minister. The current president is Sergio Mattarella and the
61.
Wiretapping Doubles in Russia Since 2007, SPUTNIK INT’L (Apr. 6, 2012, 18:27),
http://sputniknews.com/russia/20120604/173843249.html [hereinafter Sputnik Int’l].
62.
Russia had wiretap on Boston Marathon bombing suspect, US officials say,
FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/04/27/russia-had-wiretap-onboston-marathon-bombing-suspect-us-officials-say.html.
63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.
Moscow Says It Thwarted IS Terror Attacks in Russia, MOSCOW TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016,
19:02), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/moscow-says-it-thwarted-is-terror-attacks-in-russia-516
48.
67.
Rachel Donadio, An Untapped Phone Call in Italy? It’s Possible, N.Y. TIMES (May 30,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/31/world/europe/31italy.html?_r=0.
68.

Id.

69.
Marino Berengo et al., Italy: Government and society, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Aug.
12, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/place/Italy/Government-and-society [hereinafter About Italy].
70.

Id.

71.
André Munro, Republic, ENCYCLOPEDIA
https://www.britannica.com/topic/republic-government.

BRITANNICA

(June

22,

2016),

2016]

Esau

65

prime minister is Matteo Renzi.72 The Senate has 322 seats currently which
includes seven non-elective seats; five of which are presidential appointees
and two former presidents serving.73 The Chamber of Deputies has 630
seats currently and are popularly elected through a system of proportional
representation and are considered the lower chamber.74 In 2015 the Italian
population was estimated at 60.8 million people.75
Article 15 of the Italian Constitution states, “[t]he freedom and secrecy
of correspondence and of every other form of communication is
inviolable,”76 but yet many individuals’ privacy is still being intruded on
despite this constitutional guarantee. Article 266 of the Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure states:
the interception of a telephone conversation or communication
and other forms of telecommunications is allowed in proceedings
relating to the following offenses: a) intentional crimes for
which is provided for life imprisonment or imprisonment for a
maximum of five years; determined in accordance with Article 4;
b) crimes against the public administration for which is planned
the penalty of imprisonment of not less than five years
determined in accordance with Article 4; c) offenses relating to
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; d) offenses relating
to weapons and explosives; e) smuggling offenses; f) crimes of
abuse, threats, usury, illegal financial activities, insider trading,
market manipulation, harassment or annoyance to persons by
means of telephone.77

To obtain permission to wiretap in Italy the officer needs to ask the
judge for preliminary investigations and obtain authorization for serious
crimes as outlined above and essential for the continuation of the
investigation.78 In cases where serious harm to the investigation may occur
the officer may move forward with the interception of communication so
long as the court is notified not later than twenty-four hours.79 The court,
within forty-eight hours will render a decision on whether they will allow

72.

About Italy, supra note 69.

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.
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the intercepting of communications to continue or cease and if it is not
validated, the interception must cease and the evidence collected cannot be
used.80 After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Italy has allowed
anticipatory wiretapping even without any ongoing investigation.81
Italy is infamous for wiretapping.82 Wiretapping is such a common
practice in Italy that even former Secretary of State, and current Presidential
Candidate, Hillary Clinton, and Pope Benedict XVI when they were
speaking with the head of Italy's civil protection agency, Guido Bertolaso,
were wiretapped as he was being wiretapped as part of an investigation.83
In 2006, the Max Planck Institute calculated that seventy-six out of every
100,000 Italians had their phones tapped.84 Further, in 2008 as reported by
the ministry of justice, 124,326 phones were tapped.85 With the increase of
terrorism in Europe, the Russian Today reported that Italy had recently
stopped potential ISIS attacks on the Israeli embassy in Rome as well as on
the Vatican by intercepting communications.86 Despite the great news,
“Italy is the eavesdropping centre of Europe,” putting many Italians’
privacy expectations at risk.87
3.

France

France is a republic government with two legislative houses.88 The
two houses of the French parliament consist of the Senate and the National
Assembly.89 The Senate has 348 seats currently and the National Assembly
currently has 577 seats.90 France also has a head of state which is the

80.
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ni-wiretap-victory-in-confidence-vote.html.
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president and a head of government which is the prime minister.91 The
current president is François Hollande, and the current prime minister is
Manuel Valls.92 Currently, France’s estimated population is 66.6 million
people.93
On July 10, 1991 France passed the 1991 Wiretapping Act which gave
freedom of telecommunications from being intruded on without a court
order.94 The only ones that can intrude were police officers without
magistrate approval or for national security purposes which did not require
magistrate approval.95 If the reason for intruding telecommunications was
for national security purposes it only had to be approved by the current
prime minister who in turn was required to tell an independent threemember commission of two legislators and of a chair who would be named
by the courts.96
On January 7, 2015 terror struck in France and was considered one of
the “worst security crises in decades.”97 After the attacks, France passed a
new law allowing domestic surveillance of anyone linked to a “terrorist
inquiry” by intelligence agencies without prior approval.98 The new law
allows the intelligence agencies to collect metadata which will be subject to
analysis for any potential suspicious behavior, place cameras and recording
devices in private homes, and install key logger devices which record every
key stroke on a computer that is bugged in actual live time.99 Initially, the
metadata collected is anonymous but if necessary with follow-up requests,
the agencies could reveal the identity.100 Metadata is stored for five years
and recordings only one month.101 The law also allows the use of IMSI
catchers, which is something flown over a specific area that collects data
and records all types of conversations whether it is via phone, internet, or
91.
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92.

Id.

93.
France Population, TRADING
population (last visited July 22, 2016).
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text-messaging within a specific area.102 Current Prime Minister, Manuel
Valls, backed the bill and said it was “necessary and proportionate.”103
Valls also stated that “previous French law on wiretapping dated back to
1991, ‘when there were no mobile phones or internet,’ and the new bill was
crucial in the face of extremist threats.”104 The law also gained more
support after a “jihadist killing spree” as well as when police stopped the
attack on a church in April of 2015.105
III.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Differences
While there are differences between the United States and European
countries, these differences are not too drastic. While the Patriot Act still
stands today, things such as metadata collection and storing it for five years,
roving wiretaps, and the use of national security tools on lone-wolf suspects
are no longer allowed.106 This is a recent change as of 2015.107
Unlike the United States, France, the very same year, passed a law
which allowed the metadata collection the United States no longer allows as
well as other intrusive surveillance tools.108 Further, while the United
States has to show a court order to telecom providers to conduct a legal
wiretap that falls outside of the scope of the Patriot Act, the FSB in Russia
does not. All the FSB simply has to do is obtain permission and conduct
the wiretap because they require any telecom provider to pay for the SORM
equipment and installation giving them no access to the surveillance boxes
either.109
The telecom providers would never know if a wiretap was being
conducted.110 Also, in Russia, merely receiving a report that an individual

102. French court approves sweeping new surveillance powers, FR. 24 (July 24, 2015),
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is preparing to commit a crime is sufficient grounds for a wiretap, the
allegations do not even have to be backed up with hard facts.111 This differs
from the United States because 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(a)–(f) outlines
detailed requirements to obtain a court order to intercept any type of
communication, backed up facts being one of the many requirements.112
Lastly, Italy allows preemptive wiretapping of its citizens without an
ongoing investigation113 whereas the United States, even with the Patriot
Act, requires a warrant if it is seeking to intercept communications between
two United States citizens on American soil.114 While the concept and the
goals are the same, to avoid terrorism and prevent crime; the process,
requirements, and information collected are what most differs the most
from the countries.
B.

Similarities

France, Italy, Russia, and the United States have more in common than
one would think. Wiretapping has become a “norm” in these countries.
Specifically, the statistics show that “[n]o wiretap applications were
reported as denied in 2015” in the United States.115 Comparably in 2011,
out of 466,152 wiretap applications, only one percent were rejected in
Russia.116
Whenever there is a terrorist attack, there is a push for heightened
security measures and an increase in surveillance and the countries know no
end when expanding their powers of domestic surveillance.117 In Italy,
shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United
States, Italy allowed preemptive wiretapping which expanded its powers.118
Further, after the terrorist attacks, former President Bush passed the Patriot
Act and a domestic surveillance spying program.119 Likewise, shortly after
the 2015 France terrorist attacks, France passed a new law that allows
domestic surveillance of anyone linked to a “terrorist inquiry” by
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intelligence agencies without prior approval.120 France’s Prime Minister
Manuel Valls’ heavily disapproved of the comparison of the two laws.121
Further, after the 2015 France terrorist attacks, the FBI increased the
amount of wiretaps and surveillance against those who were “ISIS
sympathizers.”122 The laws of France and the United States are strikingly
similar because of the data that is allowed to be collected such as the
metadata that was once allowed in the Patriot Act.123 Lastly, the frequency
of wiretapping being conducted in Russia, Italy, and the United States are
practically identical because the request for a wiretap is hardly denied
leading to many wiretaps being conducted.124
IV.

SOCIETY’S VIEW AROUND THE GLOBE

A. The United States
Research shows that results of the polls conducted were somewhat
dependent on the survey’s phrasing and the way the person completing the
survey perceived it.125 There was a “controlled study” done by CBS
News/New York Times with two separate versions of the same poll, version
“A” and “B”.126
Version A: After 9/11, President Bush authorized government
wiretaps on some phone calls in the U.S. without getting court
warrants, saying this was necessary in order to reduce the threat
of terrorism. Do you approve or disapprove of the president
doing this?
Version B: After 9/11, George W. Bush authorized government
wiretaps on some phone calls in the U.S. without getting court
warrants. Do you approve or disapprove of George W. Bush
doing this?127

When the random sample of people took the poll in version “A” the
results were the following; fifty-three percent approved the president doing
120.
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this, forty-six percent disapproved, and one percent was unsure.128 When
the remainder of the random sample of people took the poll in version “B”,
the results flipped.129 In version “B”, forty-six percent approved the
president doing this, fifty percent disapproved, and four percent was
unsure.130 The versions varied in language, but the results remained split
despite the wording.131 When the poll stated that it was “necessary,” there
was a seven percent increase in approval rather than disapproval.132 There
was also a seven percent decrease when former President George W. Bush
was referred to as “George W. Bush” by itself rather than version “A”
which stated, “President Bush.”133 As previously mentioned, “[a]sk the
American public if they want an FBI wiretap and they’ll say, ‘No’. If you
ask them do they want a feature on their phone that helps the FBI find their
missing child they’ll say, ‘Yes’.”134 Essentially, this is same. American
citizens do not want the FBI wiretapping their phones but at the same time,
want to provide the FBI with information so that in the event their child
goes missing, the FBI can track them.135 This is a double standard amongst
American citizens.
The Pew Research Center conducted a research experiment amongst
registered voters from February 1, 2006 through February 5, 2006.136 The
survey stated the following: “[d]o you think it is generally right or
generally wrong for the government to monitor telephone and e-mail
communications of Americans suspected of having terrorist ties without
first obtaining permission from the courts?”137 Here, forty percent of
registered voters were against it and fifty-four percent of registered voters
were for it.138
A little over nine years later, and only two years later from the Edward
Snowden whistle blowing incident, the Pew Research Center released
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another study.139 One survey response yielded the following result from a
spring 2014 question; seventy-four percent of people said “they should not
give up privacy and freedom for the sake of safety” and twenty-two percent
felt the total opposite.140 However, a narrower question such as the
percentage of those that disapproved of the United States government’s
collection of telephone and internet data as part of anti-terrorism efforts
yielded the following results; fifty-four percent disapproved and forty-two
percent approved of this action.141 Not much has changed over the years in
the eyes of American citizens as the results are still demonstrating a large
split of people that are for and against domestic surveillance tools, such as
wiretapping, and these results are likely going to stay constant over the
upcoming years.
B.

European Countries

Europe’s views on wiretapping and domestic surveillance as a whole
differs some from the United States. In 2013,142 the Pew Research Center
released the following question that was asked globally, “[a]ccording to
news reports, the American government has been monitoring
communications, such as emails and phone calls, in the United States and
many other countries. In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for
the American government to monitor communications from American
[c]itizens?”143 Sixty-seven percent of the Russian respondents said that this
was unacceptable and twenty-eight percent of the Russian respondents
found it acceptable.144 The Italians responded as well with sixty-three
percent finding that this behavior was unacceptable and thirty-one percent
finding that it was acceptable.145 The French responded with an
overwhelming percentage of disapproval.146 Specifically, eighty-two
percent of people found it unacceptable to do this while only eighteen
139. George Gao, What Americans think about NSA surveillance, national security and
privacy, PEW RES. CTR. (May 29, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/29/whatamericans-think-about-nsa-surveillance-national-security-and-privacy/.
140.
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percent found it acceptable.147 The United States is split on this issue
whereas Italy, Russia, and France find it mostly unacceptable conduct by
the American government.
A couple years later, when terror struck in France on January 7, 2015,
it changed the minds of many French citizens. Three months after the
January attacks, the CSA poll, via the Atlantico news website was released,
which demonstrated that the majority of French people were favoring the
“restrictions on their freedoms in the name of fighting extremism” and only
thirty-two percent were opposed to freedoms being reduced.148 While large
majorities of the French people are now accepting of the 2015 law that
passed, many human rights organizations are against the law as it reduces
freedom and infringes upon civil liberties.149
C.

Comparison of Views

The views of European citizens differ amongst each other as well as
from the United States. While citizens of Russia and Italy heavily
disapproved of the American government conducting domestic
surveillance, France’s latest opinion is that they would rather have their
rights reduced so that the government can conduct its surveillance and
thwart potential terrorists.150 Fear plays a role in helping shape the views of
the citizens of a specific country, because when the French law first came
about in 2015 allowing wiretaps without prior approval, there was heavy
criticism, but when there were more killings and terror plots occurring, the
new law gained much needed support.151 Over the last nine years however,
American citizens have remained consistent in their views.152 With
everything going on around the world, American citizens still have very
split opinions on whether they agree or disagree with domestic
surveillance.153 With terrorism attacks occurring more and more it will be
interesting to see how the polls change over the next few years and whether
American citizens tip the scales and become overwhelmingly in favor of
domestic surveillance.
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V.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated, there are alleged safeguards and laws in place for
wiretapping to ensure that society’s privacy is not being intruded upon;
however, this is not always the case. As the saying goes, “safety may come
with a price.” Even if safety may come with a price, society should have
more requirements in place and warrantless wiretapping should come to an
end. If the government has a reasonable belief that an individual poses a
threat to United States soil, and there are concrete facts that support this
threat, then that person should be investigated through the domestic
surveillance tools necessary, including wiretapping with an appropriate
warrant to do so. However, wiretapping should only be used for this one
specific reason only to prevent terrorism.
Also, there should be stricter guidelines on what is necessary to obtain
a warrant to wiretap. The fact that there were zero applications denied in
2015, meaning a total of 4148 warrants approved, is alarming because the
judges are reluctant to deny them and/or it is too easy to obtain.154 This
does not even include the wiretaps that were obtained without warrants.
According to Albert Gidari, a top privacy law attorney, there are way more
wiretaps being conducted without our knowledge. Albert Gidari stated the
following:
Since the Snowden revelations, more and more companies have
started publishing “transparency reports” about the number and
nature of government demands to access their users’ data.
AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint published data for 2014 earlier this
year and T-Mobile published its first transparency report on the
same day the AO released the Wiretap Report. In aggregate, the
four companies state that they implemented 10,712 wiretaps, a
threefold difference over the total number reported by the AO.
Note that the 10,712 number is only for the four companies listed
above and does not reflect wiretap orders received by other
telephone carriers or online providers, so the discrepancy actually
is larger.155

This poses the question: what is the Government not saying? Who is
being listened to now? Wiretapping is a powerful surveillance tool and
should only be used for issues related to terrorism, not drug related offenses
which happens very frequently as it was the most common type of criminal
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offense investigated with a wiretap in 2015.156 With the latest terrorist
attacks occurring around the world, citizens should be prepared for an
expansion of the use of wiretapping, rather than a decrease, because the
research has shown that there is a link between terrorism and domestic
surveillance. A large percentage of society has little knowledge about the
Patriot Act.157 It is important to educate society about its rights starting
from a young age because the more the government is allowed to intrude
into society’s privacy, the easier it will be for the government to do so.
Justice Potter Stewart said it best:
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from
which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of
glass, so that he was as invisible after he entered it as he would
have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to
exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye—it
was the intruding ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply
because he made his calls from a place where he might be
seen.158

American citizens should not have to deal with the “intruding ear,”—the
government.159 That is the court rationale that should be followed to protect
society’s privacy. Current legislation that is going to the Senate for
consideration is H.R. 699: Email Privacy Act.160 The proposed bill will
eliminate the “loophole” by requiring government agencies to seek warrants
for digital communications 180 days or older.161 Warrants require probable
cause, versus what is being used now, subpoenas, which do not.162 This is a
great bill to ensure more privacy to American citizens because it will
increase the difficulty to obtain such information by government agencies.
This is the type of legislation—ways of making wiretapping more
difficult—needed to be enacted or it will be difficult to draw a distinct line
of where domestic surveillance ends. Benjamin Franklin once said,
“[t]hose who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary
156.
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safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”163 This founding father would
definitely be disappointed in today’s society for allowing such intrusion
into its privacy.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite great technological progress, increasing free trade, instant
access to international communications, and other positive aspects of
globalization, the world is still characterized by systematic and widespread
violations of human dignity. For example, it is difficult to express in words
the shocking actions of terrorist organizations such as the “Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria” (ISIS). In the 21st century, the systematic killing of
innocent human beings, slavery, torture, and other violations of human
dignity should not happen. The widespread killing of ethnic and religious
minorities and other atrocities, committed in territories controlled by ISIS,
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show the reality of the existence of extreme political evil and the
importance of confronting crimes against humanity by all means.
According to Malcolm Nance, leading expert on global terrorism,
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—“ISIS” or “the caliphate of
the Islamic State”—has become the single most dangerous threat
to global security since al-Qaeda. It is more than just a threat to
America and the West, because it also poses an existential threat
to Islam: its goal is to coopt or enslave 1.8 billion Muslims. 1

ISIS’s terrorist actions are global in scope. However, to properly
understand the nature of ISIS’s international crimes and why a normative
response is necessary to end its actions, it is essential to focus on its
activities in a concrete historical setting and against specific people.
This article focuses on crimes against humanity in the context of
ISIS’s violations of fundamental human rights of the Assyrian people.
Crimes against humanity are very closely related to international human
rights law, just as war crimes are closely related to international
humanitarian law.2 The concept of crimes against humanity was first used
by George Washington Williams to describe Belgium’s practices in the
Congo in the 1890s,3 and again in 1915 to describe the widespread
massacre of the Armenian people by the Ottoman Empire.4 It is important
to remember that the Assyrian people were also victims of Ottoman actions
during the 19th and 20th centuries.5 Therefore, the concept of crimes
against humanity, in that historical context, should also be applicable to the
crimes against Assyrians.
Today, Assyrians are once again victims of one of the most extreme
forms of political evil, defined by international law as “crimes against
humanity.”6 Those crimes include widespread murder, torture and
persecution. Assyrian Christians are one of the main victims of the
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criminal actions of ISIS.7 As a distinct minority ethnic and religious group,
they were the victims of systematic human rights violations during Saddam
Hussein’s regime in Iraq, and during other oppressive regimes. 8 In the
current historical context, those violations have become more extreme in
territories controlled by ISIS. Assyrians have been targeted because of their
ethnic and religious identity.9 They have been systematically murdered,
tortured and enslaved by ISIS’s militants, and Assyrian women have been
raped and forced into sexual slavery.10
International law is one of the most powerful discourses to analyze and
provide answers to ISIS’s actions against the Assyrian people and other
ethnic and religious groups. To properly understand the place of
international law, in situations such as the crimes against humanity
committed by ISIS, it is necessary to consider not only the applicable
international legal norms, but also philosophical, historical, and cultural
issues that influence the process of creation and implementation of legal
principles and norms.
II.

WHO ARE THE ASSYRIAN PEOPLE?

The Assyrian people are an ethnic and religious group which has a rich
historical and cultural heritage. They have inhabited the territory of what is
now Iraq for thousands of years. They speak Syriac, which is a language
derived from Aramaic.11 Assyrians were among the first people groups to
convert to Christianity, in the first to third centuries, and they spread their
religious beliefs across the Middle East in the following centuries.12
The Assyrian church has a theology which is similar to the Catholic
faith.13 Assyrians believe in Jesus Christ as the Son of God, they believe in
the death and resurrection of Jesus, and they accept the Bible as being

7.

Id.

8.

MINDY BELZ, THEY SAY WE ARE INFIDELS xviii (2016).

9.
AMNESTY INT’L, ETHNIC CLEANSING ON A HISTORIC SCALE:
SYSTEMATIC TARGETING OF MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 4 (2004).
10.
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Id. at 16.

11.
Hannibal Travis, The Cultural and Intellectual Property Interests of the Indigenous
Peoples of Turkey and Iraq, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 415, 434 (2009).
12.
Christine Chaillot, The Ancient Oriental Churches, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
CHRISTIAN WORSHIP 131, 161 (Geoffrey Wainwright & Karen Westerfield Tucker eds., 2006);
WILLIAM BAUM & DIETMAR WINKLER, THE CHURCH OF THE EAST: A CONCISE HISTORY 7–12 (2000);
A.J. MACLEAN, SYRIAN CHRISTIANS, 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 167, 170 (James
Hastings ed., 1920).
13.
See W.A. WIGRAM, M.A., D.D. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE ASSYRIAN
CHURCH 1909, http://www.aina.org/books/itthotac/itthotac.htm.
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inspired by God.14 According to the “Profession of the Orthodox Faith of
the Holy Apostolic Catholic Assyrian Church of the East,” Assyrian
Christians adhere to seven tenets of faith: priesthood, holy baptism, oil of
chrism, Holy Qurbana (Eucharist), absolution of sins, Holy Heaven, and the
sign of the life-giving cross.15 Unlike ISIS’s followers, Assyrian Christians
have a missional history; however, they do not believe in forcing others to
conform to their religious beliefs.
Some authors hold the view that the term “Assyrian Christians” has
more of an ethnic connotation than it does a religious one.16 The Assyrian
people are seeking to have their own land in the Nineveh region where they
can be politically independent to protect their status as a people group.17
When the Arab people invaded and conquered the region, the
Assyrians were subjected to religious and cultural discrimination and
persecution.18 They were often treated as second-class citizens, and did not
have the same political and social rights as others.19 In the 19th and 20th
centuries, the Assyrians were repeatedly massacred and persecuted by the
Ottoman Empire, which viewed them as a potential threat. During World
War I, the “Assyrian Genocide” claimed between 175,000 and 250,000
lives at the hands of the Ottoman Empire.20
In 1932, the Assyrian people refused to become part of the state of
Iraq, instead, choosing to be recognized as a “nation within a nation.”21
Assyrian Christians enjoyed a short period of peace from the 1940s until
1963, but have been persecuted by both Iraqi and Syrian Islamic extremists

14.

Id.

15.
Profession of the Orthodox Faith of the Holy Apostolic Catholic Assyrian Church of the
East, MAR YOSIP PARISH, http://www.maryosipparish.org/aboutus.aspx?TID=2 (last visited Sept. 30,
2016).
16.
Jeremy Courtney, What Everyone Gets Wrong About the Persecution of Christians in
Iraq, THE WEEK (Apr. 10, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/548138/what-everyone-gets-wrong-aboutpersecution-christians-iraq.
17.
See Romsin McQuade, Iraq’s Persecuted Christians Are In Limbo, THE TELEGRAPH (July
30, 2014, 12:05 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11000168/Iraqspersecuted-Assyrian-Christians-are-in-limbo.html.
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since then.22 Between 2003 and 2009, “over 350,000 Iraqi Christians have
fled (at least one-third of the Iraqi Christian population).”23
In recent years, the Assyrian people have found themselves the target
of further discrimination and persecution at the hands of ISIS terrorists.24
ISIS justifies its international crimes—against religious and ethnic minority
groups—by using a totalitarian religious discourse which dehumanizes
anybody who has a different worldview.
III. ISIS’S IDEOLOGICAL SOURCES OF JUSTIFICATION FOR CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY
For Malcolm Nance, a leading expert on ISIS, “[t]he global jihad
movement is arguably the most wealthy, influential, and violent terror cult
in the history of humankind.”25
ISIS is an insurgent and terrorist organization which has the objective
of establishing an Islamic Caliphate.26 The Management of Savagery is a
document which serves as a foundation for ISIS’s ideology and actions.
Regarding this document, journalist Jessica Sterns writes:
Al Naji wrote of the necessity of violence, in all its “crudeness
and coarseness,” in order to awaken potential recruits to the
reality of the jihadis’ war and to intimidate enemies by showing
the price they would pay for their involvement. 27

The ideology of ISIS is often expressed in audio and video messages.
One of those messages reflects the complete disregard of any view which
opposes them. Al Adnani, an ISIS spokesperson, believes that all
fundamental ideas which originated in the West, including Christianity,
secularism and democracy, should be rejected by Muslim believers and
they should embrace Jihad against non-Muslims.28 This is consistent with
the Salafist perspective of Islam which is a fundamental tenant of ISIS’s
ideology. Salafism is a theological interpretation of Sunni Islam which
22.
Travis, supra note 11, at 448 n.43 (citing Annia Ciezadlo, Iraq’s Christians Consider
Fleeing as Attacks on Them Rise, Christian Sci. Monitor, 7 (July 13, 2004); Stephen Franklin, They
Dream of Survival, Chi. Trib., 1 (Apr. 1, 2004)).
23.
Michael Youash, Iraq’s Minority Crisis and U.S. National Security: Protecting Minority
Rights in Iraq, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 341, 343 (2008).
24.
Paul Isaac, The Urgent Reawakening of the Assyrian Question in an Emerging Iraqi
Federalism: The Self-Determination of the Assyrian People, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 209, 212 (2008).
25.

NANCE, supra note 1, at 189.

26.

See JESSICA STERN & J.M. BERGER, ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR 1 (2015).

27.

Id. at 114–15.

28.

Id. at 117.
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seeks to eliminate idolatry.29 Salafism holds the view that they are the only
true Muslims.30 Shi’a Muslims, and the ones who embrace democratic
values, are apostates. 31
Another key aspect of ISIS’s ideology is an aggressive extreme form
of jihad. Regarding this, Cole Bunzel, a leading expert on ISIS, says:
“[t]he Islamic State also emphasizes the offensive form of jihad, which in
the Wahhabi tradition is premised on the uprooting of shirk, idolatry,
wherever it is found. . . .”32
ISIS’s ideology seeks the destruction of religious and political symbols
of whoever opposes its views. This terrorist methodology serves to
promote widespread violence and sectarian wars between Sunni and Shiite
Muslims.33 Malcolm Nance synthesizes ISIS’s ideology as follows:
In the interpretation of ISIS, their ideology commits them to
work solely in the belief that all God wishes, is prayer and
devotion to God and commitment to the literal words of the
Qur’an and the events it predicts. . . . They believe the only way
to convince 1.8 billion Muslims that God is pleased with the
beheading of children and the rape of women is to characterize
those acts as a form of worship. This is the interpretation of ISIS
that defines their cultism. All mass murder, subjugation, slavery,
death and more death is the highest form of worship to God.
They are his instrument and absent direct orders they accept that
they are fulfilling the events of the Qur’an’s book of
Tribulation.34

ISIS’s ideology promotes the view that its members who die in suicide
attacks, are expressing their greatest faith in God, which insure them a place
in Paradise.35 Secretary of State John Kerry stated that ISIS’s “entire
worldview is based on eliminating those who do not subscribe to its

29.
Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, 7 (Mar.
2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-ideology-of-the-Islamic-State.pdf.
30.
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Id. at 8.

32.

Id. at 10.

33.
Maj. Aaron L. Jackson, Hunting Down Terrorists “Wherever They Exist”: ISIL in Syria
and the Legal Argument for United States Military Operations Within the Territory of a Non-Consenting
Nation-State, 74 A.F. L. REV. 133, 138 (2015) (quoting Charles River Editors, The Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria: The History of ISIS/ISIL, supra note 14, at 17 (2014)).
34.
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35.
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perverse ideology.”36 ISIS has pointedly attacked any other group that it
considers to be in apostasy, including Shia Muslims,37 Yazidis,38 and
Christians.39 Because this persecution is based on religious identity, it will
not stop unless either all of the “non-believers” are eliminated, or ISIS is
defeated. ISIS’s interpretation of Sharia law specifically authorizes this
conduct, sanctioning aggressive jihad against all non-Muslims.40
IV. ISIS’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AGAINST THE ASSYRIAN AND OTHER
RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS
To accomplish its objectives, ISIS seeks to expand its control of
territories and populations, in Iraq and Syria, by using all available means,
including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment,
torture, rape, persecution, enforced disappearance and other inhumane
actions. ISIS’s actions constitute extreme violations of fundamental norms
of international law, including international human rights law and
international humanitarian law.
ISIS’s international crimes include
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
In March of 2016, the European Parliament officially recognized that
the actions of ISIS against minority groups including Assyrian Christians
are classified as international crimes.41 Just days later, the United States
followed suit, in a rare unanimous vote in the House of Representatives.42
Regarding the main characteristics of ISIS’s actions in its control
territories, Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan said:
Typically, when ISIS takes over a new town, the first facility it
establishes is a so-called Hudud Square, to carry out Sharia
punishments such as crucifixions, beheadings, lashings, and hand
36.
Matthew Rosenberg, Citing Atrocities, John Kerry Calls ISIS Actions Genocide, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/world/middleeast/citing-atrocities-johnkerry-calls-isis-actions-genocide.html?_r=0.
37.
Hamdl Alkhshall & Angela Dewan, 40 Dead in ISIS Attack on Iraqi Shiite Shrine,
Officials Say, CNN (July 8, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/08/middleeast/iraq-isis-attack-shiite/.
38.
David Stout, Be Captured and Killed, Or Risk Dying of Thirst: The Awful Choice Facing
the Refugees of Sinjar, TIME (Aug. 6, 2014), http://time.com/3085270/iraq-yazidi-mount-sinjar-islamicstate-refugees/.
39.
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amputations. It then establishes a Sharia court, police force, and
security operation station. The work of Sharia police known as
al-Hisbah, is not restricted to the implementation of the religious
code, but also includes regulation of the marketplace.43

The testimonies before the United States House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs, regarding Assyrians and other religious and
ethnic groups, show that ISIS is responsible for widespread violations of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law.
According to the hearing:
These communities—Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, Yezidis,
Alawites, and others—are under mortal threat in their ancestral
homelands. And the mass execution of men, the enslavement of
women and children, and the destruction of religious sites, is part
of the ISIS effort to destroy these communities, to destroy all
evidence of the preexistence of these communities. In fact, ISIS
maintains a special battalion. They call it the ‘‘demolition
battalion.’’ And that battalion is charged with going after art and
going after artifacts, religious and historic sites that it considers
heretical or idolatrous, and their job is simply to destroy
history.44

The Assyrian people, together with other Christian communities, have
been systematically persecuted in the territories controlled by ISIS. This
persecution is based on ethnic and religious reasons.45
Regarding the Assyrian and other Christian communities in Iraq, Brian
Katulis, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, writes:
“ISIS[’s] seizure of Mosul and surrounding parts of the nearby Nineveh
Plains devastated Christian communities that had roots in those areas
reaching back more than 1,500 years.”46
Amnesty International has documented a number of ISIS crimes.
Regarding ISIS’s actions against the Assyrian people and against other
ethnic and religious minorities, Amnesty writes:

43.
(eBook).

MICHAEL WEISS & HASSAN HASSAN, ISIS: INSIDE THE ARMY OF TERROR 230 (2016)

44.
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The group that calls itself the Islamic State (IS) has carried out
ethnic cleansing on a historic scale in northern Iraq. Amnesty
International has found that the IS has systematically targeted
non-Arab and non-Sunni Muslim communities, killing or
abducting hundreds, possibly thousands, and forcing more than
830,000 others to flee the areas it has captured since 10 June,
2014.47

Since April 2013, ISIS has expanded its influence and exerted its
control over large territories and populations in Syria and Iraq.48 ISIS
indiscriminately targets civilian populations, including children, and
systematically violates fundamental human rights, displacing civilian
populations and violating the right to life of minority groups in ISIS
occupied territories.49 According to the United Nations:
Where ISIS has occupied areas with diverse ethnic and religious
communities, minorities have been forced either to assimilate or
flee. The armed group has undertaken a policy of imposing
discriminatory sanctions such as taxes or forced conversion—on
the basis of ethnic or religious identity—destroying religious
sites and systematically expelling minority communities.
Evidence shows a manifest pattern of violent acts directed
against certain groups with the intent to curtail and control their
presence within ISIS areas.50

ISIS has systematically targeted Christian populations and churches.
In September and October of 2013, ISIS fighters destroyed one Greek
Catholic church, occupied an Armenian Orthodox church, and burnt down
another Armenian church.51 As ISIS spreads, so does the destruction of
Christian places of worship.52
ISIS terrorists have publicly beheaded, shot, and stoned civilians,
including women and children, mutilating and publicly displaying the
bodies.53 This is often justified by “the practice of takfir, declaring
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someone to be a heretic.”54 ISIS victimizes entire communities by forcing
them to witness the executions.55 Following the executions, ISIS will
display the corpses on crosses for days, or place heads on spikes, to
intimidate local populaces.56
Some of ISIS’s most disturbing crimes illustrate its complete lack of
respect for children’s rights. “Children have been the victims, perpetrators
and witnesses of ISIS’s executions.”57 ISIS has beheaded and shot children
“for alleged affiliation with other armed groups,” and has also forced
children to execute others.58 Trauma is also inflicted on children through
the psychological effects of public executions, either through forced
attendance or by viewing the mutilated corpses in the coming days.59
Inflicting terror on children is not an accidental byproduct of ISIS’s
actions; rather, children are prioritized “as a vehicle for ensuring long-term
loyalty, adherence to their ideology and a cadre of devoted fighters that will
see violence as a way of life.”60 These actions are inhumane, shocking, and
barbaric. They are contrary to any rational understanding of what it means
to be human. In philosophical terms, these actions constitute extreme
political evil.
ISIS systematically destroys churches, monuments, and other
important cultural buildings, without military importance, of any ethnic or
religious group that opposes its ideology.61 Those actions, against protected
objects, are international crimes and violations of international
humanitarian law.62
V.

ISIS AND THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

Widespread murder, torture, rape, forced disappearance, sexual
slavery, forcible displacement, sentencing and executions without due
process of the law, forced pregnancy are some of ISIS’s international
crimes.63 ISIS is consistently and systematically violating fundamental
norms of international human rights law and international humanitarian
law. Those actions are international crimes. International crimes are often
54.
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organized and implemented by government entities or by organizations that
have political objectives, such as terrorist organizations. Regarding the
interconnectedness of diverse international crimes, Wayne McCormack
writes:
There are also fundamental links among terrorism, genocide, and
slavery. A great deal of collective violence is based on ethnic or
cultural identity. The crimes of genocide and crimes against
humanity reflect not just an intolerance of widespread violence
but a revulsion for treating people as less than human.64

The different names used for international crimes help us understand
why ISIS’s actions are crimes against humanity. According to Professor
Bassiouni, “[i]nternational crimes are also called ‘delicti jus gentium’
(crimes against humanity) . . . U.S. founders, often citing European scholars
like Grotius, Vattel, Ayala, and Gentili, referred to them also as ‘crimes
against mankind’ and crimes ‘against the whole world,’ and their
perpetrators as ‘enemies of the whole human family.’”65
The term “crimes against humanity” was first used by the framers of
the Nuremburg Charter; it was selected by U.S. Supreme Court Justice,
Robert Jackson, who was the chief U.S. prosecutor during the Nuremburg
Trials.66 It was used then to describe the actions of extreme political evil
perpetrated by the Nazi regime, including the systematic killings of
innocent human beings solely because of their ethnic and religious identity.
The crimes against the Jewish people were so extreme that they were
considered not only to be crimes against the Jewish, but against all
humankind.67
In the same way, the actions of ISIS against Assyrian Christians and
other groups—systematic torture and murder of innocent human beings,
motivated solely because of ethnic and religious identity—are so extreme
that they constitute crimes against all humanity. This means, that these
crimes are committed not only against the Assyrian people, but also against
the American people, the French people, the Russian people, the Bolivian
64.
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65.
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people, the Nigerian people, and all other people of the world. Regarding
the characteristics of crimes against humanity, David Luban stated:
[First], the phrase, “crimes against humanity,” suggests offenses
that aggrieve not only the victims and their own communities,
but all human beings, regardless of their community. Second, the
phrase suggests that these offenses cut deep, violating the core
humanity that we all share and that distinguishes us from other
natural beings.68

Luban also states, that crimes against humanity “are so universally
odious that they make the criminal hostis humani generis—an enemy of all
humankind, like the pirate on the high seas under traditional international
law.”69 Luban points to the Biblical account of Cain as an example of the
concept of hostis humani generis, quoting God’s banishment of Cain in
Genesis 4: “The voice of thy brother’s blood crieth unto me from the
ground. And now art thou cursed from the earth, which hath opened her
mouth to receive thy brother’s blood from thy hand . . . a fugitive and a
vagabond shalt thou be in the earth.”70 Cain became “unfit for the society
of anyone, and (within the moral limits of proportionality) anyone’s
legitimate target”—an enemy of humanity.71
The Charter of the international Military Tribunal for the Trial of Nazi
War Criminals defines crimes against humanity as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before
or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of, or in connection with, any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.72

Consistent with Professor David Luban’s view, there are five legal
features of crimes against humanity: crimes against humanity are
committed against fellow nationals and foreign citizens; they are
international crimes committed by politically organized groups; they consist
of the most extreme acts of violence and persecution and they are inflicted
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on victims because of their membership to a specific population.73 Each
one of these distinctive features can be applied to ISIS’s crimes against
Assyrian Christians.
ISIS’s crimes are committed against both fellow nationals and against
foreigners. The “Islamic State of Syria and Iraq” acts against anyone that
stands in the way of its goal to create a global caliphate. ISIS has shown its
capability to commit crimes around the world, in addition to its ground
campaign in Iraq and Syria.74 Assyrian Christians are Iraqi and Syrian
nationals, as are many ISIS members. The crimes committed by ISIS are
done against foreign and national citizens. The crimes against the Assyrian
people and other groups, who are under the political control of ISIS, are
comparable to the Nazi regime crimes which included German and nonGerman citizens.
ISIS justifies its actions by applying its “legal” system, which is a
version of Sharia law, in territories under its control. Those norms include
the justification of the killing of human beings who do not share ISIS’s
view of Islam.75 It is obvious that, by any rational standard, ISIS’s “legal
system” is unjust, irrational and a perversion of the meaning of law. ISIS’s
actions are crimes against humanity and its “legal system” cannot be used
to justify its criminal behavior.76
Traditionally, there was a ‘state action’ requirement for a crime to be
considered a crime against humanity; that is, they “could be committed only
by state actors, or by high—placed civilians embroiled with state actors.”77
However, international law has changed in this area, and this requirement is
not necessary anymore. This has been seen in cases such as the actions of
non-state actors, Serb militias, during the Bosnian War and the civilian
groups who perpetrated a significant part of the Rwandan genocide.78
73.
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Today, the requirement of state action has transformed into a
requirement of “organizational responsibility.”79 Professor Luban claims
that, “the definition of crimes against humanity emphasizes the collective
character of the perpetrator.”80 Crimes against humanity are characterized
not by whether a state actor is involved, but rather by whether the
perpetrator has decided to participate in a widespread and systematic attack.
ISIS has made its political strategy, to systematically torture and kill
Assyrian Christians. These crimes have been committed while the
organization claims to exert legitimate political power over the citizens of
its conquered territory, and are justified by ISIS’s interpretation of Sharia
law.81
Therefore, there is an organizational responsibility in the
commission of the crimes.
According to Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, there are two
categories of crimes against humanity: the first includes crimes such as
“murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and ‘other inhumane
acts,’” such as food deprivation, violating corpses, forced witnessing of
atrocities against loved ones, and so on.82 Such crimes are considered
within the realm of crimes against humanity because of the “sheer ugliness”
inherent in their commission.83 The second category, or “crimes of the
persecution type,” as Luban terms it, includes acts such as persecution
based on racial, religious, political, or other grounds; this persecution can
take various forms, including “deprivations of the rights to citizenship, to
teach, to practice professions, to obtain education, and to marry freely;
arrest and confinement; beatings, mutilation and torture; confiscation of
property; deportation to ghettos; slave labor; and extermination.”84
Therefore, there is no doubt that ISIS is committing crimes against
humanity of the “murder” type and the “persecution” type. As it was
established in a previous section of this Article, ISIS’s crimes consist of the
most extreme acts of violence and persecution.
ISIS’s international crimes against Assyrian Christians are among the
most repugnant in modern history. ISIS has repeatedly raided, kidnapped,
and murdered Assyrian Christians since it came to power, and it has
committed other heinous acts such as destroying Assyrian homes and
79.
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churches, vandalizing and digging up Assyrian cemeteries, and forced
displacement from cultural and historical lands.85
ISIS’s crimes are committed against the Assyrian Christians and
against other ethnic and religious minorities because of their ethnic and
religious identities. The victims are “getting attacked for being (rather than
for doing).”86 This is a clear description of what ISIS is doing to Assyrian
Christians. The victims of ISIS’s crimes are not being singled out for their
identities as individuals, but rather because they are identified as part of an
ethnic and religious group.87
ISIS’s raids target villages with
predominantly Christian populations, and ISIS’s bombings in Syria
specifically target Christian neighborhoods, like the bombings of
restaurants in Qamishli, Syria.88
Crimes against humanity have two elements: actus reus and mens
rea.89 Regarding the first element, Professor Kriangsak Kittichaisaree
writes:
The actus reus of a crime against humanity . . . comprises
commission of an attack that is inhumane in nature and character,
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body, or to mental, or
physical health. The inhumane act must be committed as part of
a widespread or systematic attack against members of a civilian
population.”90

ISIS’s actions of systematic murder of ethnic and religious minority
groups, persecution of anybody that opposes its religious ideas and others,
are extreme inhumane actions which not only seek to exterminate
Christians and other religious groups, but are aimed at causing unspeakable
suffering to innocent human beings. This is done as part of ISIS’s policy
and it is implemented in systematic attacks against civilian populations.
85.
List of Assyrian and Other Churches Destroyed in Syria, ASSYRIAN INT’L NEWS AGENCY
NEWS (Dec. 13 2:15PM), http://www.aina.org/news/20151212211531.htm; See also ISIS Bomb
Assyrian Homes, Monastery in Iraq, Cemeteries Vandalized, ASSYRIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS
AGENCY NEWS (Dec. 26, 2015, 10:21 85PM), http://www.aina.org/news/20151226052124.htm.
86.

Luban, supra note 68, at 105.
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Belz, supra note 8, at xiii.
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John Davison, Twin Suicide Bombs in Northeast Syria Kill Dozens, REUTERS NEWS (Dec.
2:01am), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds-idUKKBN0UD1WZ
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For example, when ISIS captured Mosul in June of 2014, it issued an
ultimatum to Assyrian Christians in the city: convert to Islam, pay the jizya
tax, or be murdered.91 As a result of this ultimatum, over ten thousand
Assyrian Christians left the city within the month.92 ISIS has repeatedly
raided Assyrian villages and kidnapped or murdered Christians and other
minority groups. Often, the terrorist insurgent organization has sold women
and children in the human trafficking market.93 Senior UN official Zainab
Bangura confirmed in August, 2015, that ISIS had released a “price list” for
captured sex slaves.94
Regarding the mens rea element of crimes against humanity, professor
Antonio Cassesse writes: “[a]s the ICTY Appeals Chamber held in Tadic
(Appeal), the perpetrator needs to know that there is an attack on the
civilian population and that these acts comprise part of the attack.”95 The
perpetrator must have some mens rea, or subjective intent, for their crime to
be considered a “crime against humanity.” Regarding this subjective
element, Cassesse writes:
To sum up, the requisite subjective element or mens rea in crimes
against humanity is not simply limited to the criminal intent (or
recklessness) required for the underlying offence (murder,
extermination, deportation, rape, torture, persecution, etc.). The
viciousness of these crimes goes far beyond the underlying
offence, however wicked or despicable it may be. This
additional element—which helps to distinguish crimes against
humanity from war crimes—consists of awareness of the broader
context into which this crime fits, that is knowledge that the
offences are part of a systematic policy or of widespread and
large-scale abuses.96

As it was seen before in this Article, ISIS’s religious totalitarian ideas
have the specific intent, as a matter of policy and as part of a systematic
plan, to exterminate those that do not agree with their version of Islam.
Therefore, ISIS terrorists have knowledge that their actions are part of a
91.
Iraqi Christians Flee after ISIS Issue Mosul Ultimatum, BBC NEWS (July 18, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28381455.
92.
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Islamic State ‘Abducts Dozens of Christians in Syria’, BBC NEWS (Feb. 24, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31601451.
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widespread and systematic effort to attack and destroy the Assyrian civilian
population and other religious minority groups. As part of ISIS’s strategy
to implement its ideology, ISIS terrorists force Assyrian and other minority
groups to choose between adopting its religious extremist worldview or
death.97
VI. ISIS, POLITICAL EVIL, AND THE DEHUMANIZATION OF THE OTHER
Legal ideas and principles are reflections of specific theological and
philosophical presuppositions. To understand the nature of ISIS’s crimes
against humanity and the normative response of the international
community, it is necessary to have a philosophical consideration of the
case.
As rational human beings, who are concerned and attempt to make
sense of the world in which we live, how can we understand the extreme
violations against the human dignity of the Assyrian and other ethnic and
religious groups in territories controlled by ISIS? The word “evil” properly
describes actions that can be characterized as crimes against humanity. One
of the most important analyses, in the history of Western philosophical and
theological ideas, regarding the problem of evil was done by St. Augustine
of Hippo.
Charles T. Matthews describes Augustine’s perspective on evil in the
following paragraph:
[T]he Augustinian tradition interprets evil's challenge in terms of
two distinct conceptual mechanisms, one ontological and the
other anthropological. Ontologically, in terms of the status of
evil in the universe, it understands evil as nothing more than the
privation of being and goodness—‘evil’ is not an existing thing at
all, but rather the absence of existence, an ontological
shortcoming. Anthropologically, in terms of the effect of evil on
a human being, it depicts human wickedness as rooted in the
sinful perversion of the human's good nature—created in the
imago Dei—into a distorted, mis-oriented, and false imitation of
what the human should be. Privation and perversion: together,
these capture the conceptual contours within which the tradition
proposes its practical response to evil.98

Although individual members of ISIS may irrationally believe that
their religious totalitarian ideas are true and justify their crimes, their
actions against innocent Assyrians and other people, of course, lack
97.
See Iraqi Christians Flee After Isis Issue Mosul Ultimatum, BBC NEWS (July 18, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28381455.
98.
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goodness altogether.99 These actions constitute a “privation of being.” The
systematic murder and torture of innocent human beings is an ontological
shortcoming. The extreme wickedness of ISIS’s actions is a perversion of
what human beings are supposed to be and do.
Regarding the place of the rational will and the problem of evil in
Augustine’s perspective, G. R. Evans writes:
The only creature capable of acting against the good, and
bringing about an evil happening, is a creature with a mind of its
own. Augustine located the source of evil . . . in the rational will,
which is free to choose between good and evil. . . . In De Natura
et Gratia, he shows that the nature of man, too, was created
faultless (sine ullo vitio), having all good things from God: life,
senses, mind. The fault that darkened and weakened those
natural goods did not come from the Creator but from the good
free will he gave them (De Nat. et Grat. I. iii.3). It is in this
sense, that every evil event may be said to have a mind behind
it.100

The will of sovereign states and non-state actors, is an essential
element to understand the problem of evil in international relations. In
exercising its free will, often sovereign states and non-state actors can and
do choose to behave consistent with just normative standards which seek,
among other things, to protect the humanity and dignity of other fellow
human beings and of ethnic and religious groups which are different from
one’s own.
In other situations, sovereign states and non-state actors, such as ISIS,
exercise their free will by murdering innocent persons, torturing and
committing other crimes, which are contrary to what a human being should
rationally do. In the Augustinian tradition, those actions are considered
actions of extreme evil. When evil actions are done to accomplish political
objectives, such as in the case of ISIS, those action are a form of extreme
political evil. Regarding Augustine’s analysis of will and reason, Evans
writes:
Evil cannot change directly the good natures God has made. The
alteration of those natures is possible . . . [i]t takes place in this
way: evil arises in the will of rational creatures and makes itself

99.
See ISIS Attack Assyrian District in Syria, Five Killed, ASSYRIAN INT’L NEWS AGENCY
(May 22, 2015 07:34 GMT), http://www.aina.org/news/20160522033449.htm; see also IS Group Killed
21 Christians in Al-Qaryatain, Says Patriarch, ASSYRIAN INT’L NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 11, 2016, 05:53
GMT), http://www.aina.org/news/20160411015349.htm.
100.
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felt by clouding their reason and making it impossible for them to
think clearly or to see the truth. They then act upon the world in
such a way as to twist everything they touch out of its proper and
good nature into something diminished or perverted—as far, that
is, as God allows. It is in the mind, then, and specifically in the
will (which together with the memory and the understanding,
makes up the mind) that we must look for signs of evil.101

Applying this to ISIS’s crimes against the Assyrian people, it can be
said that the reasoning of ISIS leaders is clouded by their inhumane
ideology, which systematically dehumanizes people who disagree with their
view of the world. Regarding the relationship between crimes against
humanity and the dehumanization of others, Professor Wayne McCormack
said:
There are also fundamental links among terrorism, genocide, and
slavery. A great deal of collective violence is based on ethnic or
cultural identity. The crimes of genocide and crimes against
humanity reflect not just an intolerance of widespread violence,
but a revulsion for treating people as less than human. 102

The dehumanization of others is one of the most important factors
behind the actions of terrorist organizations.
ISIS systematically
dehumanizes its victims, while simultaneously accusing them of attacks
against ISIS’s version of the Islamic faith.103
This distorted view of reality has influenced ISIS’s militants thinking.
Their distorted reasoning has influenced their wills and this has led them to
disregard fundamental natural human rights, such as: the right to life, and
the right to religious freedom. This has led to an unjust use of violence
against the Assyrian, and other ethnic and religious groups—which ISIS
sees as apostates—and therefore, as less than human. Because of this,
thousands of innocent children, women, and men have been murdered by
ISIS. According to St. Augustine:
there is no single cause of evil; rather, everyone who does evil is
the cause of his own evildoing. If you doubt this, recall what I
said earlier: [e]vil deeds are punished by the justice of God.

101.

Id. at 104.
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They would not be punished justly if they had not been
performed voluntarily.104

The cause of ISIS’s evil actions is found in its leaders’ and followers’
will. Therefore, they can justly be punished for their actions of extreme
political evil. They are responsible for the use of their free will and its
consequences. St. Augustine further writes:
[T]here are traits like the love of praise and fame, and the will to
power. When that drive is not subject to reason it makes us
wretched, and no one considers himself superior to another
because of his wretchedness. When these impulses of the soul
are ruled by reason, a human being is said to be ordered. For we
should not call it right order, or even order at all, when better
things are subjected to worse. . . . Therefore, when reason, mind,
or spirit, controls the irrational impulses of the soul, a human
being is ruled by the very thing that ought to rule according to the
law that we have found to be eternal. 105

ISIS’s irrational desire to conquer people who disagree with their
ideology, exterminate those that do not convert to their version of Islam,
and establish a sovereign state where there is absolutely no respect for
fundamental human rights, is against natural reason and conscience. ISIS’s
irrational ideas are seen in its view of “infidels,” in its view of other
religions, and in its view of human nature.
International legal instruments have a language that addresses political
evil actions. This language is mainly expressed in the fields of international
criminal law, international human rights law, and international
humanitarian law. These areas of international law are expressions of the
common will of humankind against actions of extreme political evil.
Considering that widespread violations of fundamental human rights are
crimes against humanity, analysis of the human rights discourse is
especially relevant for this work.
VII. THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECT FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS
As the international community is witness to the widespread violations
of international human rights’ norms by ISIS, it is essential to have a

104.
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normative language which properly addresses inhumane actions in the 21st
century such as what Assyrian Christians are facing in the Middle East.106
One of the most powerful answers to the irrationality of extreme
political evil actions—such as those of ISIS against Assyrian Christians, is
the recognition, by governments and individuals, of the inherent dignity of
each human being and the importance of ensuring that a global culture of
respect for universal human rights becomes a main foundation for the
international normative and political systems.
Regarding the importance of the human rights discourse, Professor
Mark Amstutz writes: “[m]uch of the discussion about ethics in
international relations takes place in making use of the vocabulary of
rights.”107 The language of international human rights is a powerful
instrument to prevent and punish crimes against humanity such as the ones
of ISIS.
The words of the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) are very relevant for the case of ISIS. It reads:
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted
in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of
mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people. . . .108

ISIS’s actions are an expression of a barbarian ideology which should
outrage the collective conscience of humankind, and the individual
conscience of each rational human being. ISIS is violating the norms of all
international human rights legal instruments, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide.
According to Professor Mary Ann Glendon, “[t]he United Nation's
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, is the single most
important reference point for cross-cultural discussion of human freedom
and dignity in the world today.”109 Considering that the norms of the
106. See Syrian Rebels to Assyrians: Convert to Islam to Keep Your Jobs, ASSYRIAN INT’L
NEWS AGENCY NEWS (Aug. 4, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://www.aina.org/news/20130804131312.htm; see
also Jihadists Seize Christian Village in Syria, Expel Its Residents, ASSYRIAN INT’L NEWS AGENCY
NEWS (May 12, 2012, 4:45 PM), http://www.aina.org/news/20120512124546.htm.
107.

MARK R. AMSTUTZ, INT’L ETHICS 82 (2d ed. 2005).

108.
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109. Mary Ann Glendon, Propter Honoris Respectum: Knowing the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153 (1998).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights are recognized as part of customary
international law, they serve as a compelling source to highlight ISIS’s
violations of international human rights.
Contrary to Article I of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which recognizes the fact that “all human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights,” ISIS denies the freedom and dignity of Assyrian and
other minority groups.110 Against the norm of Article II of the UDHR, ISIS
systematical discriminates others because of race, religion, gender and other
reasons.111 ISIS also violates the customary international norm of Article
III of the Declaration, which recognizes that everybody “has the right to
life, liberty and security of person.”112
In fact, ISIS’s actions against the Assyrian people violate every norm
recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Considering the
importance of this normative source in our current historical context, it is
important to remember the specific norms that the international community
has embraced and ISIS is constantly violating. The Universal Declaration
forbids slavery and the slave trade.113 It prohibits torture and any other
form of cruel treatment of human beings.114 It recognizes the right to legal
personality of all,115 and the principle of equal protection under the law.116
It acknowledges the right to have effective legal remedies for human rights
violations.117 It rejects any form of arbitrary arrest,118 and it recognizes the
right “to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal.”119
ISIS has violated, and continues to violate, fundamental human rights
of the Assyrian and other religious and ethnic minority groups. Among the
rights that ISIS violates, are: the presumption of innocence until proven
guilty,120 and the right not to be subjected to arbitrary interference with
“privacy, family, home or correspondence.”121 ISIS systematically denies
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the right to freedom of movement and residence122 of Assyrian and other
minority groups.
ISIS violates the right of every person “to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution.”123 It also denies “the right to a
nationality;124 the right to marriage and family;125 and the right to
property.”126 ISIS denies Assyrians and other religious and ethnic groups
the right to freedom of opinion and expression,127 and the right to freedom
of association.128
There is no doubt, that the right to life is the most important human
right, and ISIS is systematically violating that norm. Although compared to
the right to life, the right to religious freedom may not seem as
fundamental; in the context of ISIS’s violations of human rights of
Assyrians and other religious minority groups, that right is very important.
The right to religious freedom is of particular significance because one
of the fundamental ideas of ISIS’s religious totalitarian worldview, is the
opposition to the concept of religious liberty. Because of this, religious
minority groups such as Assyrian Christians, have become the main targets
of the terrorist organization. Considering this fact, it is necessary to
highlight the importance of respect for religious freedom as part of the
answer against ISIS’s ideology and criminal conduct.
Professor Robert George, former Chair of the United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom, defines religious freedom
as:
The right to ponder life’s origins, meaning and purpose; to
explore the deepest questions about human nature, dignity, and
destiny; to decide what is to be believed and not to be believed;
and, within the limits of justice for all, to comply with what one
conscientiously judges to be one’s religious obligations—openly,
peacefully, and without fear. 129

Contrary to ISIS’s worldview, the international community has
acknowledged the importance of legally protecting the right of each human
122.

Id.

123.

Id.

124.

Id.

125.

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 108.

126.

Id.

127.

Id.

128.

Id.

129. In Recognition of Dr. Robert George’s Advocacy For Religious Freedom: Extension of
Remarks, 113th Cong. E178 (2014) (statement of Hon. Frank R. Wolf, of Virginia).

100

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 23:1

being to decide what to believe in. International religious freedom, is a
fundamental legal norm which serves to create the conditions for the
peaceful coexistence of diverse groups. Assyrian Christians and other
religious minority groups in ISIS’s controlled territories have the right to
religious freedom. ISIS is violating Article XVIII of the Universal
Declaration of Human Right which states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.130

ISIS is violating fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter
which indicates that the purposes of that international organization are the
promotion and encouragement of “respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion.”131 ISIS is violating the norms of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which recognizes that every human being has the
right to religious freedom, which includes the freedom to express religious
views.132
ISIS is violating the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of
all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief,
which was adopted in 1981. The United Nations Declaration recognizes
that the right to religious freedom includes, among others, the freedom to
worship, the right to write and publish religious literature, and to teach from
a religious perspective.133
VIII. THE UNITY OF HUMANKIND AGAINST ISIS’S INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES
ISIS’s actions, against the Assyrian and other religious minority
groups, are crimes against humanity. Therefore, the involvement of only
some countries, such as France, the United States, Iran, and Russia is not
enough. It is true, that certain countries have the military power to stop
ISIS’s actions; however, from a legal perspective, all countries, both
developed and developing members of the international community, can
and should ensure that crimes against humanity, such as the ones committed
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by ISIS, are stopped and leaders responsible for the crimes are punished
individually.
To accomplish this objective, the concept of universal jurisdiction is
especially relevant. This type of jurisdiction means that all countries of the
world can prosecute and punish ISIS’s individuals who are murdering,
torturing, and raping innocent Assyrians. According to Professor Paust,
Universal enforcement has been recognized over ‘crimes against
mankind,’ crimes ‘against the whole world’ and the ‘enemies of
the whole human family,’ or those persons who become hostes
humani generis by the commission of international crimes. . . .
These crimes also involve obligations erga omnes, which are
owing not merely to certain states and their nationals, but to all of
humankind.134

David Luban describes this type of jurisdiction as “vigilante
jurisdiction,” which “carries the implication that criminals against humanity
are anyone’s fair target.”135 Any nation can take official legal actions
against the perpetrators of crimes against humanity; therefore, all nations
have the ability to respond to the crimes perpetrated by ISIS against the
Assyrian Christians.136
Besides the application of the concept of individual responsibility and
universal jurisdiction to prosecute and punish ISIS individuals, it is
essential that the international community, through international
organizations and each individual country, act to end ISIS’s crimes against
humanity.
There have been some efforts to accomplish that objective. For
example, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2178
directly in response to the threat of ISIS. The resolution “condemns the
violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, sectarian violence,
and the commission of terrorist acts by foreign terrorist fighters,” and calls
member states to cooperate in the efforts to prevent radicalization and
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recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters.137 Another example is Secretary
General Nabil Al-Arabi of the Arab League’s statement, stating: “[w]hat is
happening in Iraq, is that the terrorist organization not only threatens a
state’s authority, but threatens its very existence and the existence of other
states.”138
Many countries have expressed their views through high ranking
officials. For example, regarding ISIS’s crimes, Australian Prime Minister,
Tony Abbot, said, “Australia cannot leave the Iraqi people to face this
horror, this pure evil alone, or ask others to do so in the name of human
decency, what we won’t do ourselves. It is right to do what we prudently
and proportionately can, to alleviate this suffering, to prevent its spread and
to deal with its perpetrators.”139 Khaled Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the
Bahraini Foreign Affairs Minister, indicated that “[t]his situation requires
immediate response from the international community in order to unify
ranks, beleaguer and terminate all terrorist groups.”140
German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, said: “We have seen acts of
unbelievable brutality . . . can we really wait and hope that somebody else
will see it as his or her responsibility? . . . Now, we have the chance to help
save lives and prevent any further mass murder in Iraq, and we must use
this chance.”141 King Abdullah II of Jordan said:
Those who say, this “is not our business” are wrong. The
security of every nation will be shaped by the fate of the Middle
East. . . . The terrorists and criminals targeting Syria, Iraq, and
other countries today are extreme reflections of a global threat.
Our international community needs a collective strategy to
contain and defeat these groups.142

United Kingdom’s former Prime Minister, David Cameron, said, “[w]e
must use all the instruments at our disposal, humanitarian, diplomatic and
military, to squeeze this barbaric terrorist organization out of existence.143
Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, said, “Japan regards the activities of
137.

S.C.Res. 2178 ¶¶ 22–25 (Sept. 24 2014).

138. Agence France—Presse, Islamic State Must Be Confronted ‘Militarily and Politically’ Arab League Chief, GMA NETWORK, (Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/
378152/news/world/islamic-state-must-be-confronted-militarily-and-politically-arab-league-chief.
139. Selected Leader Statements About International Efforts to Counter ISIL and Support the
People of Iraq and Syria, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/seci/c64518.htm (last visited
Oct. 15, 2016).
140.

Id.

141.

Id.

142.

Id.

143.

Id.

2016]

Mantilla

103

ISIL, which extends across national borders and has declared unilaterally
the establishment of a so—called ‘state,’ to be a serious threat to
international order. What is important now is preventing extremism from
taking root while also responding swiftly to the region's humanitarian
crises.”144
Prime Minister Haile Mariam of Ethiopia said, “ISIS’s utmost
savagery is a satanic act that has no religious basis and that needs to be
condemned by all people across the globe . . . the people of Ethiopia,
irrespective of their religious, ethnic, socio-economic and political
differences, should stand in unison to fight extremism and terrorism.”145
The Panamanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned ISIS’s
actions as violations of human rights, intended to “spread panic, grief, and
pain among the peoples of the international community,” and vowed “to
combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and acts of
indiscriminate violence arising from religious, cultural, and ethnic
intolerance.”146
Countries such as Germany, France, and Spain have assisted in the
fight against ISIS by providing military and counter-terrorism training,
while other countries such as Albania, Hungary, Estonia, Greece, New
Zealand, and the Czech Republic have pledged support in the form of
weapons, ammunition, or military personnel. Several nearby Middle
Eastern countries have also pledged their support against ISIS, including
Lebanon, Algeria, Afghanistan, Morocco, Kuwait, and others.147
IX. CONCLUSION
In the current historical context, in which the international community
is witnessing extreme atrocities committed by ISIS against Assyrian and
other ethnic and religious minority groups, it is difficult to make sense of
what human beings are capable of doing, and propose normative responses
to end acts of extreme wickedness. One of ISIS’s main ideological and
legal foundations, to justify its crimes against humanity, is the
144.

Id.

145. Ethiopia: Demonstrations to Protest the Utmost Savagery of ISIS, GEESKA AFRIKA
ONLINE (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.geeskaafrika.com/8653/ethiopia-demonstrations-to-protest-theutmost-savagery-of-isis/8653/.
146. Panama Joins the International Community Coalition Against Islamic State, MINISTERIO
DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://mire.gob.pa/noticias/2015/02/05/panama-se-unecoalicion-de-la-comunidad-internacional-contra-estado-islamico.
147. Jay Akbar, Revealed: The Astonishing Fifty-Four Countries and Groups Battling ISIS…
So why Haven’t they Been Crushed Already?, DAILY MAIL UK (July 10, 2015 04:45 EST),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3154680/The-astonishing-FIFTY-FOUR-countries-groupsbattling-ISIS-haven-t-crushed-already.html.
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presupposition that they have a religious duty to impose their worldview by
using all means. This includes the systematic killing of those that oppose
their ideology such as the Assyrian people.
An integrative jurisprudential analysis, which considers the historical
facts, provides philosophical reflections and applies universal legal norms
to the case, can contribute to understanding the reason for ISIS’s actions
and creates a persuasive discourse in the struggle to end crimes against
humanity.
The Augustinian perspective, on the problem of evil, enables one to
understand ISIS’s crimes against humanity as acts of extreme political evil.
ISIS’s ideology provides an irrational justification for international crimes
against the Assyrian people. Those actions dehumanize Assyrians and
anybody that opposes ISIS’s religious totalitarian ideas. This leads to
widespread violations of human rights which amount to crimes against
humanity.
ISIS’s extreme form of religious totalitarianism is contrary to the
consensus of the international community that has recognized the existence
of fundamental human rights, including the right to life and the right to
religious freedom, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
international legal instruments. The Declaration exists as a result of the
historical agreement, of the international community, to codify norms for
the protection of fundamental inherent natural human rights and human
dignity. Like, the actions of the Nazis against the Jewish community, ISIS’s
extreme political evil behavior requires a compelling normative response to
ensure that the crimes against the Assyrian people and other groups are
stopped and punished.
Considering the nature of ISIS’s actions, they are crimes against the
entire human race. Because of this, a global response to ISIS’s violations of
international law is essential. This approach should engage most members
of the international community, not only powerful countries. In this
decisive moment in the history of humankind, the international community
needs to look back to the ideas which provided the foundation for the
recognition of the existence of universal inalienable human rights. This
will contribute to prevent and punish acts of extreme political evil. This is a
compelling and just normative response to ISIS’s religious totalitarian ideas
and to their crimes against humanity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the divide between law and justice, individuals often propend for
justice and find law. When it comes to international law, individuals might
not even find any law, let alone the sacred ideal of justice. Neither was
international law originally conceived for directly applying to individuals,
nor was any court purposefully created for adjudicating their claims. 1 Yet,
this major gap is prominently perceived when industrial installations and
environmental degradation either affect or threaten to affect individuals’
life. What is the role of international law in adjudicating environmentrelated claims which are put forward by individuals or non-state parties?
The insight to understand how international law and domestic law are
intertwined is not a novel one. Nor is the factual and normative assumption
that individuals are sometimes able to invoke international law norms
specifically in domestic courts rather than in international settings.
Nevertheless, attempts to understand whether international law is apt to
offer a repository of underused assets for advancing the “sacred” idea of
justice in a specific case, before the case appears in court, might be an
interesting one. Not only would domestic courts provide a more proximate
and familiar environment for individuals than international settings, but
they would also be better placed to mandate scientific assessments and
issue enforceable reliefs. Yet, international law is not always easy to adapt
neither to domestic courts nor to specific legal claims.
Kivalina, a community in Northwest Alaska, has recently encountered
many setbacks in the courts of the United States, in what one may
characterize as a long and bitter environmental confrontation with major
corporations, both in terms of climate change litigation and on account of
water degradation due to the operation of the Red Dog Mine, one of the
largest mines worldwide.
In this paper, I will attempt to address Kivalina’s water issues that still
appear outstanding and not addressed after long years of purely domestic
litigation in the courts of the United States. This article will proceed as
follows. Part II.A will address the reasons why it is advisable that
international law be implemented, among other means, within domestic
courts. Parts II.B and II.C hinge on the different approaches U.S. courts
have applied toward international law and how international law can play
out in future environmental claims. I will then consider the factual matters
and case posture of Kivalina claims under Part III.A, with specific reference
to the shortcomings of domestic litigation and the outstanding claims
related to the pollution of water under Part III.B. Under Part III.C, I will
identify which water claims should still be addressed, and how this can be
1.
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 142–44, 376–77 (2nd ed., Oxford University
Press 2005).
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done by looking at the United Nations’ Law of the Sea Convention (LOS
Convention) in order to test the following hypothesis: would Kivalina
residents be able to invoke specific provisions of the LOS Convention in
order to have their claims better addressed in courts of the United States?
In the affirmative, what techniques could be deployed, in light of past and
present approaches of U.S. courts, and specifically the U.S. Supreme Court,
vis-à-vis international law? I conclude by arguing that Kivalina residents
are able to advance water-related claims by relying on the interpretation of
domestic statutes consistent with the LOS Convention. Most specifically, I
will hold that both common law and statutory remedies can be triggered
effectively by relying on the customary character of some of the
environmental provisions contained in the LOS Convention, as summarized
in Part IV.
The foregoing hypothetical is based on a number of assumptions and
limitations. I am assuming that Kivalina residents are/will be willing to
engage in litigation, rather than Alternative Dispute Resolution. Moreover,
I am specifically considering the available information in public domain
documents, yet the factual characterization of the case is necessarily more
complex. Furthermore, notwithstanding the host of issues that might be
addressed, I am going to tailor down this account to solely water issues,
which will not be assessed through multiple sources of international law,
but solely by hinging on the LOS Convention.2 Most fundamentally, I am
going to select exclusively some provisions under the LOS Convention that
may be applicable. The chosen wording for addressing the difference
between U.S. states and States at international law rests on qualifying U.S.
states as states and states at international law as States.
II. THE MIXED FUEL OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The implementation of international law is not a given. All the more
so, the implementation of international law in domestic courts is
specifically challenging due to the host of rules and approaches on how to
domesticate internationally binding law within domestic legal orders.
In order to prepare the groundwork for a prospective application of
international law to the Kivalina case, I will evaluate whether and why a
given legal order should aim as much as possible at a mixed fuel, namely a
combination of domestic and international law to be applied by judges for
the resolution of controversies, especially in environmental matters. I will
then sketch the historical trajectory along which U.S. courts have variedly
applied international law. The ultimate aim is to appraise the likelihood for
U.S. courts to make any use of international law in environmental cases, in
2.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 12, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Convention on the Law of the Sea].
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light of the most recent judgments. I will conclude by arguing that U.S.
courts are not as unfriendly to international law as some scholarship has
depicted them, however, a vein of self-restraint specifically emerges when
environmental claims are advanced through the Alien Tort Claims Act.
A. Do We Actually Need a Mixed Fuel?
If we look at the law as a fuel for development and prosperity, the
preservation of the environment and cohesive communities, it would not be
hard to understand that there is still a long way for environmental laws to
achieve the most effective fuel composition. Almost in every country,
environmental laws are in place, but their enforcement is extremely difficult
as some instances may exemplify. In South Africa, a middle-income
country, transition to democracy has made way for environmental policies
and legislation, but domestic agencies have faltered to enforce
environmental law.3 Conversely, in such a developed country as the United
States, notwithstanding innovative policies,4 enforcement is still critical,
and a survey has shown that two-thirds of U.S. corporate counsels admitted
that their companies had recently violated environmental laws.5
If the law enforcement apparatus is not effective and responsive to
societal concerns on environmental depletion, individuals usually turn to
domestic courts. But what happens if domestic law is not protective
enough? If domestic law is narrowly characterized, i.e. as a body of
normative rules that are domestically produced, individuals might not be
able to find any effective judicial remedy and courts will not play their
established role in the dynamics of checks and balances.
I believe, however, that domestic law can be effectively supplemented
by an additional ingredient to the fuel of prosperity, environmental
protection and cohesiveness, namely international law. This would result
from either application or interpretation. By way of application, domestic
courts are incrementally able and prone to apply international law even
when the latter has not been fully implemented internally, at either the
legislative or executive level (direct application).6
By way of
3.
Angela Mathee, Environment and Health in South Africa:
Opportunities, 32 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 537–43 (2011).

Gains, Losses, and

4.
See Final Policy Statement on Incentives for Self-Policing of Violations, 65 FED. REG. 19,
618 (2000) (the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has incentivized self-policing of violations,
given the multitude of sources of pollution and the difficulties of monitoring them all at a centralized
level).
5.
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAW 1071 (Wolters Kluwer
ed., 7th ed. 2000).
6.
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L. J 2347, 2349
(1991); Simon Marsden, Invoking Direct Application and Effect of International Treaties by the
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interpretation, national courts are often able, and sometimes specifically
required, to construe and apply national law in such a manner that any
conflict with international rules is prevented (consistent interpretation or
the Charming Betsy canon).7 More generally, the types of international
obligations that I will look after in this paper are ‘inward-looking
obligations,’ namely obligations undertaken by the specific State in the
capacity of international actor, in relation to its conduct within its domestic
jurisdiction rather than with other States on the international plane.8
This emerging practice, which has been characterized by Lord
Bingham as almost unimaginable in the past,9 is progressively leading to a
new branch of international law dubbed comparative international law.10
Techniques of implementation differ widely and bring about a variety of
results according to each domestic system,11 yet the domestication of
international law is not contingent to specific domestic cases, but also
contributes to the development and enforcement of international law more
broadly.12 In fact, the implementation of specific international law norms at
domestic level signals and strengthens their legitimacy, allowing for their
overall enforcement according to Thomas Franck’s theory of compliance;
what is more, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has consistently
portrayed domestic courts’ decisions as reflective of international
customary law, and the implementation of specific international law norms
would ease out and fasten the identification of customary rules.13
European Court of Justice: Implications for International Environmental Law in the European Union,
60 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 737, 738–40 (2011); ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 117–18 (2011); Dinah Shelton, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS INCORPORATION, TRANSFORMATION AND PERSUASION 11–13 (Dinah
Shelton ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
7.
Rebecca Crootof, Judicious Influence: Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Charming
Betsy Canon, 120 YALE L. J. 1784 (2011).
8.
Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts as the Natural Judge of International Law: A
Change in Physiogonomy in 3 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 155–68 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., Hart Publ’g 2011); see THE ROLE OF THE
DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1–60 (David Sloss ed.,
Cambridge U. Press 2009) [hereinafter STUDY]; see also David Sloss, Treaty Enforcement in Domestic
Courts: A Comparative Analysis, in THE ROLE OF THE DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1–60 (David Sloss ed., Cambridge U. Press 2009) [hereinafter Analysis].
9.
Lord Bingham, Foreword to SHAHEED FATIMA, USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC COURTS, at xi (Hart Publ'g 2005).
10.
Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of the National Courts in
Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 57, 60 (2011).
11.

CASSESE, supra note 1, at 224.

12.

Roberts, supra note 10, at 58.

13.
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (Oxford University
Press 1990); see Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J.
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Nonetheless, international law is no panacea to the shortcomings of
domestic environmental law. As a “global environmental crisis”14 is
unfolding, international environmental conventions and soft law are at their
apex, yet enforcement often lacks teeth15 and even domestic measures are
sometimes “exported,” making for their (extraterritorial) application in
place of the feeble and fragile specter of international law.16 Yet, exporting
domestic legislation—albeit highly protective—is a byword for diplomatic
hostility and non-coordinated, therefore inefficient, implementation of
common legal rules and principles. For this reason, I am herein
propounding the vision of a mixed fuel scenario of domestic law and
international law as intertwined tools for incrementally addressing
environmental issues that local communities in general, and the Kivalina
community in particular, are faced with.
B. The Mixed Fuel in U.S. Courts: An Overview from the Bench
In order to understand whether the mixed fuel of international and
domestic law might work in the case of Kivalina, which should be
advanced in U.S. courts, I will here overview the historical posture of U.S.
courts vis-à-vis international law, with no intent to provide an exhaustive
line of cases.
Notwithstanding the fairly clear interplay between international and
national law under the monistic and dualistic doctrines,17 the enforcement
of international law in U.S. courts has been characterized as one of “the
‘most confounding’ in the United States law of treaties.”18 Within the
perspective of the present contribution, it is safe to contend that the
confusion is not limited to the United States’ law of treaties, but also vastly
affects the status of international law in U.S. courts, as well as the tools that
are available for individuals to vindicate their rights in court. When and
how do treaties create judicially enforceable individual rights in U.S.
courts?
Rep. 3, ¶¶ 56–58 (Feb. 14); Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign
and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 248 (2008).
14.
DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 269
(University Casebook Series, 5th ed., Foundation Press 2015).
15.

Id. at 367; see some notable exceptions to this assertion id. at 404, 405.

16.

Id. at 1455.

17.
CASSESE, supra note 1, at 213; John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal
Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 311 (1992).
18.
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties 89 AM. J. INT’L L.
695, 695 (1995) (quoting United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979)); David Sloss, SelfExecuting Treaties and Domestic Judicial Remedies 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 346, 509 (2004)
[hereinafter Remedies].
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The choice of U.S. courts for my hypothesis on the Kivalina case is
mainly due to three reasons. Firstly, Kivalina is located in Northwest
Alaska, namely the 49th State of the Union, so that any remedy to be
devised for Kivalina at the domestic level will be set in a U.S. court.19
Secondly, U.S. judges appear to be a good example of a disinterested third
party able to determine the merits of even complex disputes, which is the
assumption of any enforcement of international law in domestic courts.20
Moreover, the case-law trajectory on the interaction between U.S. and
international law epitomizes some of the most fundamental challenges that
a national judiciary faces when approaching international law.
U.S. courts are presently not regarded as particularly international lawfriendly.21 Yet, it strikes to note that in 1972, Justice Powell characterized
domestic courts as the “the best means for the development of a respected
body of international law ‘[u]ntil international tribunals command a wider
constituency.’”22
The very origins of the United States as a country rest with
international law. The Federalist Papers extensively mentioned the role of
the law of nations in U.S. courts, and the Constitution bestowed the judicial
power of the United States not only to cases arising under the Constitution
and the laws of the United States, but also to cases arising under treaties,
and specific controversies of an international kind.23 According to the
majestic expression of the U.S. Constitution, “all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land,” which judges are bound to enforce “any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”24
For this reason, U.S. courts and legislators initially viewed customary
international law and treaty obligations as part of domestic law.25
Indeed, the Supreme Court took the constitutional wording very
seriously, as illustrated in Ware v. Hylton, where it held that a treaty

19.

Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012).

20.

Tzanakopoulos, supra note 8, at 157.

21.
Koh, supra note 6, at 2356–58; Benvenisti, supra note 13, at 248 (sometimes, courts
cannot be international-law friendly on account of statutes prohibiting any reference to so-called foreign
law); Tzanakopoulos, supra note 8, at 166 (citing Oklahoma’s constitutional amendments to prohibit
State courts to consider Sharia law or international law or indeed “the legal precepts of other nations or
cultures.” The Amendment passed by referendum in 2011).
22.

First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775 (1972).

23.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Koh, supra note 6, at 2352 (citing the internationalist approach
enlivened in the Federalist Papers).
24.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Remedies, supra note 18, at 508.

25.
Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 868 (1987).
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overrules all State laws upon the subject.26 Until 1860, the Supreme Court
gave no deference to the executive branch’s interpretation of treaties,27 but
it rather vigorously enforced international law to the detriment of statutes,
and more sparsely interpreted the Constitution itself in light of international
treaties.28
An abrupt change occurred in mid-nineteenth century, when the
Supreme Court started denying treaties’ status of federal law,29 under the
comity exception, the separation-of-powers and related political question
doctrine, as well as the judicial incompetence exception.30
Firstly, under the comity exception, which was further asserted
through the act of state doctrine, the Supreme Justices decided not to
adjudicate on “the acts of the government of another,”31 for sake of a
‘comity’ exception,32 further declaring that no federal common law could
govern the case “except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by acts of Congress.”33
Secondly, the separation-of-powers exception revolved around the
separation-of-powers disclaimer, by which the Supreme Court inaugurated
a phase of deference to the President of the United States,34 and more
generally to the executive power of states. Self-restraint was no more

26.
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796); David Sloss et al., International Law in the Supreme
Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 13
(Cambridge U. Press 2011) [hereinafter Supreme Court].
27.

Supreme Court, supra note 26, at 17.

28.
Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (2006);
Supreme Court, supra note 26, at 41 (where the international law-bound interpretation of the
Constitution is deemed more opportunistic than with statutes).
29.
Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1861–1900 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
US SUPREME COURT CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 55–59, 60, 61–88 (David L. Sloss et al. eds.,
Cambridge U. Press 2011).
THE

30.

Koh, supra note 6, at 2357.

31.
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (noting that "every sovereign State is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State"); see Oetjen v. Central Leather Co,
246 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1918) (act of State doctrine “rests at last upon the highest considerations of
international comity and expediency"); see also Ricaud v. American Metal Co, 246 U.S. 304 (1918);
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
32.

Koh, supra note 6, at 2357.

33.
Erie R Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (a case of diversity jurisdiction on civil
liability overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)).
34.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (holding that “the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations—a power
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every
other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution.”).
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applied in light of mere comity to other countries, but was rather entrenched
in the U.S. separation of powers system, by which any question entailing
determinations on the legality of foreign states’ acts was tantamount to a
political question,35 which appertain to the political branch’s prerogatives.
It is no coincidence that such shift happened quite lately, and precisely in
the 1930s and 40s,36 when alliances were sought and wars waged.37
Thirdly, the Supreme Court branched out the separation-of-powers
doctrine into a new exception, namely the judicial incompetence exception,
by which “the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is
political, not judicial,”38 thus banning not only findings of fact in
international cases, but also the very activity of interpretation regarding
international law and foreign affairs law.39
Besides the three exceptions, more interpretive hurdles were set forth
by the courts. It might have very well been that the wave of human rights
treaties, which swept and reshaped international law after the Second World
War, increasingly put pressure on the U.S. judiciary, and prompted federal
and state courts to hammer out a more defined doctrine of non-selfexecuting treaties, which must be domesticated into national law by a
statute to become the “Law of the Land.”40 The judge-made distinction
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties kept percolating in
the case law as long as the Cold War era ensued, and the need for protecting
U.S. governmental actions might have been one of the reasons for
upholding such a theory.41
A new trend favoring international law was impressed back again in
such decisions as Mendoza-Martinez and Afroyim on denaturalization laws,
35.

United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

36.

See generally United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).

37.

See generally Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 311.

38.

Chicago & S Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Co., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).

39.

Koh, supra note 6, at 2358.

40.
See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718 (1952); Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (individual may not invoke the UN Charter to enjoin detonation of test nuclear
weapons in Marshall Islands); Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1959) (alien may not resist
deportation on ground that U.N. Charter superseded racist provisions of immigration laws); See
Remedies, supra note 18, at 20. But see Hollis, supra note 29, at 76; Lori Fisler Damrosch, Medellin
and Sanchez-Llamas: Treaties from John Hay to John Roberts INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 460 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2011) (according to some commentators, the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties was first shaped in
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829)) (the distinction Foster drew between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties, did not prove a hurdle in the judicial enforcement of treaties. The most extensive
discussion of the issue case in a dissent by Justice Field in Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887)).
41.
Koh, supra note 6, at 2362; Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 398 (which also dates
back to the Cold War era and is a landmark decision on the act of state doctrine).
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which the Court struck down by relying on the Law of Nations.42 The
Eighth Amendment also prominently became a fertile ground for citing
foreign and international sources.43 With Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,44 a
branch of transnational public law litigation seemed to parallel the
achievements of domestic public law litigation45 in Federal courts under the
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA or ATS, Alien Tort Statute).46
In Sosa the Supreme Court explained at length the “transnationalist”
approach historically applied in such decisions as Paquete Habana47 and
Nereide,48 but refrained from adjudicating ATS claims for violations of
“any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar” when the
ATCA was enacted,49 and therefore “specific, universal, and obligatory.”50
The ATS-kind of law of nations, however, was understood as encompassing
even present-day norms of international law.51
The understanding of Sosa is still debated,52 yet it has been argued that
it bestows jurisdiction on Federal courts to decide on customary
international law status if no express interpretation is offered by the
political branches, which is a fairly balanced solution since judges are still
often perceived as unelected actors.53
Yet, the rise of transnational public law litigation was apparently
quelled in recent cases, such as Breard,54 Sanchez-Llamas,55 and Medellin
42.
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161
(1963) (citing the EMER DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS (1758) and HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF
TOTALITARIANISM (2007)).
43.

See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).

44.

See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 442 U.S. 901 (1979).

45.
See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976).
46.

Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).

47.

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 714 (1890).

48.

The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815).

49.

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 U.S. 2739, 2766 (2004).

50.

Id.

51.

Id. at 2761–62; see U.S. v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (2010).

52.

John O. McGinnis, Sosa and the Derivation of Customary International Law
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 481–93 (David L. Sloss et
al. eds., Cambridge U. Press 2011).
53.

Id. at 484.

54.

Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); see Damrosch, supra note 40, at 458.

55.
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 U.S. 2669, 2679 (2006) (concerning the police not
informing a person under arrest or detention that he/she could request his/her own Consulate to be
notified of his/her detention).
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II.56 The latter decision is widely known for having further extended the
wall of separation between domestic law and international law by excluding
the automatic enforcement—absent implementing legislation—of ICJ
decisions when provisions at issue are not self-executing, in this case
Article 94 of the U.N. Charter.57
The legacy of this new line of decisions, and specifically of Medellin,
is a seeming presumption of non-self-execution of international law
norms,58 however enforcing environmental treaties and customary norms
requires a separate analysis, to which I will now turn.59
C.
The Enforcement of Environmental Treaties and Customary
International Law
With respect to environmental agreements, almost twenty years ago
they were considered non-self-executing60 more often than not. In a notable
case, involving the enforcement of international whaling quotas, the
Supreme Court seemed to set aside the political question doctrine61 by
maintaining that, “under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s
characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this
responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political
overtones.”62 In some other instances, courts have not found provisions
specific enough to warrant their application,63 or applicable to non-state
parties.64
More generally, with concern to international agreements, U.S. courts
apply two different approaches that have been labeled as the nationalist
approach and the transnationalist approach.65 Under the nationalist
56.

Medellin v. Texas, 522 U.S. 491 (2008).

57.

U.N. Charter art. 94.

58.

Crootof, supra note 7, at 1787.

59.

Damrosch, supra note 40, at 453.

60.
Daniel Bodansky & Jutta Brunnée, The Role of National Courts in the Field of
International Environmental Law, 7 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 11, 113, 129 (1998).
61.

See Baker, 369 U.S. 186.

62.
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (at the end of
the decision, the Court cited Moby Dick by Melville).
63.

Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (1991).

64.
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Defenders of Wildlife
Inc. v. Endangered Species Scientific Authority, 725 F.2d 726, 726 (1984) (the Court merely referred to
Article VI (2) of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna
(CITES) and then struck down administrative guidelines as incompatible with it); see CATHRIN
ZENGERLING, GREENING INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 57, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013).
65.

Remedies, supra note 18, at 504.
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approach, courts deploy an array of interpretive tools as agents of the
domestic legal system only, while under the transnationalist approach
courts act as agents of both the domestic and international legal system, in a
sort of double role.66 Quite understandably, outcomes vary according to the
specific approach that courts discretionarily apply. Most notably, the
transnationalist approach is shown as the most favorable approach for the
advancement of international law in U.S. courts.67
According to recent empirical research on the subject, the
transnationalist conceptual framework is applied more often than the
nationalist approach when private parties are adverse to each other, rather
than to the government.68
When it comes to customary law, customs in environmental matters
have not been often invoked in court, however such a litigation strategy has
been attempted in some instances by hinging on the Alien Tort Claims
Act.69 In a specific case of alleged pollution of the rain forests and rivers in
Ecuador and Peru, a Federal court implied that a corporation could be liable
to indigenous people for breaches of international environmental law,70 but
later dismissed the claim on the forum non conveniens ground.71
Still, a recent attempt to have human rights law directly applied as
customary law in domestic courts brought about the landmark Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. lawsuit,72 characterizing ATCA as
presumptively against extraterritorial application in the absence of an
express declaration of extraterritoriality on the part of Congress, according
to the political question theory.73 Secondly, it maintained that ATCA can
be invoked only in “causes of action based on sufficiently definite norms of
international law,” namely norms that are “specific, universal, and
obligatory.”74
Not only is Kiobel relevant for environmental litigation, but it also
encapsulates the Supreme Court’s most recent attitude toward ATS
66.
Id. at 522; GEORGES SCELLE, PRÉCIS DE DROIT DES GENS:
SYSTÉMATIQUE pt. 2, at 10–12 (1934).
67.

PRINCIPLES ET

See Remedies, supra note 18, at 509.

68.
Id. at 532 (according to a recent empirical research, in cases where private parties are
adverse to each other, U.S. courts are more likely to apply transnationalist tools than nationalist tools,
whilst in government-party cases U.S. courts are more likely to apply nationalist tools than nationalist
tools).
69.

28 U.S.C. § 1350; see HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14 at 1380–90.

70.

Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470 (2nd Cir. 2002).

71.

See Change of Venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012).

72.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659 (2013).

73.

Id. at 1668; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001).

74.

Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1664–65; Sosa,124 U.S. at 2766.
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litigation, which is all the more restrictive in light of the political question,
separation of powers and act of state theory.75
All in all, such a framework concerning the aptitude of U.S. courts to
either apply or interpret international law will be especially useful as soon
as it is applied to the specific facts of the Kivalina case, which will now be
considered.
III. THE KIVALINA CASE
In this section, I will illustrate the most relevant environmental
impacts that the Red Dog Mine is alleged to have caused on the Kivalina
community and the surrounding environment.
The Red Dog Mine is the United States’ largest mining polluter,
whose activities have been often countered by the nearby Kivalina
community. Three issues have principally arisen from its operation: the
effects of wind-blown ore dust and traffic air pollutants; the disruption of
animal migration; and the unlawful discharge of pollutants in riverine
waters as well as at the port site.
For the purposes of the present paper, I will tailor down the scope of
the research to water-related issues.
With reference to water protection from the operation of the mine,
Kivalina individuals currently perceive that many issues are still
outstanding, in spite of the long-battled lawsuits. Such a recount attempts
to make way for the application of my initial hypothesis stating the need for
a mixed fuel of domestic and international law in the case of Kivalina.
Most notably, I argue that water-related issues that have not been addressed
at domestic level could receive a more effective response through the
intertwinement of domestic law and international law.
A. Factual and Procedural Recount
The Red Dog Mine is a lead and zinc mine, and the most heavily
polluting facility in the United States,76 which was excavated and mined out
by Teck Alaska Incorporated (Teck) on the land owned by NANA
Development Corporation (NANA),77 approximately forty-six miles inland

75.

Koh, supra note 6.

76.
Toxic
Release
Inventory,
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://myrtk.epa.gov/info/report.jsp?IDT=TRI&ID=99752RDDGP90MIL [https://perma.cc/L3XX-TCR
G] (last visited Aug. 2, 2016) (showing Red Dog Mine ranking #1).
77.
CHRISTINE SHEARER, KIVALINA. A CLIMATE CHANGE STORY 79, 106–07 (Haymarket
Books 2011).
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from the coast of the Chukchi Sea.78 Teck is now excavating a nearby
deposit, the Aqqaluk Pit, which is also located on NANA land.79
In order to understand which norms of either treaty law or general
international law are applicable to the case, an overall assessment of the
mine’s environmental impact is in order.
Three main issues have arisen from the operation of the mine. Firstly,
the mine has been deemed responsible of emitting wind-blown ore dust and
traffic air pollutants, principally due to the transportation of mineral ore
from the Delong Mountain Transportation System (DMTS) to a Teck-run
nearby port.80 Secondly, environmental groups and native communities
have been vocal in reporting the disruption of animal migration, mainly due
to the use of the DMTS and the operation of the Aqqaluk Deposit.81 Lastly,
Teck has experienced waste-water discharge issues, inland and at the port
site on coastal/ocean waters.82 With reference to the port site, the Alaska
Spill Prevention Unit has also reported the occurrence of petroleum spills.83
All three types of alleged degradation were perceived by Kivalina
residents, an Iñupiat community living fifty-four miles southwest of the
mine on a thin long-barrier reef island located between the Chukchi Sea and
a lagoon at the mouth of the Kivalina River.84 Kivalina is perhaps best
known as the first village suing major fossil fuel companies on the ground
of their contribution to climate change,85 which is now disrupting not only
the subsistence life of Kivalina but also its own very existence.86
Subsistence is at danger due to the faster migration of animals to northern
colder areas, and related difficulties for hunters to provide the community

78.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RECORD OF DECISION FOR THE RED DOG
MINE EXTENSION AQQALUK PROJECT 1 (2010).
79.

Id.

80.
Id. at 11. The 52-mile DeLong Mountain Regional Transportation System (DMTS) haul
road leads to port facilities located on the Chukchi Sea. The road has been of concern also for the fact
that it passes through the Cape Krusenstern National Monument. However, EPA stipulated with the
Alaska State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) that no adverse impact would ensue if measures and
operational controls were included in the Cultural Resources Protection Plan (CRPP) presented by Teck,
which it did.
81.

Id. at 5.

82.
Red Dog Mine, STATE OF ALASKA CONTAMINATED SITES PROGRAM, http://
dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/sites/reddog.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
83.

Id.

84.

SHEARER, supra note 77, at 101.

85.
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 133 U.S. 2390 (2013); Kivalina, 696
F.3d at 849.
86.

SHEARER, supra note 77, at 101.
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with sufficient traditional food.87 Additionally, recurrent storms and the
rising sea level have put the community under physical and emotional
stress, with a majority of people voting for relocation.88 Indeed, the lawsuit
against the major fossil fuel companies on grounds of climate damages was
intended to collect the necessary funds for relocating the threatened village,
but it was unsuccessful.89
Action has recently been taken with former President Obama
requesting Congress to earmark $400 million “to cover the unique
circumstances confronting vulnerable Alaskan communities, including
relocation expenses for Alaska Native villages threatened by rising seas,
coastal erosion, and storm surges,” which would be administered by a
Coastal Climate Resilience Fund to be established at the Department of the
Interior.90
Nevertheless, given the difficulties in finding an alternative location
and the lack of governmental involvement, I am arguing that more efforts
need be devoted to understanding whether life as it is now in Kivalina can
be ameliorated by way of international law. Domestic law has often been
invoked, especially with reference to water-related issues, but not much has
been achieved, and people in Kivalina still characterize water as being one
of the most urgent challenges to be addressed.91
Given the limited aim of this paper, I will tailor down my quest for
domestic remedies through international law by considering only waterrelated issues that have been attributed to the Red Dog Mine and leaving
aside those contentions that the Kivalina community relates to wind-blown
ore dust and animal wildlife disruption. Both aspects will nonetheless come
up in relation to water issues. In case water claims are established, my
ultimate aim is to tentatively equip Kivalina people with tools to make them
justiciable, and achieve an enhanced quality of life.

87.

Id. at 76.

88.
Id. at 103–04; Glenn Gray et al., Kivalina Consensus Building Project: Results of Doorto-Door Survey (July 2010), http://www.relocate-ak.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/
Kivalina_survey_summary5.pdf.
89.

Kivalina, 133 U.S. at 2390; Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 849.

90.
See Chris Mooney, The Remote Alaskan Village That Needs to be Relocated Due to
Climate Change, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2015/02/24/the-remote-alaskan-village-that-needs-to-be-relocated-due-to-climatechange/ [https://perma.cc/4DPT-EZ2T]; 'President Obama Proposes New Funding to Build Resilience
of Alaska’s Communities and Combat Climate Change' WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/fact-sheet-president-obama-proposes-newfunding-build-resilience-alaskas [https://perma.cc/7BD4-LJK5].
91.

Gray, supra note 88.
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B. Water Issues and Responses at Domestic Law
In the present paragraph, I broach the specific mining processes
undertaken by Teck, which relate to the alleged degradation of water. After
considering the first site (the “Main Deposit”), I will turn to the newly-dug
Aqqaluk Deposit. Finally, I will look at the port facilities, which have been
serving both sites. In all instances, I will also highlight the procedural
history of the relevant environmental claims that have been brought
throughout time, notably by members of the Kivalina community.
Notwithstanding a host of claims, which have been adjudicated by
notoriously advanced courts, most of such water-related issues are still
outstanding, all the more so after the excavation of the second site, namely
the Aqqaluk Deposit.92
The Main Deposit started operating in 1989 and was mined out by
2011.93 It was subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment under
NEPA94 and both a point-source wastewater/stormwater permit and a
dredge-and-fill permit under the Clean Water Act (CWA).95 Ore was
removed from the open pit mine and milled to obtain zinc and lead
concentrates; tailings and process wastewater were impounded in a storage
area (tailings pond); from there, treated wastewater was discharged into the
Middle Fork of Red Dog Creek.96
What is here of concern is the wastewater permit, which is known as
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination permit (NPDES), in that
Kivalina residents rely on that water—specifically, from the Wulik River—
for drinking, subsistence hunting and fishing, and aesthetic enjoyment.97
In 2002, six Kivalina residents filed a citizen enforcement suit under
section 505 CWA, documenting over 2,171 violations of Teck NPDES
permit, of which Teck admitted to more than 1,100.98 The ultimate aim was

92.

See ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d at 849.

93.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 2.

94.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2012) (under §
102(2)(C) NEPA, all major Federal actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment” are to be accompanied by a “detailed statement.” Under 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2016),
Major Federal Action, private projects requiring federal approval are also subject to NEPA).
95.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012) (Teck was
specifically required to apply to and obtain a NPDES permit under § 402 CWA (EPA’s authority and a
dredge-and-fill permit under § 404 CWA (Army Corps of Engineers’ authority))) [hereinafter Clean
Water Act].
96.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 2.

97.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387; SHEARER, supra note 77, at 113.

98.
James Macpherson, Village Claims Red Dog Contamination, COMMUNITY (Sept. 29,
2002, 8:00 PM), http://www.alaskajournal.com/community/2002-09-30/village-claims-red-dog-conta
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to ask the Court to enforce/have enforced the limit standards. The lawsuit
was eventually settled through consent decree with Teck purchasing reverse
osmosis units and good faith-pledging to build an effluent pipeline from the
Red Dog Mine to the Chukchi Sea.99 The interesting part of the settlement
comes about when it reads that, whether Teck Cominco decided not to build
the pipeline for good cause, it would pay a penalty of $8 million, or,
whether it did not build it without a good cause, then it would pay a penalty
of $20 million, both penalties apparently to the Federal Government.100
Turning to the Aqqaluk Deposit, major litigation arose after the EPA’s
issuance of its Record of Decision and new NPDES permit taking into
account the imminent reclamation of the Main Deposit and fast advancing
project for the Aqqaluk Deposit.101 Such issuance followed a complex
Teck-led Supplemental Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIS), which
convinced the EPA to permit the operations and discharges at the Aqqaluk
deposit, lower some of the effluent standards,102 and allow for selfcompliance by Teck coupled with periodic inspections on the part of the
Administration.103 For the fact that Kivalina and Port Hope residents did
not explain why such enforcement strategy was not sufficient, their appeal
was dismissed by both the Environmental Appeals Board and the Ninth
Circuit.104 The SEIS also clearly stated that maintenance of the two
deposits would be needed in perpetuity,105 with the concurrent need of
mination#.V-cOaVUrJEY; see Adams v. Teck Comnico Alaska Inc., No. 3:04–cv–00049–JWS, 2006
WL 2105501 (D. Alaska Jul. 28, 2006).
99.
Kivalina Settlement Summary, TECK, http://www.reddogalaska.com/DocumentViewer.as
px?elementId=128367&portalName=tc [https://perma.cc/VNW6-A5PF] (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
100. Id. (another prong of the settlement dwelled on the compliance Teck pledged to the 1998
permit, as amended in 2003, with a major exception on Total Dissolved Solids (TDS), for which Teck
would have paid a penalty when non-compliance occurred).
101.

Native Village of Kivalina IRA Council v. EPA, 687 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012).

102. Red Dog Mine Extension—Aqqaluk Project: Final Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement, TETRA TECH, INC., (Oct. 2009), http://dnr.alaska.gov/mlw/mining/largemine/reddog/
pdf/rdseis2009vol.1.pdf [hereinafter TETRA TECH, INC.] (most specifically, in their adjudicatory appeal
lodged with the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), petitioners held that the
Alaska certification under § 401 CWA was violating the State’s Antidegradation Policy (no degradation
analysis plan was in place) and amounted to backsliding under CWA (§§ 402(o) and 303(d)(4)),
restricting the cases under which NPDES permit limits might be relaxed in case of permit renewal,
reissuance, or modification. Most notably the contested limits covered average monthly effluent limits
(AMEL) for lead, and the effluents limits for cyanide, zinc and TDS as compared to the 1998 permit
limits. A request for recusation was made towards ADEC’s Commissioner, who was appointed in 2007
by Alaska Governor Sarah Palin as Commissioner of the ADEC, after being Teck’s lawyer for a
decade).
103.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 7–8.

104.

Native Village of Kivalina IRA Council, 687 F.3d at 1216.

105.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 4.
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hazing activities to deter wildlife from using open water at the sites.106
There appears to be, however, no relevant plan in place to address this
specific issue.
All in all, the EPA approved the plan put forward by Teck. The EPA
approved Teck’s plan as the Preferred Alternative, yet the Environmentally
Preferable differed from what Teck proposed, and consisted of three
pipelines for transporting (i) concentrate to the port, (ii) wastewater to the
Chukchi Sea instead of the Middle Fork Red Dog Creek, and (iii) diesel
fuel from the port to the mine.107 The Preferred Alternative was identified
in the plan proposed by Teck because the EPA asserted not to have the
authority “to require construction of a pipeline and a separate marine
discharge, but rather this would be a separate permitting action in response
to an application provided by Teck.”108
Nevertheless, the EPA
acknowledged that the Preferred Alternative was identified precisely on the
basis of the SEIS, including an assessment of impacts that would result
from the construction and operation of the pipeline.109
Teck ultimately opted out of any wastewater pipeline project, lodging
a file with the U.S. District Court for Alaska that contained the findings of a
study it conducted.110
Yet, doubts that Alaskan officials will not be able to monitor the actual
release of water effluents are still looming over the wilderness of Alaska.
All the more so after the EPA tasked the Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation (ADEC) with the NPDES permit program, a
decision that was unsuccessfully challenged in court.111
In June 2014, Kivalina residents faced a public health emergency as
Kivalina’s source of drinking water was contaminated due to an equipment

106. TETRA TECH, INC., supra note 1062 at 245; U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
supra note 78, at 47 (“EPA accepts that personnel may not be available to implement hazing practices
24 hours a day, seven days a week; however, we are confident that the measures Teck proposes will not
result in population-level effects to any species in the vicinity of the operation.”).
107.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 6–7.

108.

Id. at 36.

109. TETRA TECH, INC., supra note 102, at 99 (the SEIS, upon which the Record of Decision is
based, at times appears to ground its assessment on the construction of a water pipeline, which is
“considered reasonably foreseeable in terms of cumulative effects,” on the basis of a future NEPA
action “once Teck finalizes its plans and submits an application to build and operate a wastewater
pipeline.”).
110.

Id. at 110.

111. Akiak Native Community v. U.S. EPA, 625 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (DEC started
administering wastewater and discharge permitting and compliance program for Alaska on October 31,
2012, after the passage of Senate Bill (SB 110) and EPA’s final approval in October 2008, under State
primacy).
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failure at the mine site.112 Teck recognized that the company failed to keep
Kivalina residents informed after the incident,113 and no specific action
appears to have ensued.
By way of difference, Kivalina residents have not brought issues
concerning the port along the Chukchi Sea from where Teck ships minerals
overseas. According to the Alaska Division of Spill Prevention and
Response, the entire transportation corridor (DMTS) from the mine to the
port, including the road, the port facilities, and the barges is under Alaska’s
Contaminated Sites Program, apparently due to escaping (“fugitive”) dust
from operations along the transportation corridor.114 The program is also
addressing historic spills of petroleum products at the mine.115 Still, risk
assessments have never covered organic compounds associated with past
petroleum hydrocarbon spills at the port site, allegedly because they occur
in localized areas and generally remain at depth or beneath pavement,
apparently being “not in a place where current human exposure occurs.”116
Moreover, it does not appear that the Corps made a decision to issue,
deny or update a Rivers and Harbor Act Section 10 permit for any work or
structures at the port sites.117
The EPA acknowledges the existence of a pollution issue concerning
the port site and nearby wetlands.118 In its Record of Decision to the SEIS,
it deemed wetlands already contaminated due to past and ongoing fugitive
dust emissions from the road.119 The latest independent study on fish

112. Jillian Rogers, After Red Dog Spill, Kivalina Issues Wulik River Water Advisory, THE
ARTIC SOUNDER (June 20, 2014), http://www.adn.com/article/20140620/after-red-dog-spill-kivalinaissues-wulik-river-water-advisory [https://perma.cc/6MLH-M942].
113.

Id.

114.

STATE OF ALASKA CONTAMINATED SITES PROGRAM, supra note 82.

115. Red Dog Mine, DIVISION OF SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE CONTAMINATED SITES
PROGRAM, http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/sites/reddog.htm [https://perma.cc/BN7T-BQKW] (last visited
Jan. 15, 2017) (Red Dog Mine sites are subject to the regulatory requirements under DEC Contaminated
Sites Program (CSP), pursuant to 18 AAC 75.360).
116.

Id.

117. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1899); see generally United States v.
Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); see generally United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S.
224 (1966).
118.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 6.

119. Id. (the EPA concedes that a concentrate pipeline would have manifold beneficial effects.
It would avoid truck traffic, reduce fugitive dust emissions and future dust-related effects on the
environment, as well as reduce effects on traffic-induced caribou movement to the advantage of
Kivalina’s harvest of caribou. Concerning particulate matters, EPA asserts that it is highly unlikely that
the PM2.5 NAAQS is exceeded, but does not exclude that.); id.at 4 (the State of Alaska has proposed to
adopt the federal PM2.5 standard, although this has not yet been finalized. According to area
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population was undertaken by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game
Division of Habitat in 2011, and it seems to ambiguously reveal that heavy
metals were found in the Dolly Varden fish population in the Wulik
River.120 Yet, no sampling was undertaken in marine waters. The only
available sampling on marine water appears to date back to 2003, and was
published in 2007 but the ensuing assessment does not seem to be in the
public domain.121
Furthermore, the latest study concerning heavy metals on mosses and
soils can only be tracked to 2001, when the highest levels of heavy metal
concentrations were retrieved near the Red Dog Haul Road, prompting
evaluators to state that those levels equaled or exceeded (1.5 – 2.5 times)
“maxima reported for samples from severely polluted regions in Central
European countries.”122
Harvesting animals both at sea and in the tundra, Kivalina residents
have been concerned with possibly heightened blood lead level (BLL).123
The EPA did not address the issue in its Record of Decision, stating that
there was no baseline to contrast current BLLs against since no blood lead
levels were collected prior to the opening of the mine.124 In 2005, Teck and
ADEC signed a Memorandum, later amended in 2007, by which Teck
designation in 2006 (the latest issued) Northwest Arctic Borough is unclassifiable/attainment areas for
PM2.5 under Part C of the Clean Air Act (CAA)).
120. ALVIN G. OTT & WILLIAM A. MORRIS, AQUATIC BIOMONITORING AT RED DOG MINE
2010, ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME DIVISION OF HABITAT vi (2011) (the study on the
Dolly Varden fish concluded that it “is unlikely that tissue metals concentrations or changes could be
related to events at the Red Dog Mine since large Dolly Varden fishes attain their growth in the marine
environment.” However, ADEC Spill Division acknowledges that marine degradation principally
results from ore dust-blown pollution).
121. DIVISION OF SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE CONTAMINATED SITES PROGRAM,
APPENDIX A 23 (2007); see STATE OF ALASKA CONTAMINATED SITES PROGRAM, supra note 82.
122. Jesse Ford & Linda Hasselbach, Heavy Metals in Mosses and Soils on Six Transects Along
the Red Dog Mine Haul Road, ALASKA (May 2001), http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/docs/
reddog/reddogrpt2.pdf.
123. Elizabeth J. Kerin & Hsing K. Lin, Fugitive Dust and Human Exposure to Heavy Metals
around the Red Dog Mine, 206 REVIEWS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION AND TOXICOLOGY 60
(David M. Whitacre ed., Springer 2010) (residents do not appear to have blood levels of concern,
however no statistical analysis and no isotopic studies were undertaken for elucidating the
environmental source of blood level in children. Moreover, the last public health analysis dates back to
2001 and referred to blood tests undertaken in the 90s); see Public Health Evaluation of Exposure of
Kivalina and Notak Residents to Heavy Metals from Red Dog Mines, DIVISION OF SPILL PREVENTION
AND
RESPONSE
CONTAMINATED
SITES
PROGRAM,
http://dec.
alaska.gov/spar/csp/docs/reddog/publichealthexpos_102501.htm [https://perma.cc/HJA3-45EK] (last
visited Jan. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Heavy Metals].
124. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78; see Jason Prno &D. D.
Slocombe, 'A Systems-Based Conceptual Framework for Assessing the Determinants of a Social License
to Operate in the Mining Industry' 53 ENVTL. MGMT. 672 (2014).
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committed to hammer out and implement a fugitive dust risk management
plan.125 The latter gave rise to a series of Annual Management Plan
Reports, the latest of which is from 2013 and refers to a 2007 human health
and ecological risk assessment undertaken by Teck-contracted Exponent.126
The human health risk assessment stated that harvesting remained off limits
only within the DMTS, and the ecological risk assessment evaluated
potential risks to “ecological receptors inhabiting terrestrial, freshwater
stream and pond, coastal lagoon, and marine environments from exposure
to DMTS-related metals,” therefore also at the port site.127 No specific
action, however, was undertaken.
C. A Proposed Solution at International Law
The mixed fuel of domestic and international law, as proposed in
Section II of this paper, is not intended to remain wishful thinking, but
should rather be tested in practice, and specifically in the Kivalina case.
I will first assess which water-related claims might not have found a
proper response in previous litigation. I will contend that this legal gap
could be filled by applying relevant international law norms, and
specifically the LOS Convention. Since its provisions can only be applied
in U.S. courts if they are proven customary, I will draw on political
statements, relevant case law and scholarship in order to prove that specific
environmental provisions of the LOS Convention have reached the rank of
customary rules. I will advocate for the adoption of the Charming Betsy
canon when invoking relevant federal law, namely NEPA, the CWA,
EPCRA, the Rivers and Harbors Act, as well as Alaska private nuisance
law. To my understanding, such interpretation of domestic law can be
embraced by U.S. courts, allowing for the recoup of damages to be awarded
to Kivalina people and the prevention of further pollution.

1. In the Aftermath of Domestic Litigation:
Prospective Outstanding Claims
In the following paragraph, I briefly summarize the main water-related
impacts of the mine sites on Kivalina residents that are still outstanding,
125. Elizabeth J. Kerin & Hsing K. Lin, supra note 123 (residents do not appear to have blood
levels of concern, however no statistical analysis and no isotopic studies were undertaken for elucidating
the environmental source of blood level in children. Moreover, the last public health analysis dates back
to 2001 and referred to blood tests undertaken in the 90s); see Heavy Metals, supra note 123.
2014),
pdf.

126. See Fugitive Dust Risk Management Plan 2013 Annual Report, RED DOG MINE (Nov.
https://dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/sites/docs/2013_fugitivedustriskmanagementplan_annualreport.
127.

Id. at 8.
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either because they were not mitigated through domestic litigation or they
never achieved the status of legal claims.
As explained in Sections III.A and III.B, three factors have been and
are allegedly affecting inland and coastal waters, as well as Kivalina
residents’ life, namely (i) the water pollutants discharged from the mine
sites onto the Middle Fork Red Dog Creek, which confluences with the
Ikalukrock Creek and then flows into the Wulik River, the source of
Kivalina’s drinking water and a tributary of the Chukchi Sea; (ii) the
contamination of the fish population, which constitutes part of Kivalina’s
subsistence life, through effluents in the river, and ore deposits/possibly oil
spills at the port site; (iii) the contamination of marine waters and sediments
at the port site due to air pollution and possibly oil spills.
Some of these adverse impacts of the mine operations have already
been known, e.g., the exceedance of effluents discharges on the creeks.128
Some of these impacts have seemingly been overlooked, such as the
presence of petroleum and ore contamination at the port site.129 Past
litigation under both Alaska and federal law—albeit somewhat successful—
has not addressed specific issues, nor provided long-term solutions.
Some leeway left for effective litigation might revolve around the
following: (i) the need for compensating individuals, rather than the
executive branch, for noncompliance of Teck with environmental laws; (ii)
the need to increase permit standards and assess the impact of wastewater
discharges, oil spills and air-borne ore dust on the marine environment, at
least at the port site, since no follow-up ensued the 2007 ecological risk
assessment undertaken by Teck-contracted Exponent, which evaluated
potential risks to ecological receptors inhabiting terrestrial, freshwater
stream and pond, coastal lagoon, and marine environments from exposure
to DMTS-related metals; (iii) the need to tackle the presence of
hydrocarbon spills, even in localized areas, and primarily at the port site
since the site might well become a Superfund site130 if no proper action is
undertaken; (iv) the need for an Environmental Assessment in light of fresh
data to be collected, especially at the port site; (v) the tools that are
available for preventing the unlawful degradation of waters; (vi) the
feasibility of building a wastewater pipeline directly discharging on the
Chukchi Sea so that Kivalina’s residents’ drinking water would not risk
being contaminated; (vii) the protection of the marine ecosystem from
climate change, and the protection of Kivalina from submergence.

128.

See SHEARER, supra note 77, at 113.

129.

See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78.

130. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability, 42 U.S.C. §§
9601–75 (2012).
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2. Possible Responses from International Law: A Case for the Law
of the Sea Convention
I now turn to the LOS Convention in order to test the hypothesis that I
put forward in Section I, namely whether outstanding water issues of
Kivalina can be addressed by way of a mixed fuel encompassing
international (substantive) law and U.S. (procedural and substantive) law.
The chosen international law instrument to be deployed in the case is
the LOS Convention, namely the most comprehensive, and successful,
instrument for protecting the seas. For the purpose of this paper, I will not
be able to offer a fair account of the Convention’s history, case law and
varied implementation.131 Rather, I will first overview the sections
specifically relevant to the case, give an account of the positioning of the
United States vis-à-vis the Convention and understand whether a case can
be made for the customary status of some of the Convention’s
environmental provisions.
Indeed, here lies a legal dilemma: the United States has never ratified
the Convention, but the ‘magic’132 of customary law has persuasively been
invoked with respect to specific sections of the Convention.
If it is true that the law of the sea is “as old as nations,”133 the modern
law of the sea is also the remarkable result of UNCLOS III, a nine-year
negotiated conference extending the efforts of the previous UNCLOS I and
II conferences.134 The Convention resulting from UNCLOS III notably
contains a comprehensive legal framework devoted to the protection and
preservation of the marine environment (Part XII), encompassing a variety
of provisions, among which general obligations, monitoring and
environmental assessment, international rules and national legislation to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment,
enforcement in general and provisions for the smooth coordination of the
LOS Convention with other conventions on the protection and preservation
of the marine environment.135

131. See generally JAMES B. MORELL, THE LAW OF THE SEA: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
1982 TREATY AND ITS REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES (McFarland 1992); DAVID D. CARON &
HARRY N. SCHEIBER, BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS (2004); HUGO CAMINOS ET AL., LAW OF
THE SEA, FROM GROTIUS TO THE INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 2015).
132. Quoting Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L.
491 (2008).
133.

LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 212 (2d ed. 1979).

134. LORI F. DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
1354 (West Academic 2014).
135.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 207.
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The United States signed and ratified all four UNCLOS I conventions.
It also actively engaged in UNCLOS III negotiations, yet an abrupt change
of posture occurred after the election of President Reagan, when, among
other opposition techniques, an internal U.S. policy review known as the
Green Book was being circulated at the Conference in early 1982, with the
proposal of over 100 amendments.136 On that account, President Reagan
considered the deep seabed provisions137 fatally flawed and in contrast with
his “free enterprise philosophy.”138 In July 1982, Reagan announced that he
would not sign the Convention, which nonetheless hit all previous records
with 117 countries signing on the very first day it was open to signature.139
As early as in 1983, Reagan announced that the United States regarded
the LOS Convention, save for the deep seabed mining provisions (Part XI),
as containing “provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans
which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly
balance the interests of all states.”140 Reagan sketched instances of the
traditional uses of the oceans as navigation, overflight, and generally all
high seas rights and freedoms that are not resource related.141 Quite
interestingly, the Declaration also encompassed a number of statements
concerning the marine environment, establishing a 200 nautical mile
Exclusive Economic Zone with a view to enable “the United States to take
limited additional steps to protect the marine environment,” specifically by
working “through the International Maritime Organization and other
appropriate international organizations to develop uniform international
measures for the protection of the marine environment while imposing no
unreasonable burdens on commercial shipping.”142
After the adoption of the Convention’s Implementing Agreement by
the U.N. General Assembly in 1994,143 the Convention was sent to the
Senate for advice and consent, which have not been given yet.144
Since this paper is geared toward judicial remedies, it is worth
considering whether U.S. courts have characterized the LOS Convention as
part of customary law. Firstly, I am going to tackle this issue by looking at
136. TED L. MCDORMAN, SALT WATER NEIGHBORS: INTERNATIONAL OCEAN LAW
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 101 (Oxford University Press 2009).
137.

Id. at 102.

138.

Id. at 103.

139.

Id. at 104; TETRA TECH, INC., supra note 102, at 99.

140.

Ronald Reagan, President, U.S. Statement on United States Oceans Policy (March 10,

141.

Id.

142.

Id.

143.

DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1357.

144.

Id.

1983).
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courts’ understanding of the customary character of the LOS provisions in
light of the declarations made by the United States in that concern.
Secondly, I will turn to a tentative analysis of the customary character of
some of the LOS environmental provisions at international law and besides
the understanding that U.S. courts have had of the political branch position
on the issue.
With reference to the courts’ view on the U.S. Executive Branch
stance toward the LOS Convention, the Supreme Court has consistently
maintained that the United States has not ratified the Convention, “but has
recognized that its baseline provisions reflect customary international
law.”145 This understanding has prompted a District Court to note in Sarei
v. Rio Tinto, that the United States “is obliged to refrain from acts that
would defeat the object and purpose of the agreement,”146 specifically when
the norms at issue are customary norms reflected in Article 194(1) of the
LOS Convention, but dismissed the claim as non-justiciable, which was
overturned in appeals.147 Eventually the Supreme Court vacated the
appellate judgment and remanded the case to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Kiobel.148
The Appellate Judges affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the
non-justiciable character of the claim for it being a political question and
rendered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice, which means any further
attempt to bring the same case to court is ruled out.149
Be that as it may, the finding of a customary character of specifically
Article 194(1) by the District Court was not contended, and will be material
to the Kivalina case, as I will explain further in this paragraph under the
prong of a general (non US-based) assessment of the customary nature of
some of the LOS Convention’s environmental provisions. Nevertheless, in
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, the district court approached the environmental claims of
the dispute by asking for and obtaining evidence of the linkage between the
mining corporation and the State where environmental violations
occurred,150 yet it later dismissed the case precisely because any such act
145. United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 (1992) (citing Brief for United States 25, n.6)
(internal quotation omitted); Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 198 F.3rd 297,
305 (1st Cir. 1999).
146. Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc., 221 F. Supp 2d. 1116, 1116 (2002); see also Rio Tinto PLC et al.
v. Alexis Holyweek Sarei et al., 133 U.S. (2013); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc., 722 F.3d 1109, 1109
(9th Cir. 2013).
147.
148.
(2013)).

Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
Rio Tinto, 722 F.3d at 1109 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659

149.

Id. at 1207.

150.

OREN PEREZ, ECOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: RETHINKING
Publ’g 2004).

THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT CONFLICT (Hart
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would fall under the act of state doctrine, making any claim non-justiciable.
Were the customary character of Article 194(1) to be put forward in future
claims, courts might be confused by the district court’s request of a linkage
between the corporation and the State in the perpetration of the alleged
environmental violations. Such a linkage would not be present in the
Kivalina case since the concession for exploiting mineral resources is
granted by a Nonprofit Organization, NANA Regional Corporation Inc.,
rather than by the state or the federal government, and the latter have no
part in the management of the mines.
As a separate strand from the U.S. positioning and practice, U.S.
courts might alternatively consider whether provisions show a customary
character at international law.151
Any such inquiry should follow the strict dicta put forward by the
Second Circuit in Kiobel, even more so in the context of environmental
cases since Kiobel was an environmental case also.152 The first step of the
evidentiary inquiry dwells on retrieving “international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting
states,” which in this case is the LOS Convention.153 As Kiobel maintains,
the treaty’s evidentiary value for customary law depends on the number of
signatory parties and the parties’ relative influence on the issue,154 which
are quite numerous and would lead to the affirmative in the case of the LOS
Convention.155 Nonetheless, the further steps pointed out by Kiobel are not
as easy to assess since evidence of a custom also springs from a general
principle of law recognized by civilized nations; an international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; or judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most qualified publicists of the various nations, which
would only constitute subsidiary means for the determination of rule of law.
Since the Convention’s text was finalized and adopted, all countries
have agreed that many provisions parallel the provisions included in the
UNCLOS I Conventions, and even some of the provisions that had no
UNCLOS I counterpart are clearly established customary law.156 As of late
2014, 167 countries have become party to the Convention, and 147 of them
have become party to the Implementing Agreement.157 It is, however, safe
151.

Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 634.

152.

Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1660.

153.

Id. at 1161.

154.

Id. at 1166.

155.

Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 634.

156.

DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1356.

157. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, BLUEBIRD, http://www.bluebirdelectric.net/oceanography/Ocean_Plastic_International_Rescue/United_Nations_Convention_On_The_
Law_Of_The_Sea_UNCLOS.htm (last visited Oct. 15 2016).
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to say that the UNCLOS I Conventions still govern States Parties to them,
but it also governs States Parties to the UNCLOS III Convention insofar as
the latter did not supersede the earlier Conventions.158 Since the 1958
Conventions are guides to the customary law of the sea governing States
not party to the convention, we now turn to those.159
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas, resulting from UNCLOS I,
encompasses several provisions seeking to ensure safety at sea (Article 10)
and the prevention of sea pollution by the discharge of oil from ships or
pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed
and its subsoil (Article 24), or even from the dumping of radioactive waste
(Article 25).160 It does not, however, comprise some of what UNCLOS III
would later cover, namely pollution from land-based sources, through the
atmosphere and from dumping at sea (Article 207 – 212), nor its
enforcement provisions, notably foreign vessels, by port countries (Article
218 covering pollution in the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive
economic zone) and coastal countries (Article 220 covering pollution in the
territorial sea and exclusive economic zone).161
With reference to land-based sources of marine pollution (LBSMP),
which is material in the case of Kivalina, it was argued that customary law
is established as covering the principles and obligations of good
neighborliness and reasonable use of the seas.162 The same commentator,
however, also recalled the customary nature of Article 207 of the LOS
Convention (Pollution from land-based sources), which is eventually
deemed too general for effectively tackling this kind of pollution, but the
author did not set as his objective to provide a thorough account of all the
applicable provisions of the Convention to cases of land-based pollution
affecting the marine environment.163

158. MORAKINYO ADEDAYO AYOADE, DISUSED OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS AND PIPELINES
TOWARDS “SUSTAINABLE DECOMMISSIONING” 56 (Kluwer Law Int’l eds., 2002); DAMROSCH &
MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1359.
159.

DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1359.

160.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 10, 24, 25.

161. DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1494; see Convention on the Law of the Sea,
supra note 2.
162. Daud Hassan. Land-Based Sources of Marine Pollution: The Global Framework for
Control AUSTL. INT’L L. J. 61, 62 (2003).
163. See id. (for retrieving soft law instruments relating to LBSMP, most notably Montreal
Guidelines for Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-Based Sources,
Decision 13/18/li, Governing Council of Unep (May 24, 1985); Washington Declaration on Protection
of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities, a/51/116, Annex I, Appendix li (Nov. 3, 1995).
Further soft law instruments relevant to the environmental provisions of the LOS Convention are, inter
alia, Principles 7 and 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Intergovernmental Working Group on
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In my view, the underused assets of the Convention’s environmental
provisions can be better retrieved in the repository of the general provisions
(Arts. 192 – 196). As sharply noted, Article 192 sets forth an obligation on
“States,” rather than “States Parties,” to “protect and preserve the marine
environment,”164 alternatively implying (i) the customary character of such
rule; (ii) obligations for third-State parties within the meaning of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Articles 34 – 48 of the
VCLT);165 or, (iii) a general principle of international law, which is the
most favored option by commentators.166 The term pollution and dumping
are quite broadly defined in Article 1 of the LOS Convention.167 Article
192 of the LOS Convention seems to require active measures to maintain or
improve the marine environment,168 in “all parts of ocean space both within
and beyond the limits of any national jurisdiction.”169
Article 192 is further fleshed out in Article 194(1), whereby “States
shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent”
with the Convention “that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from any source, using for this purpose
the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their
capabilities, and they shall endeavor to harmonize their policies in this
connection.”170 Again, the article appears applicable also to countries that
have not ratified the LOS Convention,171 and clearly refers to the need for
establishing international standards (also Article 213 – 222 of the LOS
Marine Pollution (IWFMP) Principles for Assessment and Control of Marine Pollution (1971),
a/Conf.48/lwgmp.li/5).
164. Myron H. Nordquist et al., Commentary, United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. IV, 39 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985).
165.

1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

166.

Nordquist et al., supra note 164.

167. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 1(1)(4) (pollution of the marine
environment means:
The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in
such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and
reduction of amenities.
According to Article 1(1)(5)(a) dumping means “(i) any deliberate disposal of wastes or other
matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea; (ii) any deliberate disposal
of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea.”).
168.

Nordquist et al., supra note 164, at 40.

169.

Id. at 43.

170.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 1, ¶ 1.

171.

Nordquist et al., supra note 164, at 64.
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Convention), to be enforced through national organs, whether judicial or
not.172 Most notably, Article 194(3) provides that prevention/protection
measures should be applied in relation to a number of circumstances, and,
for the purposes of this paper, “(a) the release of toxic, harmful or noxious
substances, especially those which are persistent, from land-based sources,
from or through the atmosphere or by dumping; (b) pollution from vessels,”
taking into consideration vessels’ construction, equipment, operation and
manning.173 Pursuant to Article 194(5), the required measures “shall
include those necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as
well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other
forms of marine life,” which is specifically suited to the ecosystems in and
around Kivalina.174
Nonetheless, what is most important to assess is the host of
international standards that would allow these provisions to be specific
enough, in the light of the Sosa decision, to supplement domestic rules.
With relation to pollution from vessels, MARPOL175 would fill in the gap
or suggest an increase of domestic standards through its six technical
annexes requiring preventive measures covering five categories of
substances, as well as a Protocol concerning Reports on Incidents Involving
Harmful Substances.176 Differently, with relation to the inadequacy of
water permit standards, further standards cannot be provided by the
Convention on Biological Diversity, since the United States signed it in
1993, but never ratified it.177 Rather, possibly applicable provisions can be
retrieved in the LOS Convention itself, and specifically in Article 204(1),
which sets forth the obligation for “States” to “observe, measure, evaluate
and analyze, by recognized scientific methods, the risks or effects of
pollution of the marine environment.”178
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 204(2) of the LOS Convention, States
shall “keep under surveillance the effects of any activities which they
permit or in which they engage in order to determine whether these
activities are likely to pollute the marine environment.”179 The obligation
172.

Id. at 65.

173.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 194, ¶ 3.

174.

Id. ¶ 5.

175. See generally International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(Marpol), Nov. 2, 1973, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-1, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184.
176. MYRON H. NORDQUIST ET AL, UNCLOS 1982 COMMENTARY SUPPLEMENTARY
DOCUMENTS 803 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012).
177. Robert F. Blomquist, Ratification Resisted: Understanding American’s Response to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1989–2002, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 493 (2002).
178.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 204, ¶ 1.

179.

Id. at art. 204, ¶ 2.
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to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was acknowledged
as customary in character under certain circumstances by the ICJ in the
Pulp Mills case,180 and a domestic court might be able to flesh out the
content of Article 204 of the LOS Convention by mandating EIAs on
environmental agencies, even when the activities have been permitted but
long-term effects were not duly/possibly anticipated.
All in all, Article 192, Article 194 and Article 204 of the LOS
Convention, as supplemented by further instruments at international law,
are seemingly apt to be applied also in domestic settings, on ground of their
fairly established customary character and specificity.181 With reference to
the U.S. judicial setting, specificity would be needed for these provisions to
meet the Sosa test and therefore be applied either directly as a rule or
indirectly as a standard within the canon of interpretation (the Charming
Betsy canon). Moreover, the holding by which Article 194 of the LOS
Convention partakes in customary law has never been invalidated through
the Sarei v. Rio Tinto case law.182
Be that as it may, this conceptual framework is now to be applied to
the specificities of Kivalina’s prospective claims.

3. The LOS Convention at Play in Kivalina
In the following paragraph, I specifically address the water issues that
I have previously characterized as still outstanding for Kivalina residents in
light of my contention on the customary character of Articles 192, 194 and
204 of the LOS Convention. I will eventually argue that specific legal
claims may be brought to the competent U.S. courts, or environmental
administrations, mainly by relying on specific provisions of the LOS
Convention.
Such legal claims would be targeted to the following objectives: (i) to
achieve compensation for individuals; (ii) to increase the environmental
standards contained in the relevant permits and assess the impact of
wastewater discharges, oil spills and air-borne ore dust on the marine
environment, at least at the port site in that the last ecological risk
assessment dates back to 2007, was undertaken by Teck-contracted
Exponent and it eventually emphasized potential risks to ecological
receptors inhabiting terrestrial, freshwater stream and pond, coastal lagoon,
180.
(Apr. 10).

Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 204

181. See DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1493 (reporting that the works of the
International Law Commission have only analyzed customary norms with relation to transboundary
damage prevention and allocation of loss, as well as in transboundary aquifers context).
182. Sosa, 124 U.S. at 2763 (requiring a specific, universal, and obligatory content for rules to
be the law of nations under the ATS); Sarei, 722 F.3d at 1109.
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and marine environments from exposure to metals related to the operation
of the mine; (iii) to assess the presence of hydrocarbon spills, even if in
localized areas, and primarily at the port site since no official documents
have been issued apparently on this concern; (iv) to undertake an
Environmental Assessment in light of fresh data to be collected, especially
at the port site; v) to understand which tools are available for preventing the
unlawful degradation of waters; (vi) to assess the feasibility of the
construction of a wastewater pipeline directly discharging on the Chukchi
Sea so that Kivalina’s residents drinking water would not risk being
contaminated; and (vii) to ensure the protection of the marine ecosystem
from climate change, and the protection of Kivalina from submergence.
I will eventually argue that Kivalina residents might resort to three
avenues, and specifically to (a) a private nuisance action before an Alaska
state court and an ATS action before a federal court for point (i); (b) a
request for the issuance/re-issuance, modification and revocation of permits
and the right to petition for points (ii), (iii) and (iv); (c) a citizens’ suit
based on the violation of the NPDES permit and an EPCRA183 action for
point (v). I did not find, however, a way to address points (vi) and (vii) by
relying on the customary provisions of the LOS Convention.
With reference to the need for compensating individuals, the CWA
spells out the right for citizens to sue in section 505, with no possibility to
be awarded damages in case of violation of the wastewater permit, i.e., the
NPDES permit.184
Alaska’s Civil Code of Procedure allows individuals to bring a civil
action to enjoin or abate a private nuisance, with damages awarded in the
action.185 Such remedy has not been displaced by the CWA, according to
section 505 (e) CWA.186 In case of actions connected to air emission or
water or solid waste discharge, which would be the case for Kivalina
people, an action would be barred “where the emission or discharge was
expressly authorized by and is not in violation of a term or condition of (1)
a statute or regulation; or (2) a license, permit, or order that is issued after
public hearing by the state or federal government and subject to (i)
continuing compliance monitoring; (ii) periodic review by the issuing
agency; or (iii) renewal on a periodic basis; or (3) a court order or
judgment.”187
Kivalina residents might contend that no continuing compliance
monitoring nor periodic review has been warranted at the port site, nor a
183.

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–50 (2012).

184.

Clean Water Act, supra note 95, § 505.

185.

Action Based on Private Nuisance, ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230(a) (2011).

186.

Clean Water Act, supra note 95, at § 505(e).

187.

§ 09.45.230(b).
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periodic renewal of the permit for the operation of the port has been
undertaken since the NPDES renewal ensuing the approval of the Aqqaluk
project arguably refers only to discharges on the Middle Fork Red Dog
Creek, neglecting discharges at the port and the effect that the discharge of
increased effluents on the Middle Fork Red Dog Creek has on the port site.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs need to work very carefully to (i) show substantial
harm, probably by referring to the effects of water pollutants on the animals
they harvest and the fallouts of air pollutants on their own health, as well as
(ii) negligence or reckless conduct.188
Such actions are not apparently displaced by the Clean Water Act in
that the Supreme Court referenced to Ouellette189 in a dicta of American
Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut190 asserting that the Clean Water Act
does not preclude aggrieved individuals from bringing a “nuisance claim
pursuant to the law of the source State.”191
Be that as it may, Articles 192, 194, and 204 of the LOS Convention
would not need to be directly applied, but rather invoked for the consistent
interpretation with international law of Alaska’s provisions on private
nuisance (Charming Betsy canon).192 Most notably, the three LOS
provisions would imply a need for stringent monitoring and permit renewal
in order to protect and preserve the marine environment, and Kivalina
residents could bring a private nuisance action concerning all three
outstanding claims that I identified previously. As for most international
agreements, provisions are not binding on private parties, be they either
individuals or corporations, but rather on States Parties.193 Still, by
applying the Charming Betsy canon, the analyzed LOS Convention
provisions would not be apt to horizontal application (private-to-private
claim), but rather would specify both state and federal legislation as they
belong to the law of the land and should therefore be enforced.194
With reference to the first outstanding claim, namely the water
pollutants discharged from the mine sites onto the Middle Fork Red Dog
Creek, which are alleged to impact the source of Kivalina’s drinking water
and possibly also the Chukchi Sea, any violation of the NPDES might
trigger a private nuisance claim in that Kivalina residents might show
substantial harm and recklessness/negligence of the violating conducts,
188.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 (1979); Fernandes v. Portwine, 56 P.3d 1 (Alaska

189.

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 U.S. 805 (1987).

190.

American Elec. Power Company Inc., v. Connecticut, 131 U.S. 2527, 2540 (2011).

191.

Ouellette, 107 U.S. at 497.

192.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 192, 194, 204.

193.

Id. at art. 192, 194, 204.

194.

Id.
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which are further aggrieving given the lack of notification of such events,
as it turned out in 2014.195 Article 194(3) of the LOS Convention would
help construe some of the terms of Alaska private nuisance rules, and
specifically the reference to “continuing compliance monitoring,” “periodic
review by the issuing agency” or “renewal on a periodic basis,”196 which
should cover “(a) the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances,
especially those which are persistent, from land-based sources, from or
through the atmosphere or by dumping,” as set forth in Article 194(3)(a) of
the LOS Convention.197 By leveraging on the threat of private nuisance
claims, companies might be incentivized to voluntarily put in place such
customary-based monitoring mechanisms even when the permit does not
require them to do so.198
In relation to the second outstanding claim, namely the contamination
of the fish population, which constitutes part of Kivalina’s subsistence life,
through effluents in the river, and ore deposits/possibly oil spills at the port
site, the monitoring apparatus necessary for avoiding a threat of private
nuisance claims would consist of mechanisms “to protect and preserve rare
or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or
endangered species and other forms of marine life,” pursuant to Article
194(5) of the LOS Convention, which is particularly apt for the fragile
ecosystem of Alaska.199 On Kivalina’s facts, no recent impact statement on
the fish population at the port site is currently available.
Also with respect to the third outstanding claim, namely the
contamination of marine waters and sediments at the port site due to air
pollution/possibly oil spills, in order not to be liable for a private nuisance
claim, Teck would be required to comply with Article 194(5) of the LOS
Convention, assessing the impact of vessels and discharges on the “fragile
ecosystems” of the port, as well as the “habitat of depleted, threatened or
endangered species and other forms of marine life.”200 More importantly,
Teck itself is in charge of operating the port. In order to avoid pollution
from vessels, Teck would be spurred on to evaluate which MARPOL
protocols have been domesticated in the U.S. legal system, as well as to
assess whether any such obligation is binding on private port authorities as
well.
What is most interesting about Alaska’s Code of Civil Procedure is the
fact that the foregoing restrictions on private nuisance actions do not apply
195.

Clean Water Act, supra note 95.

196.

§ 09.45.230(a).

197.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 194.

198.

See generally § 09.45.230(a).

199.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 194.

200.

Id.
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if the discharge produces a result that was unknown or not reasonably
foreseeable at the time of the authorization.201 Therefore, if Kivalina
residents were able to prove the unknown result/not reasonably foreseeable
effect of the discharge, they would be able to succeed in the action, even
when the relevant judge deems the level of monitoring and permit renewal
sufficient. Unfortunately, it is not possible to make any prediction on the
environmental impact of the mine operations on the port site in that data are
lacking. Nevertheless, permit and monitoring do not appear to have been
periodic. This might suggest that nuisance conducts were unknown or not
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the authorization, allowing private
nuisance actions to be brought with no restriction. By qualifying the
polluting conduct as “an action for waste or trespass upon real property”
and in light of Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Fernandes v. Portwine,
the statute of limitations appears to be six years.202
With reference to the ATS claim, an alien should file it, so there
should be at least one person within the Kivalina community having
multiple citizenships/a foreign citizenship and being willing to file the
claim. Yet, no case law has been retrieved on standing for U.S. citizens
filing the ATS claim as foreign nationals on account of multiple
citizenships.
On the likelihood of succeeding in court, the Sarei v. Rio Tinto
litigation would not be a legitimate precedent.203 Although the Court did
not rule out the customary nature of the LOS Convention, and specifically
Article 194, Kiobel204 is still an overpowering legacy and might dispel
purely environmental law-based ATS claims without a specific
differentiation between human right-based and environmental law-based
claims. Given the non-extraterritorial character of a prospective ATS claim
brought by Kivalina residents, however, the outcome might not be impacted
by Kiobel. Yet, the Sosa standards for a customary rule to apply would still
need to be met. ATCA contains no limitations period, yet this does not
imply there is none and court practice is varied in this regard.205
201.

§ 09.45.230(c) (2011).

202.

Fernandes, 56 P.3d at 5.

203.

See Sarei, 722 F.3d at 1110.

204.

See generally Kiobel, 133 U.S. 1659.

205. See Sosa 124 U.S. 2739 at 2766 (according to Sosa, in order to be applied under the
ATCA international law norms need be “specific, universal and obligatory.”); see Wesley Papa v. U.S.
and the U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 281 F.3d 1004, 1011–13 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Doe v. Islamic
Salvation Front, 257 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118–19 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 461–66 (D.N.J 1999) (the case-law on the relevant statute of limitations for an ATCA
claim is varied, usually being a ten-year time bar in analogy to the Torture Victims Protection Act
(TVPA)); see In re Agent Orange Prod. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 63–64 (E.D.N.Y 2005) (it appears that
in this instance only a federal court held that “there are no statutes of limitation with respect to war
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As a second prong of litigation, Kivalina residents might petition for
the re-issuance, modification, and revocation of permits pursuant to specific
environmental regulations,206 which are also applicable to state programs.207
In the case of Alaska, the NPDES permit program is administered at the
state level.208 This prong of litigation is not per se judicial, however, it
might become so in case the petition is denied with no reasonable ground in
light of the holdings of Massachusetts v. EPA.209
Under this prong, the analyzed LOS Convention provisions would be
directly binding on the relevant level of government in the permit process,
rather than on a corporation, such as Teck.210 A corporation would,
however, be indirectly affected by the application of those provisions at the
governmental level, which would result in higher environmental
standards.211
Most specifically, with regard to section 402 CWA (stormwater)
permit, which is required for the discharge of water pollutants on the
Middle Fork Red Dog Creek, Kivalina plaintiffs will need to petition the
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. Kivalina plaintiffs are
in the position to ask for more stringent effluents limits, which would
counter the lowering of some of the effluent standards in the latest NPDES
permit, which were challenged unsuccessfully.212 Such a right to petition is
enshrined in the Code of Federal Regulations and can be better fleshed out
by relying on the need for states to “take, individually or jointly as
appropriate, all measures consistent” with the LOS Convention “that are
necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable
means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, and they
shall endeavor to harmonize their policies in this connection” (Article
194(1) LOS Convention).213 On the same ground, Kivalina residents might
require a modification of the current system of NPDES enforcement, which
crimes and other violations of international law”); Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Justice Delayed, Not Denied:
Statutory Limitations & Human Rights Crimes, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 2, 381 (2012); but cf. J. Romesh
Weeramantry, Time Limitation Under the United States Alien Tort Claims Act, INT’L COMMITTEE RED
CROSS 627, 632 (2003).
206.

40 C.F.R. § 122.62 (2008).

207.

40 C.F.R. § 123.25 (2015).

208. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Memorandum of Agreement Between
State of Alaska & U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Alaska DEC 3 (Oct. 29, 2008).
209.

See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 U.S. 1438 (2007).

210.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art.194.

211.

Id.

212.

See Native Village of Kivalina IRA Council, supra note 104.

213.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 194.
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presently provides a mechanism of self-compliance by Teck coupled with
periodic inspections on the part of the Administration. Enhanced controls
on the part of either ADEC or third parties that have been assessed as truly
neutral could provide a better enforcement system.
With regard to section 404 CWA (dredge-and-fill) permit, which is
required for the operation of the Aqqaluk deposit and probably also at the
port site, yet the latest point is not apparent, the relevant authority to
petition would be the Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District.214 The
aim would still be to petition for increased environmental standards and
more frequent controls on the governmental side.
Moreover, Kivalina residents would also need to petition the Army
Corps of Engineers, Alaska, for a Rivers and Harbors section 10 permit for
the operation of the port site in that it does not appear to be in place. By
way of difference from the CWA, the right to petition is not specifically
granted in the Rivers and Harbors Act.215 Such a right should be derived
from the general right to petition as enshrined in the Right to Petition
Clause contained in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the
petition would be substantiated by relying on Article 204(1) of the LOS
Convention (Charming Betsy canon), which sets forth the obligation for
“States” to “observe, measure, evaluate and analyze, by recognized
scientific methods, the risks or effects of pollution of the marine
environment,” namely the activities that are required for the issuance of a
Rivers and Harbors section 10 permit.216
All in all, pursuant to Article 204(2) of the LOS Convention, States
shall “keep under surveillance the effects of any activities which they
permit or in which they engage in order to determine whether these
activities are likely to pollute the marine environment.”217 This obligation
appears specifically stringent in the context of permit issuance, re-issuance,
modification, and revocation, all the more so at the port site, which was not
covered by the latest Supplemental Environmental Impact Assessment.
Since the project is subject to NEPA, one further line of petitioning
might dwell on the request for an Environmental Assessment to be carried
out at the port site according to specific environmental regulations.218
Moreover, the same LOS Convention provision, as complemented with the
Pulp Mill judgment,219 can be construed as requiring recurrent or at least
precautionary Environmental Assessments. On Kivalina’s facts, citizens
214.

Clean Water Act, supra note 95, § 404.

215.

Id.

216.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, art. 204.

217.
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218.

40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2016).

219.
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may petition for an Environmental Assessment concerning the impact of
Middle Fork Red Dog Creek’s discharges on the Chukchi Sea, and
specifically at the port site, which was not analyzed by the latest SEIS.
With concern to the permit process, Kivalina residents might also
petition for the withdrawal of approval from the programs that have been
delegated to Alaska, under both the stormwater (section 402(c)(3)) and
dredge-and-fill (section 404(i)) programs.220 Even in these cases, the right
to petition would need be grounded on the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and substantiated within the activities mandated by Article
204(2) of the LOS Convention.
Under the third prong of action, namely citizens’ suits and civil
actions, Kivalina residents may bring a suit against any person alleged to be
in violation of water-related permits,221 immediately for violations of
NPDES or toxic effluents standards,222 and in general after sixty days from
when the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation to the
Administrator, the State, and the alleged violator.223
Nonetheless, any such action is barred if the Administrator or State
“has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action.”224
Kivalina residents were able to meet the standing prongs in previous
NPDES litigation, therefore they are likely to meet them also at this time.
Such a citizen enforcement action, however, could only be targeted to stop
permit violations, since it does not allow citizens to recoup damages, but
only litigation costs.225
A citizens’ suit may also be brought against the EPA Administrator on
a failure to perform any act or duty.226 Such a strand of litigation, however,
is specifically difficult to pursue in that the duty/act should be nondiscretionary. On Kivalina’s facts, the Administrator’s duty can be fleshed
out in the obligation to update and tighten up the NPDES and dredge-andfill permits, as well as in the duty to carry out/update an environmental
assessment at the port in light of the obligation for States, pursuant to Art.
194(1), to “prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment
from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable means at their
disposal and in accordance with their capabilities.”227 Yet, the means for
accomplishing these duties are discretionary. Besides, this strand of
220.

Clean Water Act, supra note 95, § 404.

221.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
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Clean Water Act, supra note 95, at § 505(b).
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litigation would not specifically benefit from the consistent interpretation of
the CWA with the customary environmental provisions of the LOS
Convention.
This prong of litigation also rests on the civil actions’ provision set
forth in EPCRA,228 which can be filed against either the violator or the
State Administrator. Such actions, nonetheless, are geared toward a
different goal from the one set in the CWA, and precisely compliance with
reporting obligations, also in case of accidental chemical release under the
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Program. The EPA would investigate cases
of EPCRA non-compliance and may issue civil penalties, including
monetary fines, and require correction of the violations. On Kivalina’s
facts, citizens can certainly file such an action were a violation of the
NPDES to occur without Teck stating an emergency notice, as it happened
in 2014.229 This specific prong of litigation, however, would not require the
application of the Charming Betsy canon with reference to the LOS
Convention, since the latter could not add much to such a specific piece of
legislation. Citizens would not be able to recoup damages, but they can still
count on the further means of an injunctive relief.230
Likewise, I do not see how the actual construction of a wastewater
pipeline directly discharging into the Chukchi Sea can be mandated by
wielding on LOS Convention provisions. Therefore, this specific claim of
Kivalina people cannot be advanced by relying on the LOS Convention.
The last outstanding claim that I have put forward is the protection of
the marine ecosystem from climate change, and the protection of Kivalina
from submergence. I believe that both concerns might come under the
ambit of the specific solicitude that States need to show for “rare or fragile”
ecosystems (Article 194(4) LOS Convention)231 and climate change
considerations should be internalized within a new EIS232 according to
NEPA and Article 204 of the LOS Convention. Notwithstanding, I cannot
see how greenhouse gas emissions, namely the cause for Kivalina’s
prospective submergence, might be curbed by relying on the LOS
Convention. Therefore, this prong of litigation cannot rely on the
Charming Betsy canon, as applied to the LOS Convention.
A specific concern might be addressed at policy level, which is the
environmental justice posture of the present case. The landmark executive
order issued by President Clinton in 1994 prompts all federal agencies to
228.

Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1).
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carry out a review of their internal decision-making procedures to
incorporate consideration of environmental justice issues therein. Such an
executive order will not create a right of action for Kivalina people, still the
concerns it addresses must be adequately incorporated in such federal
executive actions as an environmental statement/EIS under NEPA.233
All in all, I contend that it is possible to flesh out rules of diligence at
both company level (Teck), and governmental level (State and Federal
government) by way of a consistent interpretation of domestic legislation
with the specific provisions resulting from the customary rules of the LOS
Convention, namely Article 192, Article 194 and Article 204. In this way,
companies, such as Teck, might anticipate the risk of litigation, especially
under the private nuisance prong, and undertake actions to exceed permits’
requirements. Similarly, under the administrative prong, in case the
relevant authorities refusal to reissue modify or revoke permits, courts
might pay less deference to the executive branch under the Chevron
doctrine, or at least frame deference within the limit of political discretion
and claim jurisdiction to rule on how the agency is fulfilling its duties in
light of the environmental rules of the LOS Convention, which have been
ascertained as customary in character.234
Nevertheless, in any thread of litigation one should carefully balance
the opposing interests of full environmental soundness and public health
safety with the economic prosperity Teck is bringing to the area. In all the
foregoing legal argumentations, legal counsels should emphasize the need
for tackling pending environmental issues as they appear now in order to
avoid future litigation costs, epidemiological diseases, reclamation costs,
and internal opposition from Native American workers at Teck.
In conclusion, and especially in light of the historical trajectory of the
stance U.S. courts have taken vis-à-vis international law and its judicial
enforceability, I would not recommend a litigation strategy that depends on
the direct application of the LOS Convention environmental provisions, but
rather on the application of the Charming Betsy canon while applying
relevant domestic legislation and regulations.
IV. TAKING STOCK
In this paper, I have attempted to analyze how a specific case of
environmental injustice can be addressed by hinging on international law
provisions.

233. Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994); see Counsel of Executive Quality,
Environmental Justice: Guidance under the National Environmental Policy Act, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT (1997).
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The case of environmental injustice is now unfolding around the
largest zinc mine worldwide, Alaska’s Red Dog Mine, and is specifically
impacting the Native Alaskan Kivalina community. The latter has long
battled against environmental degradation under U.S. law, with no apparent
success. In light of the impasse of purely domestic remedies, I have
focused on the water-related issues of the litigation and argued that
international law might equip plaintiffs with stronger arguments allowing
for the implementation of international law in U.S. courts.
Most notably, I have made the case for specific pieces of U.S.
environmental legislation being interpreted consistently with the
environmental provisions of the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention. The
LOS Convention is of interest to the case not only by the fact that it is
strictly relevant to the subject matter, but also because of the customary
character of some of its provisions, as acknowledged by U.S. courts and
scholarship.
Some issues, however, are still outstanding, even at the end of my
analysis.
It still must be proven that the ICJ Pulp Mill decision can be extended
to the imperative of undertaking recurrent or even precautionary
environmental assessments. Moreover, I have not tested the potential of the
LOS Convention on all the possibly applicable pieces of environmental
legislation. For instance, I did not assess its impact on the interpretation of
some of the provisions of the Safe Drinking Water Act. Furthermore, I
have not tested the potential of all LOS applicable provisions either. The
understanding of how the LOS Convention can be intertwined with climate
change instruments is specifically compelling, but worth a brand new
chapter.
The quest for justiciable rights and competent courts to assess them is
ultimately intended to enhance awareness on the part of the national
judiciary of its entrustment as interpreter of the whole of the relevant law,
be it both domestic and international. Moreover, this attempt of
domestic/international solutions to current environmental issues might also
serve the cause of the international legal order, where enforcement is often
problematic. It can also conjure up the threat of litigation costs that
companies may incur in case such litigation claims prove successful,
enabling companies to prevent environmental degradation in the first place.
Lastly, and more importantly, the domestic staging of environment-related
claims against the backdrop of international law would set individuals, and
not only States, as recipients and actors of international law, hopefully
equipping them with further tools to advance their rights.
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JOINT NOTIFICATION
ADDRESSED TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE COURT:

The Hague, 1 September 2015
On behalf of the State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland, in
accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, we have the honor to transmit to you an original of the Special
Agreement for submission to the International Court of Justice of the
differences between the Applicant and the Respondent concerning the Frost
files, signed in The Hague, The Netherlands, on the first day of September in
the year two thousand fifteen.

Mata Rosenberg, Klaus Hall, Ambassador of the State of Amestonia
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Riesland to the Kingdom of The
Netherlands to the Kingdom of The Netherlands
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SPECIAL AGREEMENT
SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE BY
THE STATE OF AMESTONIA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF RIESLAND
ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM CONCERNING
THE FROST FILES
The State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland (hereinafter
referred to as “Amestonia” and “Riesland” respectively and “the Parties”
collectively),
Considering that differences have arisen between them concerning the
legality of certain alleged acts of espionage, and other matters;
Recognizing that the Parties have been unable to settle these differences by
means of negotiation; and
Desiring further to define the issues to be submitted to the International Court
of Justice (hereinafter referred to as “the Court”) to resolve this dispute;
In furtherance thereof the Parties have concluded this Special Agreement:
Article 1
The Parties submit the questions contained in this Special Agreement
(together with Clarifications to follow) (“the Case”) to the Court pursuant to
Article 40(1) of the Statute of the Court.
Article 2
(a)
(b)

(a)

It is agreed by the Parties that Amestonia shall act as Applicant and
Riesland as Respondent, but such agreement is without prejudice to
any question of the burden of proof.
The Parties agree that any reference in this Special Agreement to
documents obtained and disclosed without the consent of
Respondent is without prejudice to Respondent’s objection to the
admissibility of these documents as evidence before the Court.
Article 3
The rules and principles of international law applicable to the
dispute, on the basis of which the Court is requested to decide the
Case, are those referred to in Article 38, paragraph 1 of the Statute
of the Court.
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The Court is also requested to determine the legal consequences,
including the rights and obligations of the Parties, arising from its
Judgment on the questions presented in the Case.
Article 4

(a)
(b)

All questions of rules and procedure shall be regulated in accordance
with the provisions of the Official Rules of the 2016 Philip C. Jessup
International Law Moot Court Competition.
The Parties request the Court to order that the written proceedings
should consist of Memorials presented by each of the Parties not later
than the date set forth in the Official Schedule of the 2016 Philip C.
Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition.
Article 5

(a)
(b)

The Parties shall accept any Judgment of the Court as final and
binding upon them and shall execute it in its entirety and in good
faith.
Immediately after the transmission of any Judgment, the Parties shall
enter into negotiations on the modalities for its execution.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized, have
signed the present Special Agreement and have affixed thereto their
respective seals of office.
Done in The Hague, The Netherlands, this first day of September in
the year two thousand fifteen, in triplicate in the English language.
Mata Rosenberg, Klaus Hall, Ambassador of the State of Amestonia
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Riesland to the Kingdom of The
Netherlands to the Kingdom of The Netherlands
**SPECIAL AGREEMENT**
THE CASE CONCERNING THE FROST FILES
AMESTONIA / RIESLAND
1.

Riesland is a developed democratic state with a population of
approximately 100 million, which boasts one of the fastest growing
free-market economies in the world. Many of Riesland’s top
corporations are listed on the New York, London, and Shanghai
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stock exchanges. Its rapidly-expanding information technology and
communications sector is world-renowned.
Amestonia is a developing country bordering Riesland to the south,
with a population of approximately 20 million. Amestonia is a
predominantly agrarian export economy. Agriculture employs 55%
of Amestonia’s workforce.
The Rieslandic Secret Surveillance Bureau (“the Bureau”) engages,
inter alia, in covert operations and collects intelligence outside of
Riesland pursuant to the provisions of the Secret Surveillance
Bureau Act 1967 (“SSBA”), as amended.
Section 21 of the SSBA, entitled “Electronic Surveillance,” grants
the Director of the Bureau (“the Director”) the power to authorize
“electronic surveillance,” without a court order, to acquire “foreign
intelligence.” The SSBA defines “electronic surveillance” as “the
installation of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device
outside Riesland’s territory, and/or the acquisition by such a device
of the content of or other technical information concerning a wire or
radio communication.” The statute defines “foreign intelligence” as
“any information located or emanating from outside Riesland’s
territory, which is relevant to the ability of Riesland to protect itself
against any actual or potential threat to its national security or the
ability of Riesland to conduct its foreign affairs.”
Section 32 of the SSBA, “Minimization Procedures and Structural
Safeguards,” sets forth five limitations on the Bureau’s surveillance
activity. First, electronic surveillance may not be authorized by the
Director whenever there is a “substantial likelihood” that
information acquired thereby will include “any communication to
which a national of Riesland is a party.” Second, it establishes a fivejudge National Security Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), which must
review all electronic surveillance conducted under the SSBA every
six months. Proceedings before the Tribunal are closed to the public,
but the Tribunal is authorized to call on technical experts, academics,
and NGOs to participate as amici curiae. Third, a Parliamentary
Committee for Surveillance Oversight is created, with access to all
information relating to the Bureau’s operations, and the capacity to
launch independent investigations and to summon the Bureau’s
Director and other personnel to appear before it. Fourth, the statute
provides that surveillance of “foreign public officials” may be
authorized only when the Director, with the concurrence of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, considers it “necessary.” Fifth, the
Bureau must comply with any regulations issued by the Attorney
General concerning legal aspects of any surveillance program.
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Relations between Riesland and Amestonia, which share a common
language and have similar ethnic composition, have been largely
positive. On 11 December 1970, Riesland’s Prime Minister visited
Amestonia to mark the centenary of the completion of the first
railway line between the two countries. During that visit, the Prime
Minister and his Amestonian counterpart signed a number of
bilateral agreements, concerning tourism, trade, extradition,
intelligence-sharing, and other fields of cooperation. Since then, the
two nations have enjoyed healthy cross-border economic, cultural
and security ties, including the establishment of a free-trade area in
agricultural and agricultural-related goods in 1992. By 1998,
Riesland had become the top importer of Amestonian agricultural
produce, totaling approximately €1.5 million per day. Between 2003
and 2013, Amestonia saw an annual GDP growth rate of between
6.8% and 7.4%, the highest in the region.
On 4 March 1992, Riesland and Amestonia signed the “Treaty on
The Establishment of Broadcasting Facilities” (“the Broadcasting
Treaty,” Annex I), pursuant to which each state was permitted to
build, staff, and operate a television station in the other’s territory. In
a joint press release, ministers from both states expressed their hopes
that the treaty “will become yet another milestone in what is already
the warmest of friendships between our two societies.” Both Parties
ratified the Broadcasting Treaty shortly thereafter.
Riesland National Television is a state-owned and operated
corporation, which provides public broadcasting services across
Riesland. In accordance with the Broadcasting Treaty, Riesland
established a new division of the corporation, The Voice of Riesland
(“VoR”), to operate in Amestonia. The inaugural program of the new
station and its Amestonian counterpart, a combined performance by
the two countries’ national orchestras of Vivaldi’s “The Four
Seasons,” aired on 22 December 1992. VoR broadcast a variety of
award-winning documentaries and highly-acclaimed programs for
the next 22 years.
One of VoR’s most popular shows was “Tea Time with Margaret,”
a weekly one-hour news program featuring interviews with leading
Amestonian political and business figures. Margaret Mayer, the
show’s host, is a television icon from Riesland, appointed by the
Ministry of Telecommunications to serve as Head of VoR. Among
those appearing on her show were former and incumbent
Amestonian presidents, cabinet ministers, parliamentary party
leaders, business executives, and diplomats.
The Institute for Land and Sustainable Agriculture (“ILSA”), a
Dutch NGO established for the purpose of monitoring global soil
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structure, composition, and biodiversity, began to express concerns
in the early 1990s about the long-term sustainability of Amestonia’s
agricultural production and trade. In particular, ILSA’s reports
addressed Amestonian farmers’ reliance on a class of neuro-active
insecticides known as neonicotinoids, or “neonics,” produced solely
by Rieslandic companies, to boost yields. From time to time ILSA
called on the governments of both countries to study and review the
environmental and ecological impacts of these insecticides on the
regional biosphere.
On 2 October 2012, ILSA published a report entitled “The Plight of
the Bumblebee.” The report summarized a 20-year peer-reviewed
scientific study examining the negative effects of the increased use
of neonics by Amestonian farmers on populations of bees and other
pollinators. ILSA experts found that the region’s honeybee
population had decreased by some 25% over the previous 20 years,
due in part to the well-documented phenomenon of Colony Collapse
Disorder (“CCD”). The report also found a statistically significant
correlation – but not definitive evidence of causation – between the
gradual increase in CCD and the rise in the use of neonics across the
region. ILSA urged Riesland to reevaluate its production of this type
of insecticide, and Amestonia to reevaluate its extensive use,
suggesting that the only long-term solution would be a complete
phase-out of neonicotinoids. It concluded, “the current rate of
decrease in bee populations will, if it continues unchecked, result in
catastrophic consequences for the environment, for food production,
for sustainable farming, and ultimately for the economies of both
states.”
The European Commission adopted a Regulation on 24 May 2013,
restricting for a period of two years the use of a number of neonics
for seed treatment, soil application, and foliar treatment in crops
attractive to bees. The ILSA report and the European Commission’s
action sparked academic and parliamentary debates in both Riesland
and Amestonia, but no policy changes were undertaken in either
country.
On 2 July 2013, a new website, www.longlivethehive.com, was
launched. The website invited environmental activists to register
online and to utilize its chat rooms to discuss ways to stop the
continued production and use of neonicotinoids. The website quickly
gained attention in Amestonia and Riesland, and at its peak was
visited by approximately 200,000 users a day. Conversations on its
online forums, which protected users’ anonymity, often focused on
lobbying activities in support of draft legislation. However some
members also promoted violent actions, including sabotage and
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arson. One anonymous post, which was later reposted onto social
media and received widespread attention in Amestonia, read: “Our
politicians have failed to respond to peaceful initiatives. We must
take charge and command attention. The despoliation of the Earth,
and of its living creatures, is an act of violence, and unless it is
stopped, it must be responded to effectively and in kind.”
On the night of 2 February 2014, seven Amestonian warehouses
were simultaneously set on fire. The warehouses stored a significant
number of barrels of neonicotinoids. In total, five people died from
smoke inhalation, and many others were injured. Two of the dead
were Rieslandic nationals. Police found spray-painted images of a
bee on the asphalt outside the sites. Initial government reports
estimated the damage from the attacks, including long-term adverse
health consequences for the local population, at €75 million.
The President of Amestonia, Jonathan Hale, was interviewed by
Margaret Mayer on the day following the arson attacks. When asked
about the alleged involvement of environmental activists in the
attacks, President Hale responded: “We do not yet have all of the
facts concerning these terrible, orchestrated crimes. The police are
investigating and will bring the perpetrators to justice. Given the
critical importance of agriculture to our national economy, acts of
sabotage like these should be seen as attacks on us all. My
administration will not tolerate such provocations.”
On 7 March 2014, 263 envelopes containing white powder were sent
to the Ministries of Trade and Agriculture in both Riesland and
Amestonia, to prominent Amestonian farmers, and to board
members of three neonic-producing Rieslandic corporations. The
image of a bee was stamped on the back of all of the envelopes.
Examinations determined that the powder was a non-toxic variant of
a neonicotinoid. An anonymous tweet by user @buzzkiller24601
posted that evening, which quickly went viral, read: “You’ve been
warned. The threat is real. It must be addressed. Next time you’ll
taste your own poison. #banneonics #savethebees.”
President Hale and the Prime Minister of Riesland, Alice Silk,
discussed the arson and the white powder incident in a telephone
conversation the following day. Prime Minister Silk offered
Riesland’s continued cooperation in combatting what she called
“acts of eco-terrorism,” including coordination and sharing of
intelligence information, and stressed the importance of continued
agricultural trade between the two countries. Following the call, the
Prime Minister announced that she had ordered Riesland’s security
and intelligence services to direct their operations against “what
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appears to be a new, growing, and dangerous threat to the well-being
of both of our countries.”
On 16 October 2014, Tom Sivaneta, the Bureau’s Director, met with
the Amestonian Minister of Internal Affairs. He informed the
Minister that the Bureau had succeeded in identifying a ring of
Amestonian environmental activists who had been plotting to
contaminate a large shipment of honey, intended for consumption in
Riesland, with a chemically-altered and toxic neonicotinoid. He
provided the Minister with the names and locations of the ring
members. The following day, Riesland declared a Terrorism Alert
pursuant to the Terrorism Act 2003 (Annex II). The Terrorism Alert
was reissued in April 2015.
On 21 October 2014, the police broke into a garage located in
Amestonia’s capital and apprehended three Amestonian college
students. The students had in their possession significant quantities
of chemically-altered neonicotinoids and detailed maps of a number
of honey extraction facilities in Amestonia. They admitted to
planning an attack (which they insisted would not cause injuries or
deaths), and to being part of a group of environmentalists, which they
called “The Hive.” The students refused to provide the authorities
with the names, locations, or future plans of other members of the
group.
Frederico Frost, a national of Riesland, is a former Bureau
intelligence analyst who had been part of the Bureau’s eco-terrorism
working group, established in early 2014. Frost had full access to
sensitive information relating to Riesland’s intelligence operations
in Amestonia. On the morning of 16 December 2014, Frost drove
from the Bureau’s facilities to Amestonia, where he contacted
Chester & Walsingham, a law firm that had previously represented
defendants in a number of high-profile whistle-blower and national
security cases. Frost handed lawyers from the firm a USB drive
containing nearly 100,000 documents labeled top secret that he said
he had directly downloaded from Bureau computers. The firm agreed
to represent Frost in relation to any disclosure or dissemination of
the materials.
On 18 December 2014, accompanied by his lawyers, Frost met with
two reporters from The Ames Post, Amestonia’s most widelycirculated newspaper. He gave the reporters a copy of the USB drive,
requesting that the newspaper publish the contents on its website. In
a written statement, Frost explained that “I have come to realize how
surveillance programs, like the ones I was engaged in, threaten
individual liberties and sovereign equality. I am compelled to talk
about this! If we are going to trade liberty for security, we have to do
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it with our eyes open. These decisions should be made by the public,
not by politicians.”
In January and February 2015, thousands of documents marked “top
secret” were gradually published, unedited and unredacted, on the
website of The Ames Post, following what the newspaper termed “a
process of authentication and review performed by our reporters and
lawyers.” One of the documents, published on 23 January and
headed “The Verismo Program,” bore a signature of Tom Sivaneta.
It detailed a May 2013 operation he had authorized, in which a
waterproof recording pod was installed on the undersea fiber optic
cable that was the primary backbone for Amestonia’s international
internet and telephone communications traffic. The device was
placed on a section of the cable located in Riesland’s exclusive
economic zone. The pod copied all information that went through the
cable and transferred it to the Bureau’s servers. According to the
document, 1.2 million gigabytes of data were collected and stored
daily pursuant to Verismo. The document also noted that, following
the white powder incident on 7 March, Bureau employees had been
instructed to use all of the Bureau’s resources “to track
environmental activists in Amestonia,” relying on specifically
tailored search terms, or “selectors.”
On 29 January 2015, The Ames Post published on its website a
document on the letterhead of the Office of the Attorney General of
Riesland, James Deloponte. Dated 2 July 2014, it detailed
regulations issued by the Attorney General regarding the Bureau’s
surveillance. The document provided that all data collected by the
Bureau through Verismo or related programs, other than as the result
of investigation of a specific individual, could be stored for a
maximum of two years. It also noted that the Tribunal, in accordance
with the SSBA, had reviewed the Verismo Program every six months
since its inception with no participation from outside experts. The
Parliamentary Committee for Surveillance Oversight had also
reviewed Verismo twice in closed-door hearings, but neither the
Tribunal nor the Committee had ever challenged its legality.
According to the document, Amestonian security authorities had
knowingly accepted, on at least 50 occasions, redacted information
relating to terrorist activity derived from Verismo.
On 2 February 2015, Riesland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a
diplomatic note to his counterpart in Amestonia requesting the
immediate extradition of Frost, in accordance with the 1970
Extradition Treaty, to stand trial for theft and a number of data
security offenses. The diplomatic note also requested that Amestonia
recover the information Frost had downloaded, believed to be held
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by either Chester & Walsingham or The Ames Post, and return it to
Riesland for use in the ongoing criminal investigation against Frost.
It emphasized that “any further publication of these materials will
have a long-term, damaging impact on cooperation between our two
nations in our joint campaign against terrorism.” The Amestonian
Minister indicated that the extradition request would be considered
in accordance with the Treaty, but noted the Amestonian
Government’s “surprise at the reported scope and reach of
Riesland’s surveillance programs.” He called upon the Minister to
provide more information on the extent of these activities and their
impact on Amestonian nationals’ private lives.
On 16 February 2015, the banner headline of The Ames Post website
read: “Margaret the Spy!” Another document leaked by Frost stated
that since its inception in 1992, the premises of the VoR station had
been used by the Bureau to promote its surveillance activities on
Amestonian soil. The document was printed on the letterhead of the
Office of the Bureau’s Director. According to the document,
Margaret Mayer was part of an operation called “the Carmen
Program,” intended to collect intelligence on high-ranking
Amestonian public figures and private sector leaders. Whenever
such individuals came to be interviewed for Mayer’s show, they
were told that their electronic devices could interfere with the
sensitive wireless microphones used during broadcasts. They were
offered the opportunity to place their devices in a locker within their
line of sight from the studio. Electronics placed in the locker were
removed during the interviews by means of a concealed backdoor.
This provided Bureau engineers, who doubled as VoR employees,
sufficient opportunity to hack into the guests’ phones and portable
computers and install a rootkit malware referred to in Frost’s
documents as “Blaster,” which then provided the Bureau full remote
privileged access to these devices. The information collected from
“Carmen” was stored and later analyzed in an underground floor
within the VoR building, code-named “The Opera House.”
A number of memoranda mentioning “Carmen” were also published
in raw form on The Ames Post’s site. They revealed that over 100
Amestonian public figures, businessmen, officials, and diplomats
were surveilled under this program, whose primary objective was “to
collect information concerning Amestonia’s domestic and foreign
policy, in order to advance Riesland’s political and economic
interests in the region.” One memorandum contained an image of
David Cornwell, Amestonia’s Ambassador to the United Nations,
and detailed how Carmen operatives had been able to hack his phone
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and access emails regarding Amestonia’s positions on upcoming
votes in the General Assembly and specialized agencies.
That evening, Amestonian police applied to a judge for an
emergency warrant to seize all assets and property of VoR pending
an investigation into whether criminal offenses had been committed,
citing as probable cause the Carmen Program documents published
by The Ames Post. While the police were in chambers with the judge
applying for the warrant, VoR’s television broadcasting was
interrupted and replaced with old reruns of “Tea Time with
Margaret.” The judge immediately granted the warrant. Upon
execution of the warrant that night, the Amestonian police found the
station unattended, although the TV broadcasting equipment and
various other devices and documents had been left untouched. These
articles were all catalogued and removed by the police.
At 3:15 A.M. the following morning, Amestonia’s Border Patrol,
conducting routine operations, encountered Margaret Mayer and two
other Rieslandic VoR employees on a train crossing into Riesland.
The Border Patrol requested that they present their travel documents
for inspection. They refused, and were promptly detained. When the
commander of the police unit conducting the investigation into VoR
learned of this development, she sought and was granted a warrant
for the arrest of the three on suspicion of espionage. They were
subsequently charged with that offense, and were denied bail on the
basis that they were a flight risk.
President Hale held a press conference on the morning of 17
February 2015. Before taking questions, he read a prepared
statement:
I am deeply troubled by reports that Riesland has, for
decades, engaged in a concerted surveillance campaign
targeting our citizens and violating our territorial
integrity and political independence. Riesland’s own
documents show that these offenses against our
sovereignty were purely politically motivated and had
no public order implications. We are entitled to an
explanation. Any claims that such programs are
necessary to combat terrorism simply ring hollow. No
matter how severe any perceived threat to Riesland’s
national security, there is absolutely no justification for
the systematic infringement of our citizens’ privacy.
Mass electronic surveillance of our people and
institutions violates Riesland’s obligations under the
U.N. Charter, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic
and Consular Relations, the Broadcasting Treaty, and
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principles of comity between nations. Simply put,
gentlemen do not read each other’s mail, and friends do
not spy on friends.
In response to a reporter’s question, President Hale went on to say,
“Our police authorities are treating the VoR facilities and its
equipment as a crime scene. Margaret Mayer and the other VoR
employees are suspected of having committed the very serious crime
of espionage, charges which will be handled according to our laws.”
He denied that the search of the premises and the detention of the
three individuals violated Amestonia’s obligations under the
Broadcasting Treaty, saying: “the VoR facilities and employees lost
their immunities and privileges once the station ceased acting as a
broadcaster and became a nest of spies.” Amestonia then recalled its
ambassador to Riesland for consultations, and officially closed its
TV station in Riesland.
On 19 February 2015, Prime Minister Silk rejected President Hale’s
characterization of Riesland’s and VoR’s activities in a televised
interview. She explained that Riesland’s surveillance programs
complied with both domestic and international law because they
“were prescribed by statutes, structured around minimization
procedures, and routinely reviewed by competent authorities with
oversight power.” She asserted that the methods employed were
“both necessary and proportionate,” observing that the results of the
surveillance “had benefited the national security and interests of
Amestonia just as much as those of Riesland.” She ended her
statement by saying:
Our two nations have enjoyed decades of fruitful
bilateral cooperation, which is now being severely
compromised. We make no apology for our efforts to
keep ourselves and our friends safe from acts of
terrorism. Meanwhile, the Amestonian administration is
hardly reciprocating our acts of friendship. It is
providing sanctuary to Frederico Frost, who is accused
of very serious crimes in Riesland, and has expropriated
our property and arrested our nationals in blatant
disregard of the treaty between us.
Joseph Kafker is a 70-year-old retired Amestonian politician who
founded the Green Party, now the third largest in the Amestonian
Parliament. For years, Kafker has been a vocal opponent of the use
of neonics in agricultural production. During his years as a Member
of Parliament he attempted, on a number of occasions, to promote
legislation banning them. None of these efforts was successful, a fact
he lamented on his retirement in 2012. On 7 March 2015, Kafker was
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invited to give the keynote address at an international environmental
law conference at Riesland’s largest law school. After he completed
his speech, he was detained by the police, allegedly in accordance
with the Terrorism Act. The story broke in the international media
the following day. In a special session, the Amestonian Parliament
adopted a resolution denouncing Kafker’s detention and demanding
his release. The Government of Riesland did not respond.
On 10 March 2015, Kafker’s case was brought before the National
Security Tribunal. Following a request from the Attorney General’s
Office, the Tribunal ruled that all evidence pertaining to Kafker’s
activities and leading to his apprehension was “closed material,” as
the term is defined in the Terrorism Act. The Tribunal further
allowed Bureau officers to testify via video conferencing, with their
faces and voices obscured, regarding the need to detain Kafker.
Following their testimony, the Tribunal granted the petition to extend
Kafker’s detention for reasons of national security. Kafker’s lawyer,
who had been selected from a list of approved “special advocates,”
was present during the proceedings, but was not permitted either to
consult with his client or to share with him any of the secret
information said to substantiate the allegations against him. Kafker
remains detained without charge in a maximum-security facility in
Riesland and his detention has been extended by the Tribunal every
21 days. A motion challenging the constitutionality of the
proceedings was filed before the Supreme Court of Riesland but was
denied.
On 12 March 2015, Amestonia’s Foreign Minister contacted his
counterpart in Riesland and demanded access to the secret evidence
that constituted the basis for Kafker’s detention. He also stated that,
in Amestonia’s view, the Terrorism Act did not comply with
international human rights standards. The Rieslandic Minister
rejected the request, responding that disclosure of the information
concerning Kafker’s apprehension would endanger the integrity of
particular intelligence sources and therefore the national security of
Riesland. The Minister further stressed that the National Security
Tribunal had already determined that the information could not be
disclosed in accordance with the Terrorism Act.
On 14 March 2015, President Hale instructed his Minister of Justice
to refuse the extradition request for Frederico Frost, citing the
“political offense” exception in the Extradition Treaty. He also
ordered that Riesland’s request for the documents held by The Ames
Post be denied. Attorney General Deloponte responded to these
developments in a statement:
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The Government of Riesland has repeatedly made clear
that it will not tolerate the publication of leaked
confidential information, and that it will do whatever is
in its power to disrupt any further threats to our national
security. With or without foreign government support,
we will continue our efforts to bring the fugitive Frost to
justice, and to stop the damage that will result from any
dissemination of Riesland’s top secret documents.
On 17 March 2015, The Ames Post website’s banner read “A Kafkeresque Affair.” A memorandum, sourced from Frost’s USB stick,
revealed that a May 2014 interview with Kafker on “Tea Time with
Margaret” had allowed the Bureau to hack into his electronic
devices. According to the memorandum, Kafker was considered a
“high-level suspect with ties to The Hive, including the planned
contamination of a large shipment of honey with a toxic variant of
neonicotinoids in 2014.” The continuous surveillance of Kafker,
following the bugging of his devices, was considered a “top
priority.” From intercepted communications, Bureau analysts were
able to establish that Kafker was a frequent visitor to the
longlivethehive website, had participated in online chats, and had
used the forum’s “like” function to endorse conversations including
calls for violent disruptions to raise public awareness of the neonics
controversy. Attorney General Deloponte refused to comment on
questions raised by the media following The Ames Post’s
publication. He stated only that Riesland was in possession of
“closed materials” that “directly link Kafker to The Hive’s senior
echelons.”
On 22 March 2015, the computer networks and communication
switches at both The Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham were
hacked and disabled. Investigators found that the hackers had used a
malicious program to disrupt the operation of the computer systems
and to corrupt master boot records, to the extent that nearly 90% of
the information was “non-recoverable.”
Based on traffic analysis, cyber security experts from the
Amestonian Institute of Technology concluded: “The malware used
in the hacking of the computers has been traced to IP addresses
within Riesland’s territory that are associated with Riesland’s
computer infrastructures. Significant segments of code in the
malware are exact replicas of those used in the Bureau’s ‘Blaster’
program. These code segments are not otherwise known to be in use
or available to the general public.” Both Chester & Walsingham and
The Ames Post contracted external appraisers, who have estimated
the combined damages related to infrastructure and to unrecoverable
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data at €45-50 million. A significant number of proceedings before
Amestonian courts were delayed for months as a result of Chester &
Walsingham’s inability to access its files. The Ames Post had to shut
down its operations entirely; it resumed publication only in June
2015.
On 1 April 2015, President Hale issued a statement denouncing the
cyberattacks, stating that “all of the evidence points back to the
Bureau and to Riesland.” He described them as “not only
undermining freedom of expression and attorney-client privilege –
essential values in and of themselves,” but as an “assault upon the
very principles that stand at the core of our society.” In an interview
with local news held on 5 April 2015, Attorney General Deloponte
refused to respond to allegations that Riesland was involved in the
attacks.
On 22 April 2015, the Amestonian Ministry of Justice announced
that the police investigation into the items found at the VoR station
premises had determined that a number of them had been used for
surveillance. The Ministry reported that it had obtained a forfeiture
order against the premises and all property found there on the basis
that it was employed in criminal activity. Finally, the Ministry stated
its intention to sell the station’s real estate and property, estimated to
be worth €20 million, by public auction. Challenges to the original
warrant dated 16 February 2015 and to the forfeiture order, presented
to Amestonia’s High Court by attorneys from Riesland National
Television Corporation, were rejected. All subsequent appeals were
summarily dismissed. The auction has been stayed until the
conclusion of all outstanding legal proceedings before the
International Court of Justice.
In mid-2015, diplomats from Riesland and Amestonia began
meeting in an attempt to settle their differences. After several months
of negotiations, the parties were unable to reach an agreement. In
July 2015, Amestonia circulated among the members of the United
Nations Human Rights Council the text of a proposed resolution
calling on the recently-appointed Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Privacy to investigate whether Riesland’s cyber and surveillance
programs were in compliance with international law. An article
published in The Sydney Morning Herald on 9 July 2015 reported
that Riesland’s supporters on the Council had urged it to resolve its
disputes with Amestonia. A source within the Council told the
newspaper: “A number of countries voiced their concern that the
continued uncertainty as to the legality of the challenged surveillance
programs would hinder their ability to continue to engage and share
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intelligence with Riesland without fear of being complicit in human
rights abuses.”
In light of growing international pressure, Riesland and Amestonia
agreed to refer all matters in dispute to the International Court of
Justice, and for this purpose have drafted and signed this Special
Agreement. Riesland, however, has reserved its objections to the
admissibility of information derived from any confidential
documents that may have been provided to The Ames Post by Frost.
The parties agreed that the issue of the admissibility of the
documents would be left for the Court to resolve, as reflected in
Article 2(b) of this Special Agreement.
Amestonia and Riesland are both members of the United Nations,
and are parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice; the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations; the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations; the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings; and the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Neither state has made
any reservations, declarations or understandings with regard to any
of these treaties.
Applicant asks the Court to adjudge and declare that:
(1)
The documents published on the website of The Ames
Post are admissible as evidence before the Court;
Riesland’s mass electronic surveillance programs
against Amestonian public figures and nationals
revealed in those documents violates international
law; and Amestonia is therefore entitled to an order
directing the immediate cessation of those programs
with assurances of non-repetition;
(2)
The seizure and forfeiture of the VoR station and its
equipment, and the arrest of Margaret Mayer and the
other two VoR employees, did not violate the
Broadcasting Treaty, and were in accordance with
Amestonia’s other international law obligations;
(3)
The detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism
Act violated international law, and Amestonia is
therefore entitled to his immediate release, the
disclosure of all information which formed the basis
of his apprehension, and the payment of compensation
for his detention; and
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The cyber attacks against the computer systems of The
Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable
to Riesland, and constitute an internationally wrongful
act for which Amestonia is entitled to compensation.
Respondent asks the Court to adjudge and declare that:
(1)
The illicitly-obtained documents published on the
website of The Ames Post are inadmissible before the
Court, but in the event that the Court does find them
to be admissible, they do not evidence any breach by
Riesland of an international obligation owed to
Amestonia;
(2)
The arrest of Margaret Mayer and the other VoR
employees, and the expropriation of the VoR facility
and its equipment, violated the Broadcasting Treaty
and international law generally, and Riesland is
therefore entitled to the immediate release of its
nationals and compensation for the value of the
confiscated property;
(3)
Riesland’s detention of Joseph Kafker under the
Terrorism Act is consistent with its obligations under
international law, and the Court has no authority to
order either Kafker’s release or the disclosure of the
information relating to his apprehension; and
(4)
The cyber attacks against the computer systems of The
Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham cannot be
attributed to Riesland, and in any event did not
constitute an internationally wrongful act.
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ANNEX I
TREATY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF BROADCASTING FACILITIES
BETWEEN THE STATE OF AMESTONIA
AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF RIESLAND
4 MARCH 1992
[excerpts]
The State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland (“the
Contracting Parties”),
(a) desiring to fortify the friendship between the two countries; (b)
recognizing the importance of strengthening understanding and cooperation
between their peoples; (c) seeking to offer their citizens radio and television
channels that will reflect the two nations’ dynamic political, cultural, and
artistic activity; have agreed upon the following articles:
ARTICLE 1
1. Each Contracting Party may establish and operate in the territory of the
other a radio and television broadcasting station.
2. The land on which each station will be constructed will be procured by
the operating-state and held in its name. The operating state will be
responsible for staffing, running, and funding the station, and shall
procure at its own expense and in its own name the materials and other
equipment required for its operation.
[...]
ARTICLE 2
Each station shall produce and air programs and content including news
stories, interviews, documentaries, and movies produced either in or by the
operating country, with local viewers and listeners in the host country as the
target audiences.
[...]
ARTICLE 14
1. The premises referenced in article 1(2) of the present Treaty shall be
inviolable, and agents of the host state may not enter those premises
without the consent of the head of the station. Such consent may be
assumed only in cases of fire or other similar disaster posing or
threatening serious immediate danger to public safety or order.
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2. In addition to the premises of the station, its furnishings, equipment, and
other property used in its operation, as well as its means of transport,
shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment, expropriation, or
execution.
3. The receiving state is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to
protect the premises of the station against any intrusion or damage, and
to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the premises or impairment of
its dignity.
4. The archives and documents of the station shall bear visible external
marks of identification, and shall be inviolable at all times and wherever
they may be.
[...]
ARTICLE 15
1. Each station's employees, who are also nationals of the operating state,
shall be entitled to the
following immunities and privileges:
a) The persons of each station’s employees shall be inviolable, and
they shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The
host state shall treat them with due respect and shall take all
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their freedom or
dignity.
b) Each station’s personnel shall enjoy immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state, and shall not be obliged to give
evidence as witnesses.
c) In respect of acts performed by an employee of the station in the
exercise of its functions, the immunities and privileges shall
continue to subsist after the employee’s functions at the station
have come to an end.
[...]
ARTICLE 23
1. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of
all persons employed by each station to respect the laws and
regulations of the host state. Those who are nationals of the operating
state have an additional duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of
the host state.
2. The premises of the station must not be used in any manner
incompatible with the station’s functions as envisaged in the present
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Treaty, in other rules of general international law, or in any other
agreements in force between the Parties hereto.
[...]
ARTICLE 36
All privileges and immunities provided for in this Treaty, save for those in
Article 15(1)(c) above, shall cease to have effect upon the cessation of the
station’s functions as envisaged in the present Treaty.
[...]
ARTICLE 40
The term of this agreement shall be 30 years.
(Signed)
Shannon Belle Cambridge
Minister of Telecommunications
State of Amestonia

(Signed)
John Andre Sorge
Minister of State of
Telecommunications
Federal Republic of
Riesland
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ANNEX II
TERRORISM ACT 2003
[excerpts]

1. Definitions
[...]
“National Security Tribunal” (“the Tribunal”) shall have the meaning given
that term under the Secret Surveillance Bureau Act 1967;
[...]
“Terrorist Act” shall mean an act as defined in Article 2.1(b) of the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
(9 December 1999);
[...]
2. Terrorism Alert
If the Government receives information that there is a credible danger of an
imminent terrorist act being committed in Riesland, it may issue a Terrorism
Alert. Such an Alert shall be valid for six months, unless it is revoked earlier.
Upon its expiration or revocation, the Government may issue a new
Terrorism Alert if it considers that the credible danger of terrorist acts still
persists or has been revived.
3. Detention Powers
a. When a Terrorism Alert is in force, the Government may detain any
foreign national suspected of being involved in instigating, authorizing,
planning, financing, carrying out, or aiding a Terrorist Act, as defined
herein, for a period not exceeding 180 days.
b. Except as provided herein, no court shall review the detention of any
person hereunder, but every detainee shall be brought before the Tribunal
within three days of his or her detention.
c. Proceedings before the Tribunal will be held in secret, and its
proceedings will not be disclosed to the public or the media. Records of
the Tribunal’s proceedings shall be entitled to the highest protection
provided by law.
d. The Tribunal may decide whether continued detention of an individual
is required for reasons of national security or public safety. The Tribunal
shall give appropriate consideration to factors including, but not limited
to:
i. the likelihood that the detainee has in fact committed, instigated,
authorized, planned, financed, or aided a Terrorist Act;
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the likelihood that the detainee will commit a Terrorist Act or will
incite others to do so if he or she is released;
iii. the likelihood of family or government rehabilitation or support
for the detainee if he or she is released;
iv. the likelihood that the detainee may be subject to criminal trial,
whether under this Act or some other statute;
v. the likelihood that, following release, the detainee’s country of
nationality will request extradition from Riesland; and
vi. any substantial interest in the detainee expressly stated by
national law enforcement or intelligence authorities.
e. In making its decision under subsection (d), the Tribunal may receive
and accept any documentary or testimonial evidence from any source. It
shall determine whether or not particular evidence is to be treated as
“closed material.” Closed material shall not be made available to the
detainee, his or her counsel, or third parties, without the Tribunal’s
authorization.
f. In proceedings before the Tribunal, officials from the security and
intelligence authorities may be allowed to testify anonymously via video
conferencing with their faces and voices obscured.
g. After the initial review provided in subsection (b), each detainee will be
brought before the Tribunal no less often than every 21 days for a
periodic review. The Tribunal will consider whether conditions such as
those listed under subsection (d) have changed, allowing for the
detainee’s criminal prosecution or release.
h. The Tribunal may extend the detention of any detainee in appropriate
circumstances, but no detainee shall remain in custody under this Act for
a period of more than 540 days in total.
i. Persons detained under this Act may be represented by legal counsel to
be selected by them from a list of “Special Advocates,” who possess
appropriate security clearance. This list shall be compiled by the
Attorney General. Only Special Advocates will be entitled to participate
in proceedings where closed material is presented. A Special Advocate
may not disclose closed materials to or discuss them with the detainee or
any third party, or obtain the detainee’s instructions pertaining to such
materials.
[...]

2016 PHILIP C. JESSUP
INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION
CORRECTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS TO THE SPECIAL
AGREEMENT
The following corrections and clarifications to the Special Agreement
have been agreed to by the parties, and the text jointly notified to the Court
on 1 September 2015 should be considered amended accordingly. The
Registrar of the Court reminds all parties and participants of the following:
a. The Special Agreement is, in essence, a negotiated stipulation of
facts. Its words have been carefully chosen, and are the result of
extensive negotiation. The parties decline to “clarify” matters
about which they are unlikely to agree.
b. Any request for clarification not addressed in the following
paragraphs has been considered by the parties to be redundant,
inappropriate, or immaterial, or the parties were unable to reach
agreement on a mutually acceptable answer.
c. Except to the extent that corrections and clarifications are set out
below, participants are to assume that the Special Agreement is
accurate in all respects.
d. With respect to pronunciations of the various proper names used
in the Special Agreement, all parties and the Court have agreed
that they will not take formal or informal offense at any
reasonable effort to pronounce proper names correctly.
CORRECTIONS
1.

The words “radio and” should be deleted from both subparagraph (c)
to the preamble and Article 1(1) of the 4 March 1992 Broadcasting
Treaty, excerpted in Annex I.

2.

At the end of section 3(a) of the Terrorism Act, excerpted in Annex
II, the following sentence should be added: “No detention shall be
undertaken under this Act except pursuant to a warrant issued by the
National Security Tribunal.”

3.

At the end of Paragraph 43 the following sentence should be inserted:
“Amestonia and Riesland are not parties to any other bilateral or
multilateral treaty of potential relevance.”
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CLARIFICATIONS
1.

Amestonian police investigators found that the chemically altered
neonicotinoids in the possession of the three Amestonian college
students, referenced in Paragraph 19, could potentially cause serious
bodily injury to anyone handling or inhaling them.

2.

The undersea fiber optic cable, referenced in Paragraph 22, is owned
by a multinational telecommunications company registered in
Germany, and is roughly 2000 km in length. At the request of the
Amestonian government, divers from the telecommunications
company were sent to the coordinates cited in the “Verismo
Program” published on the Ames Post website. They identified the
pod and dismantled it by 6 April 2015. Company investigators were
able to determine that the pod did not cause any breaking or injury
to the cable, nor did it interrupt or in any other manner obstruct
communications.

3.

When, as referenced in Paragraph 23, the intelligence obtained under
what the Frost Files called “the Verismo Program” was provided to
Amestonian security authorities, its source was never disclosed.
Amestonian officials always accepted the intelligence, and never
challenged or otherwise demanded additional information as to the
nature, scope, and reach of the Verismo Program, until 2 February
2015.

4.

In accordance with the provisions of the Broadcasting Treaty,
Amestonia approved the appointment of each Rieslandic national
working at VoR. Thereafter, these employees received
documentation detailing their privileges and immunities under the
Treaty.

5.

The memoranda detailed in Paragraph 26 additionally revealed that
the Rieslandic Minister of Foreign Affairs was consulted on the
authorization of the Carmen Program and was routinely briefed on
the program’s activities.

6.

Amestonia was immediately informed of Kafker’s detention when
he was apprehended, and he was afforded consular assistance.
Kafker has access to medical care and the ability to communicate
with, and accept visits from, his immediate family.

7.

Riesland reissued a Terrorism Alert in October 2015. It has notified
the Secretary General of the United Nations of each of the issued
Alerts without providing any additional information.
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8.

The Amestonian Institute of Technology (AIT) referenced in
Paragraph 38 is a world-renowned research-intensive academic
institution with a focus on engineering and computer science. The
Amestonian Government turned to security experts from AIT
following the 22 March 2015 cyberattack, and asked for their
assistance in determining the identity of the perpetrators. The experts
were also provided unfettered access to the devices seized from the
VoR station.

9.

AIT’s subsequent investigation determined that the computer
infrastructures referenced in Paragraph 38 were Rieslandic
governmental computer infrastructures.

10.

Amestonia and Riesland became parties to the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties in 1982 and 1976 respectively.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland appear
before the International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 40(1) of
its Statute through submission of a special agreement for resolution of all
the differences between them concerning the Frost Files. This Court has
jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 36(1) of its Statute, as both
parties have agreed that this Court will adjudicate the dispute under its ad
hoc jurisdiction. The parties concluded this special agreement and
Compromis in The Hague, The Netherlands and jointly notified this Court
of their special agreement on 1 September 2015.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The State of Amestonia respectfully requests the Court to adjudge:
I.
Whether documents published on the website of The Ames Post are
admissible as evidence before the Court, whether Riesland’s mass
electronic surveillance programs against Amestonian public figures and
nationals revealed in those documents violate international law, and
whether Amestonia is entitled to an order directing the immediate cessation
of those programs with assurances of non-repetition; and
II.
Whether the seizure and forfeiture of the VoR station and its
equipment, and the arrest of Margaret Mayer and two other VoR
employees, violated the Broadcasting Treaty and were in accordance with
Amestonia’s other international law obligations; and
III.
Whether the detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism Act
violated international law, and whether Amestonia is entitled to his
immediate release, the disclosure of all information which formed the basis
of his apprehension, and the payment of compensation for his detention;
and
IV.
Whether the cyber-attacks against the computer systems of The Ames
Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable to Riesland and whether
they constitute an internationally wrongful act for which Amestonia is
entitled to compensation.

2016]

Distinguished Brief

189

STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND
Amestonia is a developing nation with a population of 20 million and
an agrarian-based economy. It borders Riesland, a developed country with
a population five times that of Amestonia and a world-renowned
information technology and communications sector. The two nations share
a language and have enjoyed largely positive political and economic
relations. They have concluded a number of bilateral treaties in diverse
fields of cooperation, among them the 1992 “Treaty on the Establishment of
Broadcasting Facilities” (“the Broadcasting Treaty”). The Broadcasting
Treaty entitles each State to furnish and operate a television station in the
other’s territory in hopes of facilitating mutual understanding and fortifying
the friendship between the two nations. To this end, the treaty extends
certain privileges and immunities to the stations and their employees,
obligates the station’s employees to respect the laws of the host State and
not to interfere in its internal affairs, and requires that the station not be
used in any manner incompatible with the treaty.
THE FROST FILES
The Riesland Secret Surveillance Bureau (“the Bureau”) engages in
spying and covert activities pursuant to the Secret Surveillance Bureau Act
of 1967 (“SSBA”). The SSBA provides for some external oversight of the
Bureau’s activities by other Rieslandic government bodies. In December
2014, whistleblower Frederico Frost, a former Bureau intelligence analyst,
fled to Amestonia and turned over numerous top-secret documents relating
to the Bureau’s activities (“the Frost Files”) to Chester & Walsingham, a
law firm representing him, and The Ames Post, an Amestonian newspaper.
The Ames Post independently reviewed and published the documents on its
website gradually over January and February 2015. Amestonia declined
Riesland’s request for Frost’s extradition under the political offense
exception in the countries’ Extradition Treaty.
VERISMO AND CARMEN
The Frost Files revealed that beginning in May 2013, as part of a
surveillance program called “Verismo,” the Bureau collected and stored 1.2
million gigabytes of data a day from an undersea fiber optic cable that
serves as Amestonia’s primary means of international communication.
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The Frost Files also revealed that from its establishment in 1992
pursuant to the Broadcasting Treaty, the Voice of Riesland (“VoR”), a
division of state-owned corporation Riesland National Television, had
operated as the pretext for a Rieslandic surveillance program known as “the
Carmen Program.” Under this program, Bureau employees acting as VoR
employees covertly collected information from Amestonian public and
private sector leaders, including U.N. Ambassador Cornwall. These
prominent Amestonians were invited to be guests on “Tea Time with
Margaret,” a weekly show hosted by Rieslandic television icon Margaret
Mayer, the government-appointed head of the VoR. While Mayer
interviewed her guests, Bureau employees would install a rootkit malware
known as “Blaster” on their electronic devices, allowing the Bureau full
remote privileged access to the interviewees’ phones and computers. The
program’s primary objective, as described in the leaked documents, was “to
collect information concerning Amestonia’s domestic and foreign policy, in
order to advance Riesland’s political and economic interests in the region.”
THE VOR ARRESTS AND SEIZURES
On 16 February 2015, the day The Ames Post published the Carmen
documents, Amestonian police applied for a warrant to seize VoR assets
and property, citing the documents as probable cause. While the police
were applying for the warrant, the VoR interrupted its broadcasting and
replaced it with reruns of Teatime with Margaret. The judge thereafter
granted the warrant. Upon execution, the police found the station
unattended and seized the station’s property. At 3:15AM the following
morning, Amestonian border patrol encountered three VoR employees,
including Margaret Mayer, attempting to cross into Riesland by train. The
three refused to produce their travel documents upon request by the
Amestonian officials and were subsequently detained. Amestonian police
then sought and obtained an arrest warrant for all three on suspicion of
espionage. Amestonian investigators later determined that the confiscated
property had been used for surveillance. The Amestonian Ministry of
Justice obtained a forfeiture order against VoR real estate and property.
Amestonia intends to sell the property at public auction, pending the
resolution of this case.
THE NEONICS CONTROVERSY
To boost crop yield, Amestonian farmers use a class of insecticides
known as neonicotinoids (“neonics”) produced by Rieslandic companies.
Following a report finding a correlation between the use of neonics and a
dramatic decline in the region’s honeybee population, environmental
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activists began advocating for legislation to ban the production and use of
neonics. Some online contributors advocated for violence on the activist
website www.longlivethehive.com.
On 2 February 2014, seven Amestonian warehouses were set on
fire, killing three Amestonian nationals and two Rieslandic nationals and
injuring many others. On 7 March 2014, Amestonian and Rieslandic
government officials and Rieslandic businessmen received 263 envelopes
of white powder, later determined to be non-toxic neonics. That night, an
anonymous online tweet warned that the “threat is real” and that “next
time” the envelope recipients would “taste [their] own poison.” On 16
October 2014, Tom Sivaneta, the Bureau’s Director, informed the
Amestonian Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Bureau had identified a
group of environmental activists planning to contaminate a honey shipment
bound for Riesland with a toxic neonicotinoid. The next day, Riesland
issued a Terrorism Alert pursuant to the Terrorism Act 2003. On 21
October 2014, Amestonian police arrested three college students—selfprofessed members of an environmental group called “The Hive”—in
possession of toxic neonics and maps of Amestonian honey extraction
facilities. Riesland reissued Terrorism Alerts in April 2015 and October
2015.
THE DETENTION OF KAFKER
On 7 March 2015, shortly after the VoR arrests and Amestonia’s
refusal to extradite Frost, Riesland detained Joseph Kafker—a 70-year-old
retired Amestonian politician and vocal opponent of the use of neonics—
after a speaking engagement in Riesland. Pursuant to provisions of the
Terrorism Act applying to detentions when a Terrorism Alert is in force,
Kafker was denied, inter alia, appearance in person before the Tribunal,
contact with his appointed special advocate, and access to the information
providing the basis for his arrest. The Tribunal continues to extend his
detention every 21 days, and the Supreme Court of Riesland has denied
Kafker’s motion challenging his detention.
CYBER-ATTACKS
On 22 March 2015, malware similar to that used in the Blaster
program and traceable to the cyber-infrastructure of the Rieslandic
government was used to attack the networks and communication switches
at Chester & Walsingham and The Ames Post. As a result of the attacks, the
two targets suffered a combined €45-50 million in damages, The Ames Post
shut down operations for approximately two months, and a significant
number of proceedings in Amestonian courts were delayed for months.
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APPLICATION TO THIS COURT
Amestonia and Riesland have agreed to refer this dispute to this
Court by a Special Agreement. Riesland, however, does not consent to the
introduction of information derived from confidential documents published
by The Ames Post. The parties have stipulated in Article 2(b) of the Special
Agreement that the issue of the admissibility of the documents is left for
this Court to decide.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
FIRST PLEADING
The Frost Files are admissible before this Court, Riesland’s
surveillance programs violate international law, and Amestonia is entitled
to immediate cessation and a guarantee of non-repetition of such
surveillance programs. This Court does not exclude evidence on the bases
of reliability or providence. In any event, the Frost Files are of sufficient
reliability and probative value to warrant their admission, and Amestonia
did not violate international law in accessing and submitting them. The
Frost Files and additional evidence prove the existence and scope of
Riesland’s surveillance programs. These programs violated Riesland’s
treaty obligations under the ICCPR and the Broadcasting Treaty, as they
deprived Amestonian civilians of their fundamental human rights and
contravened Amestonian law.
These programs further violated
Amestonia’s territorial integrity and U.N. Ambassador Cornwall’s
diplomatic immunities. Amestonia is entitled to immediate cessation and a
guarantee of non-repetition of Riesland’s programs, as Riesland continues
to store unlawfully-collected Amestonian data and is otherwise likely to
develop analogous programs.
SECOND PLEADING
Amestonia’s arrest and detention of VoR employees and seizure of
VoR property did not violate the Broadcasting Treaty or Amestonia’s other
international law obligations. The immunities and privileges of the
employees and premises terminated pursuant to Article 36 upon the
station’s use as a pretext for the Carmen Program. Alternatively, the station
ceased to function as envisaged when it was abandoned. In any event,
exceptio non adimpleti contractus justifies Amestonia’s non-performance
of its obligations. Furthermore, the treaty was suspended due to material
breach or was invalid due to fraud. Riesland violated provisions of the
Broadcasting Treaty essential to its object and purpose. Riesland had the
intention to do so at the time the treaty was concluded and thereby induced
Amestonia’s agreement. Finally, the Voice of Riesland was not entitled
under international law to State immunity from domestic jurisdiction
because international law does not require immunity for corporations, even
if they are state-owned. Even if the VoR was entitled to immunity, it
waived that immunity by opting into an alternate regime.
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THIRD PLEADING
Riesland’s detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism Act
violated numerous provisions of the ICCPR. Riesland violated Article 9 by
detaining Kafker without adequately informing him of the reasons for his
detention, for impermissible reasons, unnecessarily, and without prompt
appearance before a judge. Kafker was entitled to a fair hearing in
accordance with the provisions of Article 14, which Riesland violated by
depriving Kafker of his rights to counsel, equality of arms, review by a
higher tribunal, and trial without undue delay. Riesland was not entitled to
derogate from its obligations under Article 4 because it did not provide
notification of the provisions from which it derogated, the circumstances
did not justify derogation, the circumstances did not justify derogation, the
rights in question are non-derogable, and the derogation was not strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation. The laws of armed conflict do
not apply, and in any event would not absolve Riesland of its human rights
obligations. In addition to compensation, Amestonia is entitled to the
release of Kafker and the disclosure of information relating to his
apprehension, both of which remedies are within this Court’s power to
order.
FOURTH PLEADING
The cyber-attacks against The Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham
are attributable to Riesland and constitute an unlawful act for which
Amestonia is entitled to compensation. The evidence indicates that the
attacks were carried out by the government of Riesland or by a person or
entity acting under its control. In any event, because Riesland had an
obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing the attacks and failed to
do so, it is responsible for a breach of its international obligations. The
attacks constitute an unlawful use of force, a violation of the principle of
non-intervention, a violation of the customary norm of good neighborliness,
and a violation of Article 17 of the ICCPR. Furthermore, the attacks are not
justifiable under international law because they were not a valid exercise of
the right to self-defense and because they were not valid countermeasures.
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PLEADINGS

I.

THE DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED ON THE WEBSITE OF
THE AMES POST ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE
BEFORE THE COURT; RIESLAND’S MASS ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS AGAINST AMESTONIAN
PUBLIC FIGURES AND NATIONALS REVEALED IN
THOSE DOCUMENTS VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW;
AND AMESTONIA IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO AN
ORDER DIRECTING THE IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF
THOSE PROGRAMS WITH ASSURANCES OF NONREPETITION.
A.

The Frost Files are admissible before this Court.
1.

This Court’s rules of evidence do not provide
for the exclusion of relevant leaked documents.

This Court may exercise jurisdiction over “the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation.”1 This Court frames its own procedural rules regarding matters
under its jurisdiction.2 The ICJ Rules of Court and Practice Directions limit
the admissibility of evidence only when evidence is untimely,3 irrelevant,4
or submitted by certain non-parties.5 Accordingly, this Court has never
excluded evidence on the grounds of unreliability6 or unlawful
procurement.7 Instead, this Court has assigned evidence weight based on its
reliability and probative value.8 Though international criminal courts may
1
Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), 59 STAT. 1055, [hereinafter “I.C.J. Statute”],
Art.36(2)(c).
2

I.C.J. Statute, Art.30.

3

I.C.J. Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts and Documents No. 6 (2007), [hereinafter “I.C.J. Rules”],
Art.56; I.C.J. Practice Directions, I.C.J. Acts and Documents No. 6 (2007), Dir. IX.
4

I.C.J. Rules, Arts.63, 79, 84.

5

I.C.J. Practice Directions, Dir. XII.

6

Markus Benzing, Evidentiary Issues in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY (Zimmermann et al., eds. 2012), 1254; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Fact-Finding in
the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) in FACT-FINDING BY
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (Lillich ed. 1991), 83.
7

Hugh Thirlway, Dilemma or Chimera?—Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in
International Adjudication, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 624 (1984).
8
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C./Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168,
¶59; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua/U.S.), Merits, 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶¶60, 68, 84-85; Corfu Channel Case (U.K./Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 7.
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exclude unreliable evidence, fact-finding before these courts entails
substantially different procedures from fact-finding before this Court.9
2.

Even if reliability is a basis for exclusion, the
Frost Files are sufficiently reliable.

Some international courts find leaked documents unreliable and thus
inadmissible when their content is contested or unverifiable.10 In contrast,
courts find leaked documents reliable and admit them when their content is
“susceptible of confirmation”11 and includes “detail that tallies perfectly
with…the rest of the record.”12 The Frost Files bear “sufficient indicia of
credibility,”13 as they are highly-detailed primary-source materials that
include dates, include names, and are on official letterhead.14 They have
been confirmed by third-party authentication and subsequent
investigation.15 Riesland has implicitly admitted the Frost Files’ accuracy
by charging Frost with theft.16
3.

The Frost Files’ history of procurement does
not preclude admissibility.

This Court17 and a majority of international courts18 have never
excluded unlawfully-obtained evidence from the record. Even if this Court
were to exclude unlawfully-obtained evidence, the illegality of the
procurement of the Frost Files is a matter of Rieslandic domestic law, not
international law, the subject of ICJ jurisdiction.19
B.
9

Riesland’s surveillance programs violated international

Rosalyn Higgins, Speech, G.A. Sixth Committee (2 November 2007).

10

Ayyash et al., Decision on the Admissibility of Documents Published on the Wikileaks
Website, STL-11-01, ¶¶40,42.
11

Prosecutor/Taylor, Decision of 27 January 2011, SCSL-03-01-T-1171, 4-5.

12

ConocoPhillips Company et al./Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela, Dissenting Opinion of Georges
Abi-Saab, [ICSID] No.ARB/07/30, ¶59 (2013); Prosecutor/Gotovina and Markac, Decision of 2
October 2012, [ICTY] IT-06-90-A, ¶26.
13

Prosecutor/Gotovina and Markac, ¶26.

14

Compromis, ¶23.

15

Compromis, ¶¶22, 27; Clarifications, ¶2.

16

Compromis, ¶¶24, 31.

17

Thirlway, 624.

18

William Worster, The Effect of Leaked Information on the Rules of International Law, 28 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 443, 456-463 (2013).
19

I.C.J. Statute, Art.36.
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law.
1.

Riesland’s surveillance programs breached its
ICCPR obligations.

The ICCPR, to which Riesland and Amestonia are parties, prohibits
“arbitrary or unlawful interference” with individuals’ privacy and
correspondence,20 and applies to mass surveillance, electronic interception
of communications, and storage of personal data.21
a.

The ICCPR applies to Riesland’s surveillance
programs.

States must respect the rights of individuals “subject to [their]
jurisdiction,”22 regardless of territorial borders.23 Jurisdiction is nonspatial24 and may arise as a function of cyber-interferences.25
Extraterritorial jurisdiction exists when a state’s actions “produce effects
outside its territory.”26 Extraterritorial jurisdiction can arise from the
confiscation of a passport,27 failure to provide state-owed pensions,28 or
arrest of an individual.29 This Court has found that the ICCPR applies
extraterritorially when a State’s security forces occupied an area.30

20

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
“I.C.C.P.R.”], Art.2(1).
21
HRC General Comment No.16 (1988), U.N.Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, ¶¶8,10; The Right to
Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N.Doc.A/RES/68/167 (2003), Preamble.
22

I.C.C.P.R., Art.2(1).

23

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶111; Armed Activities, ¶220; HRC General Comment No.31
(2004), U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶10; Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and
Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56 HARV. INT’L L. REV. 81,109-110 (2015).
24

Montero/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/OP/2, ¶5 (1990); Al-Skeini et al./U.K., [ECtHR] 53
EHRR 589, ¶¶133-137 (2011).
25

European Parliament Report on the ECHELON System, Gerhard Schmid, Special Rapporteur
(2001), ¶8.3.2; TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE
(Schmitt, ed. 2013), [hereinafter “Tallinn Manual”], Rule 2.
26

Drozd and Janousek/France and Spain, [ECHR]14 EHRR 445, ¶91 (1992); Salas and
Others/U.S., [IACHR] No.10.573, ¶2 (1994).
27

Montero/Uruguay, ¶5.

28

Gueye et al./France, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985, ¶¶9.4-9.5 (1989).

29

Lopez Burgos/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, ¶¶12.2-12.3 (1981).

30

Wall Opinion, ¶111; Armed Activities, ¶220.
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Riesland’s programs, by impacting millions of Amestonians,31 established a
jurisdictional relationship between Riesland and surveilled Amestonians.
Even if this Court finds that jurisdiction requires a spatial relationship,
Riesland owned and operated VoR premises, was afforded territorial
protections on VoR premises,32 and staffed the VoR with its agents.
Riesland therefore exercised effective control over VoR premises,33 where
the Carmen Program unlawfully collected and stored Amestonian data.
b.

Arbitrary or unlawful interferences violate
ICCPR Article 17.

In determining whether surveillance violates the ICCPR, courts
frequently consider whether interferences pursue legitimate aims, are
proportionate to those aims, and accord with sufficiently-limiting domestic
law.34
i.
The interferences had no
legitimate aim.
Vague political and economic interests cannot justify interference.35
National security concerns only justify interference when a State’s
existence, territorial integrity, or political independence is threatened.36 The
purpose of the Carmen Program was to protect political and economic
interests,37 and the purpose of the Verismo Program was to promote
Rieslandic national security.38 As Riesland faced no major security
threats,39 neither program had legitimate aim.

31

Compromis, ¶2, 22.

32

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.1(2), 14.

33

See M./Denmark, No.17392/90, ¶1 (ECtHR 1992); Harold Koh, Memorandum Opinion on the
Geographic Scope of the ICCPR, 7 (19 October 2010).
34

HRC Gen. Comm. 16, ¶4; Lars Rehof, Article 12 in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (Eide et al., eds. 1992), 189-190 (quoting New Zealand
representative); MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 291 (2005);
Toonen/Australia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, ¶6.4 (1994)
35
The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights [UNHCHR], U.N.Doc.A/HRC/27/37, ¶22 (2014). Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and
Derogation Provisions in the I.C.C.P.R., [hereinafter “Siracusa Principles”], U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/1985/4
(1985), Limitation Clauses; European Convention on Human Rights (2010), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Art.8.
36

Siracusa Principles, Prins.29-32.

37

Compromis, ¶26.

38

Compromis, ¶¶31, 35.

39

See infra §III.A.3.b.
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The interferences were
disproportionate to legitimate
aims.

Neither surveillance program had a legitimate aim,40 rendering
proportional surveillance impossible. Beyond this, the use of “mass
interception capabilities” is per se disproportionate.41 The Verismo
Program’s violation of millions of Amestonians’ rights was
disproportionate to Riesland’s national security concerns, particularly as
Amestonia is Riesland’s ally and the program predates Hive eco-activism.42
iii.

The SSBA provided insufficient
limitations on interferences.

Domestic laws governing interferences must: (1) narrowly tailor
interferences to specific aims; (2) precisely dictate boundaries regarding
permissible circumstances for interferences, authorization processes,
categories of susceptible persons, and procedures for storing collected data;
and (3) provide safeguards against abuse.43 The SSBA provides for broad,
rather than tailored, programs, gives Rieslandic politicians discretion over
where, how, and on whom data are collected and stored, and does not
require notification of surveilled persons.44 The SSBA Tribunal and
Committee were inadequate safeguards, lacking expert input and never
challenging programs’ lawfulness.45
2.

Riesland’s Carmen Program violated the
Broadcasting Treaty.

Article 23(1) requires that VoR employees “respect the laws and
regulations” of Amestonia.46 The Carmen Program, through which VoR
employees conducted domestically-unlawful surveillance, contravenes this
provision. Article 23(2) requires that VoR premises not be used in any
40

See supra §I.B.1.b.i.

41

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, U.N.Doc.A/HRC/23/40, ¶¶37, 62 (2011).
42

Compromis, ¶¶7, 13, 22.

43

Right to Privacy in the Digital Age (UNHCHR), ¶28; Bakhtiyari/Australia,
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/D/1069/2002, ¶9.6 (2003); Weber and Saravia/Germany, 2006 ECHR 1173, ¶¶79,
84, 93-95.
44

Compromis, ¶5.

45

Compromis, ¶23.

46

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23(1).
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manner “incompatible” with VoR functions “as envisaged in the treaty.”47
Espionage is incompatible with the VoR’s functions as a vehicle for
advancing inter-State friendship.48 Furthermore, the element of
“incompatibility” in near-identical provisions in the VCDR49 and VCCR50
refers to activity that violates the receiving State’s laws and to acts that fall
outside the typical, designated functions of the mission.51 Both concerns are
implicated here, as the Carmen Program violated Amestonian law and falls
outside the designated functions of the premises as a broadcasting station.
3.

Riesland’s surveillance programs violated
Amestonian territorial integrity.

The sovereign equality of States, enshrined in U.N. Charter Article
2(1),52 constitutes a basic international law principle. Sovereign States “may
not exercise…power in any form” in the territory53—which encompasses
cyber-infrastructure54—of another State. Peacetime espionage, including
cyber-espionage targeting cyber-infrastructure,55 conducted within another
State constitutes a violation of territorial integrity,56 as evidenced by State
47

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23(2).

48

See infra §II.A.1.

49

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1964), 500 U.N.T.S. 95, [hereinafter,
“V.C.D.R.”], Art.41(1).
50
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1967), 596 U.N.T.S. 261, [hereinafter,
“V.C.C.R.”], Art.55(1).
51
EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 471 (2008); B.S. MURTY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DIPLOMACY: THE
DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENT AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 417 (1989); Martin Den Heijer, Diplomatic
Asylum and the Assange Case, 26 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L. L. 399, 413.
52

Charter of the United Nations (1945), 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, Art.2.

53

S.S. Lotus (Fr./Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No.10, 18. See also Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, U.N.Doc.A/Res/25/2625 (1970), Art.1.
54

Tallinn Manual, Rule 1.

55

Michael Schmitt, Cyber Activities and the Law of Countermeasures in Rights and Obligations
of States in Cyberspace in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE (Ziolkowski, ed.
2013), 665-666; Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L.
291, 305 (2015); Wolff Heinegg, Legal Implications of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT, 14-15 (Czosseck et al.,
eds. 2012).
56

Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (TimorLeste/Australia), Memorial of Timor-Leste, ¶3.4 (2014); Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of
Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stranger ed.
1962), 12; JOHN KISH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ESPIONAGE 83-84 (Turns, ed. 1995); Manuel GarciaMora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offences Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PITT.
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condemnations of such espionage.57 Even if limited espionage is lawful,
extensive espionage, such as that conducted by Riesland,58 is not.59
4.

Riesland’s Carmen Program violated the
immunities afforded U.N. representatives.

U.N. representatives are entitled to “inviolability for all papers and
documents,”60—including protection from cyber-operations61—and to
secrecy in voting.62 Riesland’s surveillance of U.N. Ambassador Cornwall,
which collected information regarding Amestonia’s General Assembly
votes,63 was therefore unlawful.
C.

Amestonia is entitled to immediate cessation and a
guarantee of non-repetition of Riesland’s surveillance
programs.

Because the storage of Amestonians’ personal data constitutes a
continuing wrong,64 Amestonia is entitled to cessation of Riesland’s
surveillance programs. A guarantee of non-repetition is necessary when risk
of repetition is high.65 Given Riesland’s public support for its programs66
and technological sophistication, indicating high likelihood of repetition, a
guarantee of non-repetition is necessary.

L. REV. 65, 79-80 (1964).
57

U.S.S.R. Draft Resolution, U.N.S.C., U.N.Doc.S/4321 (23 May 1960) (Condemning incursions
by American surveillance U-2s), Art.1; Condemnation of U.S. Espionage in Mercosur States,
MERCOSUR/PM/SO/DECL.07/2014 (10 November 2014).
58

Compromis, ¶¶22, 25-26.

59

See Terry Gill, Non-Intervention in the Cyber-Context in PEACETIME REGIME, 225-226.

60

Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1946), 1 U.N.T.S. 15,

61

Tallinn Manual, Rule 84.

62

G.A. Rules of Procedure, U.N.Doc.A/520/Rev.17 (2007), Rules 30, 88, 92, 103.

63

Compromis, ¶26.

64

Compromis, ¶36; See Rainbow Warrior Case (Fr./N.Z.), 82 I.L.C. 499, ¶114 (1990).

65

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex./U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 121, ¶¶150-153.

66

Compromis, ¶31.
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II.

THE DETENTION AND ARREST OF VOR EMPLOYEES,
AND THE SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF THE VOR
FACILITY AND EQUIPMENT, DID NOT VIOLATE THE
BROADCASTING TREATY OR AMESTONIA’S OTHER
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.
A.

The privileges and immunities provided under the
Broadcasting Treaty terminated pursuant to Article 36.
1.

The station ceased to function as envisaged in
the treaty when it became the headquarters of
the Carmen Program.

Broadcasting Treaty Article 36 states, “[A]ll privileges and immunities
provided for in this Treaty, save for those in Article 15(1)(c) above, shall
cease to have effect upon the cessation of the station’s functions as
envisaged in the Present Treaty.”67 The VCLT requires treaties to be
“interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”68
The context within which treaties are to be interpreted includes the treaty’s
text (both the body and the preamble) and any other relevant, applicable
rules of international law.69
The Broadcasting Treaty’s object and purpose is the fortification and
reinforcement of decades of friendly relations between Amestonia and
Riesland through the operation of the broadcasting station.70 The preamble
recognizes the parties’ “desir[e] to fortify the friendship between the two
countries” and “recognit[ion of] the importance of understanding and
cooperation between their peoples.”71 The treaty’s text also supports this
reading, balancing the extension of privileges and immunities with the duty
to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state.72 In interpreting
object and purpose, this Court has recognized parties’ intent to promote
friendship, cooperation, and mutual understanding achieved through the
specific field the treaty addresses, and that the “friendship” provisions of a
preamble should be “regarded as fixing an objective, in the light of which

67

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.36.

68

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, [hereinafter
“V.C.L.T.”], Art.31(1).
69

V.C.L.T., Art.31.

70

Compromis, ¶6; Broadcasting Treaty, Preamble.

71

Broadcasting Treaty, Preamble.

72

Broadcasting Treaty, Arts.14, 15, 23, 36.
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the other Treaty provisions are to be interpreted and applied.”73
The station’s functions are therefore best understood as broadcasting
television in service of “fortify[ing] the friendship between the two
countries.”74 Interpreting the station’s functions as synonymous with merely
broadcasting would be wholly inconsistent with the treaty’s object and
purpose. When the station began to function as a façade for a hostile and
illegal espionage scheme against Amestonia, it ceased to “function as
envisaged” as a vehicle promoting friendship and cooperation, and the
privileges and immunities provided under the Broadcasting Treaty
terminated pursuant to Article 36.
2.

Alternatively, the station’s functions ceased
when its broadcasting was interrupted and its
premises abandoned.

Even if “cessation of the station’s functions” merely means “cessation
of broadcasting,” the station ceased to function as envisaged when VoR
staff cut the television broadcasting and abandoned the station.75 The
attempt by VoR employees, including the station’s head, to flee
Amestonian territory that night demonstrates that the employees did not
intend to return and resume the broadcast.76 No warrant was provided for
the seizure of VoR property until after the station had cut its broadcast,77
and upon execution of the warrant Amestonian police confirmed that the
premises had been abandoned by the staff.78
3.

Articles 14(1-3) and 15(1)(a-b) constitute
“privileges and immunities” within the meaning
of Article 36.

The rights and privileges enumerated in Article 15 are explicitly
labeled “immunities and privileges.” Further, Article 36’s explicit exception
of Article 15(1)(c) illustrates that 15(1)(a) and (b) are clearly within Article
36’s ambit. Though Article 14 does not explicitly use the label “privileges
and immunities,” it uses the same language in Article 14—“shall be

73

Oil Platforms (Iran/U.S.), Preliminary Objection, 1996 I.C.J. 803, ¶28; Nicaragua, Merits,

74

Broadcasting Treaty, Preamble.

75

Compromis, ¶¶25-27.

76

Compromis, ¶28.

77

Compromis, ¶27.

78

Compromis, ¶27.

¶273.
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inviolable”—as does Article 15.79 Article 14 also says VoR employees
“shall be immune,” clearly indicating intent to confer an “immunity.”80 This
reading comports with the ordinary meaning of “privileges and
immunities.”81
4.

The former VoR employees do not retain
functional immunity pursuant to Article
15(1)(c) with respect to the acts at issue.

VoR employees were not immune from arrest under the functional
immunity extended under Article 15(1)(c), which provides, “In respect of
acts performed by an employee of the station in the exercise of its
functions, the immunities and privileges shall continue to subsist after the
employee’s functions at the station have come to an end.”82 The unlawful
actions for which the VoR staff members were detained and arrested—
initially failing to present travel document, and subsequently espionage83—
were plainly not “in the exercise of [the station’s] functions”84
B.

In any event, the treaty was not in effect at the time of
the arrest of the VoR employees and the seizure and
forfeiture of the VoR facility and its equipment.
1.

The Broadcasting Treaty was invalid due to
fraud.

The VCLT states, “A party which has been induced to conclude a
treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating State may invoke
the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.”85 The term
“fraud” includes “any false statements, misrepresentations or other deceitful
proceedings”86 by a State meant to induce consent to a treaty. More
79
Edward Gordon, The World Court and the Interpretation of Constitutive Treaties, 59 AM. J.
INT’L L. 794, 814 (1965)(A “rule of interpretation constantly mentioned by the Court is…that a treaty
must be read as a whole…to avoid inconsistency.”).
80
For other treaties using the language “shall be immune” to confer an “immunity,” see, e.g.,
V.C.D.R., Art.22; V.C.C.R., Art.31; Convention on Special Missions (1985), 1400 U.N.T.S. 231, Art.4.
81
"Immunity, n." O.E.D. ONLINE, December 2015, Oxford University Press (“Freedom from…
jurisdiction, etc… esp. from prosecution or arrest.”).
82

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.15.

83

Compromis, ¶28.

84

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.15; see supra §II.A.1.

85

V.C.L.T., Art.49.

86

Commentaries on the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook (1966-II),
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succinctly, “[f]raud is the antithesis of good faith.” 87
From its inception, the VoR station was used to “gain an advantage to
the detriment of”88 Amestonia.89 Only seven months elapsed between the
signing of the treaty and the first broadcast.90 During that period, Riesland
built an extensive covert facility underneath the broadcasting station and
installed and developed the necessary equipment to conduct surveillance on
VoR guests.91 Planning for this elaborate operation certainly began before
the time the treaty was concluded. The Court may draw adverse inferences
from circumstantial evidence where direct evidence is in the exclusive
control of the other party.92 Signing the treaty in bad faith constitutes a
misrepresentation by Riesland that induced Amestonia to consent to its
conclusion.
2.

Alternatively, Riesland’s violations of the
Broadcasting Treaty constitute a material
breach.

VCLT Article 60 provides that “the violation of a provision essential
to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty” constitutes
grounds for its suspension.93 This requires inquiry into the character of the
provision(s) breached and their relationship to the treaty’s object and
purpose.94 Material breaches can result from violations of ancillary
provisions considered by a party to be essential to the object and
purpose.95Amestonia’s failure to initiate VCLT termination or suspension
procedures before now does not preclude its claiming prior material breach
in response to Riesland’s allegations.96 Further, having made notification
through these proceedings, Amestonia need not continue performing its

[hereinafter “V.C.L.T. Commentaries”], Art.46 Cmt.3.
87

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 839 (Dörr et al. eds.,

2012).
88

Dörr, 839.

89

Compromis, ¶25.

90

Compromis, ¶¶7-8.

91

Compromis, ¶¶25.

92

Corfu Channel, 18.

93

V.C.L.T., Art.60.

94

Bruno Simma and Christian Tam, Reacting against Treaty Breaches in OXFORD GUIDE TO
TREATIES (Hollis, ed. 2012), 582-583.
95

V.C.L.T. Commentaries, Art.7 Cmt.9.

96

V.C.L.T., Art.65(5); V.C.L.T. Commentaries, Art.62 Cmt.8.
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obligations.97
Riesland’s violations of Article 23(1) and 23(2) of the Broadcasting
Treaty98 amount to material breaches. These provisions are essential to the
object and purpose of the treaty because they represent reciprocal
obligations due the receiving state.
Riesland’s illegal espionage scheme, carried out by VoR employees
over the course of more than two decades under the direction of the
Bureau,99 demonstrates blatant and calculated disrespect and disregard for
Amestonia’s laws in contravention of Article 23(1).100 Further, the use of
the VoR premises as the headquarters of the Carmen Program, to
Amestonia’s detriment,101 constitutes a significant breach of Article
23(2).102
3.

Amestonia’s non-performance of the treaty was
justified by exceptio non adimpleti contractus.

Exceptio non adimpleti contractus dictates that “in an agreement
creating reciprocal obligations, one Party cannot obtain from the other the
execution of its obligation, if it does not respect its own commitment” 103
and follows from the contractual nature of treaties.104 Modern scholars
regard exceptio as an “implied promise of reciprocity” contained within
treaties imposing synallagmatic—or intertwined—obligations.105 Exceptio
is a defense and requires no procedures or prior notifications to invoke it.106
As argued above, Riesland violated its obligations under Article 23.
This provision represents the mutual obligations of the parties governing
97

E.J. De Aréchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RCADI 59, 81 (1978).

98

See supra §I.B.2.

99

Compromis, ¶¶25-26.

100

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23.

101

Compromis, ¶¶25-26.

102

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23.

103

Joseph Nisot, L’exception ‘non adimpleti contractus’ en droit international, 74 RGDIP 668,
668 (1970). See also, Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands/Belgium), Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Anzilotti, 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser.A/B) No.70, 49-50.
104

Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India/Pakistan), Separate Opinion of
Judge De Castro, 1972 I.C.J. 46, ¶2 n.1.
105
D.W. Greig, Reciprocity, Proportionality and the Law of Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 295, 400
(1994); James Crawford and Simon Olleson, The Exception of Non-performance: Links between the
Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 21 AUSTRALIAN YIL 55, 55-58 (2000).
106
ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF
COUNTERMEASURES 15 (1984); Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995
(Greece/FYROM), Counter-memorial of Greece ¶8.26 (2010).
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appropriate uses of the station and is synallagmatic with the special status
conferred to the premises. Therefore, Amestonia was justified in its nonperformance of Article 15.
C.

Amestonia’s actions concerning VoR property and
personnel did not violate Amestonia’s other obligations
under international law.
1.

The VoR is not entitled to State immunity under
customary international law.

Though States themselves enjoy immunity from other States’ domestic
jurisdiction under customary international law,107 there is no customary
international law obligating the extension of immunity to state-owned
corporations and entities.108 The practice of treating state-owned
corporations as “instrumentalities” of the state, subject to the presumption
of sovereign immunity,109 is solely a feature of some States’ domestic laws,
not a customary norm.110 Other States only grant immunity to state-owned
entities for acta jure imperii,111 and others do not extend sovereign
immunity at all to separate legal entities.112 During the drafting of the U.N.
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
States expressed divergent views on whether state-owned corporations with
separate legal personalities could avail themselves of State immunity,
reflecting diverse domestic practices.113
Therefore, as supported by scholarly opinion,114 insufficient State
practice and opinio juris115 exists to indicate crystallization of a norm
entitling state-owned corporations to immunity. Both approaches are
107

ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 99-101 (2005).

108

XIAODONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 278-279 (2015).

109

E.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §1602–1611 (U.S.), §1603(b).

110

See, e.g., OBB Personenverkehr AG/Sachs, 136 S.Ct. 390 (2015) (U.S.).

111

State Immunities Act, 1978 c. 33, pt. I (U.K.), §14.

112

See, e.g., Central Bank of Nigeria Case, 65 I.L.R. 131 (Germany, 1975) (“Separate legal
entities of a foreign State enjoy no immunity.”).
113

Report of the Working Group on Jurisdictional States and their Property, ILC Yearbook
(1999-II), ¶¶61-83; United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property (2005), 44 I.L.M. 801 (U.N.Doc.A/59/22), Art.2.
114

Yang, 279; HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 353 (2008); David
Stewart, Current Developments: The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, 99 AM. J. INT’L LAW 194, 199 (2005).
115

3, ¶77.

North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany/Denmark, Germany/Netherlands), Merits, 1969 I.C.J.
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therefore in line with international law obligations, and a State is entitled to
deny immunity to foreign State-owned corporations in accordance with its
own domestic law.116 Riesland National Television is a State-owned
corporation with a separate legal personality,117 and the VoR is a division of
that corporation.118 Therefore, Amestonia is in observance of its
international law obligations in denying jurisdictional immunity to the VoR.
2.

Alternatively, Riesland waived State immunity
with respect to the VoR by opting into an
alternate regime under the Broadcasting
Treaty.

A State entitled to immunity in a foreign court may waive that
immunity, either explicitly or by implication.119 Once waived, immunity
cannot be reasserted.120 Waiver, whether implicit or explicit, must clearly
express an intention to waive, and that waiver must be specific to the
litigation at issue.121
The Broadcasting Treaty provided a detailed immunities regime,122
including circumstances for termination of immunities.123 Opting into this
regime evinces a clear intention to submit to the domestic jurisdiction of the
receiving State if the circumstances provided are met.124 This interpretation
comports with a well-recognized canon of treaty construction125 by
preventing surplusage. If Article 36 did not express an intent to waive
immunity, Articles 14 and 15 would be inoperative, as many of the
immunities—extant under customary international law—provided therein
would be redundant. Furthermore, Article 36 would be inoperative, as the
termination of the treaty-provided immunities would have no practical
effect on the VoR’s legal status.

116

Lotus Case, 18.

117

Compromis, ¶40

118

Compromis, ¶8.

119

Yang, 316.

120

Fox & Webb, 376-377.

121

MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 740-741 (2008).

122

Broadcasting Treaty, Arts.14, 15.

123

Broadcasting Treaty, Arts.14, 15, 36.

124

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.36.

125

GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (2012).
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THE DETENTION OF JOSEPH KAFKER UNDER THE
TERRORISM ACT VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW,
AND AMESTONIA IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO HIS
IMMEDIATE RELEASE, THE DISCLOSURE OF ALL
INFORMATION WHICH FORMED THE BASIS OF HIS
APPREHENSION,
AND
THE
PAYMENT
OF
COMPENSATION FOR HIS DETENTION.
A.

Riesland’s detention of Kafker violated international
law.

Amestonia may bring a diplomatic protection claim on behalf of a
national injured by an internationally wrongful act126 who has exhausted
domestic remedies.127 Kafker, an Amestonian citizen, exhausted domestic
remedies by appealing to Riesland’s highest court.128 In human rights cases
relating to detention, “presumptions apply in favour of the ostensibly
weaker party” and against the State possessing information about the
detention.129 Because Riesland admits possession of “closed materials” on
Kafker’s detention,130 it must affirmatively demonstrate the detention’s
legality.
1.

The detention violated Article 9 of the ICCPR.

Arbitrariness under Article 9(1) encompasses both violations of
Article 9’s procedural guarantees and broader concepts like
“inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of
law…reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.”131 It applies to all
deprivations of liberty,132 even those carried out in full compliance with
domestic law.133 The court may consider procedural deficiencies
cumulatively.134

126

Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece/U.K.), Judgment No.2, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser.B)

No.3, 12.
127

See, e.g., Arhuacos/Colombia, UN.Doc.CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995, ¶8.2 (2003).

128

Compromis, ¶33.

129

Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea/D.R.C.), Separate Opinion of Judge Trindade, 2010 I.C.J. 347,

130

Compromis, ¶36.

131

HRC General Comment No.35 (2014), U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/GC/35, ¶12.

132

HRC General Comment No.8 (1982), U.N.Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, ¶1.

133

A./Australia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, ¶9.5 (1997).

134

Diallo, Merits, 2010 I.C.J. 639, ¶82.

¶73.
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a.

Riesland did not inform Kafker of the reasons
for his detention.

Section 3(a) of the Terrorism Act provides that suspected “terrorist
act”135 involvement is grounds for detention up to 180 days. During that
period, every 21 days a hearing must determine whether the conditions
requiring detention—“reasons of national security and public safety,”
including consideration of a non-exhaustive list of six factors in Section
3(d)—have changed. After 180 days, however, Section 3(h) allows the
detention to be extended to 540 total days “in appropriate circumstances.” 3
September 2015 marked 180 days since Kafker’s arrest on 7 March 2015.136
Even if Kafker was informed that he was detained under the
Terrorism Act, Riesland did not provide him any “factual specifics” of the
basis for his detention, as Article 9(2) requires.137 Whether Kafker surmised
the basis himself is irrelevant.138 Further, the Terrorism Act provides
“vague and expansive” grounds for detention, contrary to Article 9.139 The
HRC has previously noted the potential illegality of arrests under domestic
laws for “extremist activity,”140 “terrorism,”141 and “national security.”142
The exceedingly vague “appropriate circumstances” criterion under which
Riesland has held Kafker since 3 September is manifestly unlawful.
b.

Riesland is detaining Kafker for impermissible
reasons.

Detentions are arbitrary when made for improper purposes,143
including suppression of political expression,144 use of detainees as
135

As defined in the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2000), 2178
U.N.T.S. 197, [hereinafter “C.S.F.T.”], Art.2.1(b).
136

Compromis, ¶32.

137

HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶25; Ilombe and Shandwe/D.R.C., U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/86/D/1177/2003,
¶6.2 (2006).
138

Akwanga/Cameroon, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/101/D/1813/2008, ¶7.4 (2011).

139

HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶38.

140

HRC Concluding Observations: Russian Federation, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6, ¶24

(2009).
141

HRC Concluding Observations: Mauritius, U.N.Doc.CCPR/CO/83/MUS, ¶12 (2005). See also
HRC Concluding Observations: Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/BIH/CO/1, ¶18 (2006)
(“public security”).
142

HRC Concluding Observations: Sudan, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.85, ¶13 (1998).

143

See, e.g., Hassan/United Kingdom, [ECtHR] No.20750/09, ¶85 (2014).

144

Blanco/Nicaragua, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/51/D/328/1988, ¶10.3 (1994); Castells/Spain, [ECtHR]
14 EHRR 445, No.11798/85, ¶48 (1992).
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bargaining chips,145 and retribution for third-party actions.146 The
circumstances of Kafker’s arrest—his speech on environmental law and
online activism, his opposition to neonics,147 and Amestonia’s arrest of
VoR employees less than three weeks before—strongly suggest that
Riesland detained him to silence his advocacy and to retaliate for
Amestonia’s VoR investigation.
c.

Kafker’s detention is not reasonably necessary.

Even if Riesland did detain Kafker for legitimate security reasons, it
must provide specific reasons for the measures.148 Riesland bears the
burden—increasing with the length of detention—of proving a “present,
direct, and imperative threat”149 that cannot be addressed by “less intrusive
means,”150 such as regular court proceedings.151 Even States that permit
preventive detention routinely handle eco-terrorism using standard criminal
law.152 Riesland’s sole justification—the “integrity of particular intelligence
sources”153—is vague, common to many criminal investigations, and
unpersuasive in light of the subsequent revelation of the sources of
intelligence on Kafker’s activities.154 Riesland offers no evidence that
Kafker is likely to commit new crimes, destroy evidence, or receive
amnesty in Amestonia. Finally, laws permitting detention for evidencegathering in relation to suspected terrorism typically limit the period of
detention to a few days or weeks,155 which Riesland has not shown to be
insufficient.

145

Anon./Minister of Defense, [S.C. Israel] 54(1) P.D. 721, 743 (2000).

146

Yklymova/Turkmenistan, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/96/D/1460/2006, ¶7.2 (2009).

147

Compromis, ¶¶32, 36.

148

NOWAK, 382.

149

HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶15.

150

C./Australia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999, ¶8.2 (2002).

151

Benhadj/Algeria, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003, ¶8.8 (2007); Madani/Algeria,
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/89/D/1172/2003, ¶8.7 (2007). This requirement also stems from the rule that “similar
cases be dealt with in similar proceedings” under Article 14(1) and 14(3). See HRC General Comment
No.32 (2007), U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/GC/32, ¶14; Evelyne Schmid, A Few Comments on a Comment, 14
INT’L J. HUM. RIGHTS 1058, 1062 (2010).
152

See, e.g., Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §43 (USA); Serious Organised Crime
and Police Act of 2005 (U.K.).
153

Compromis, ¶34.

154

Compromis, ¶37.

155

CLAIRE MACKEN, COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, 2-3

(2011).
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Kafker was not brought promptly before a
judge.

Article 9(3)’s requirement of prompt appearance in person156 before a
judge protects those arrested but not yet charged.157 302 days after Kafker’s
arrest (at time of writing), Riesland has not permitted him to appear in
person before a court or to communicate to the court through his lawyer.
Even if his lawyer’s appearance at the hearing on 10 March was an
adequate substitute, delays of greater than 48 hours—including three-158
and four-day159 delays—“are absolutely exceptional and must be justified
under the circumstances.160 Riesland has given no justification for failing to
bring Kafker before a judge on or before 9 March, when the 48-hour
window expired.
2.

The detention violated Kafker’s fair trial rights
under Article 14.

Article 14 applies to the “determination of any criminal charge.” If the
“purpose, character, or severity” of the sanction is penal in nature, domestic
law cannot avoid Article 14’s procedural protections by characterizing a
detention as non-criminal.161 Kafker’s arrest and detention on suspicion of
“instigating, authorizing, planning, financing, carrying out, or aiding a
Terrorist Act”162—which is a domestic criminal offense163—demonstrates
the penal nature of the sanction. Violations of discrete provisions of Article
14 may constitute violations of Kafker’s broader rights to a fair trial and
presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 14(1).164 Furthermore,

156
HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶42; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, U.N.Doc.A/RES/43/173 (1988), Prin.32(2).
157
Schweizer/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/17/D/66/1980, ¶19 (1982); de Morais/Angola,
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, ¶6.4 (2005).
158

Hammel/Madagascar, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/29/D/155/1983, ¶19.4 (1990).

159

Freemantle/Jamaica, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/68/D/625/1995, ¶7.4 (2000).

160

HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶33; Abramova/Belarus, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/107/D/1787/2008, ¶¶7.3–
7.5 (2013).
161

Perterer/Austria, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/81/D/1015/2001,
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/98/D/1629/2007, ¶7.4 (2010).
162

Terrorism Act, §3(a).

163

Terrorism Act, §3(d)(4); C.S.F.T. Art.4(a).

164

¶9.2 (2004); Fardon/Australia,

See Alegre/Peru, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/85/D/1126/2002, ¶7.5 (2005); Barney/Colombia,
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/87/D/1298/2004, ¶7.2 (2006); Roque/Peru, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/85/D/1125/2002, ¶7.3
(2005); Kulov/Kyrgyzstan, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/99/D/1369/2005, ¶8.7 (2010).
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detention following an unfair trial is arbitrary under Article 9.165
a.

Riesland deprived Kafker of his right to
counsel.

Article 14(3)(b) entitled Kafker to communicate with counsel of his
choosing during hearings before the Tribunal. Kafker’s counsel was not
permitted to consult or otherwise share information with Kafker166 and was
chosen from a list compiled by the very agency conducting the
investigation.167
b.

Riesland deprived Kafker of his right to
equality of arms.

Kafker had the right to “adequate time and facilities for the preparation
of his defense” under Article 14(3)(b), to present and examine evidence and
witnesses under Article 14(3)(e), and to be tried in his presence under
Article 14(3)(d). Article 14(3)(b) entitled Kafker’s special advocate to pretrial access to all government evidence and other information required for
an effective defense.168 The defense must enjoy the “same legal powers” as
the government in presenting evidence.169 Kafker and his counsel had only
three days to prepare a defense prior to the initial hearing did not have
access to his attorney or to the “closed material” that allegedly provided the
basis for his detention,170 and did not enjoy the government’s rights to be
present, to introduce secret evidence, or to offer anonymous testimony.171
He therefore could not effectively challenge the grounds for his detention.
c.

Riesland deprived Kafker of his right to review
by a higher tribunal.

Article 14(5) establishes the right to review by a higher tribunal,
requiring “full review of the legal and factual aspects” of the lower court’s
decision.172 Section 3(b) provides that no court other than the Tribunal may

165

HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶17.

166

Compromis, ¶33.

167

Terrorism Act, §3(i).

168

Arutyunyan/Uzbekistan, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/80/D/917/2000, ¶6.3 (2004).

169

HRC Gen. Comm. 32, ¶39.

170

Compromis, ¶33.

171

Terrorism Act, §§3(e), 3(f).

172

Vázquez/Spain, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/69/D/701/1996, ¶8.6 (2000).
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review the detention of an individual under the Terrorism Act. Accordingly,
Kafker’s motion challenging the constitutionality of the proceedings was
denied by the Supreme Court,173 seemingly without review of the evidence
upon which Kafker was detained.
3.

Riesland was not entitled to derogate from its
human rights obligations.

The lawfulness of derogations from human rights obligations is
judicially reviewable.174 Unlike derogations under ECHR Article 15,
derogations under ICCPR Article 4 are entitled to little or no deference, or
“margin of appreciation,” in judicial review of the stated basis for
derogation.175
a.

Riesland did not provide adequate notification
of derogation.

On each of the three occasions Rieland issued Terrorism Alerts
(October 2014, April 2014, and October 2015),176 it failed to inform the
U.N. Secretary-General of the provisions from which it derogated and the
reasons for derogation,177 as required by Article 4(3). These failures bar
Riesland from asserting derogation ex post under Articles 9 and 14.178
b.

The circumstances did not justify derogation.

According to Article 4, States claiming derogation have the burden of
demonstrating a “public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation,”179 defined by the European Court as “actual or imminent”180 and
“exceptional[,] affect[ing] the whole population and constitut[ing] a threat
173

Compromis, ¶33.

174

See, e.g., Ireland/U.K., [ECtHR] (ser.A) No.25 (1978), ¶214.

175

Sarah Joseph, Human Rights Committee: General Comment 29, 2 HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. 81,
86 (2002); Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Derogations from
Human
Rights
Treaties
in
Situations
of
Emergency,
http://www.genevaacademy.ch/RULAC/derogation_from_human_rights_treaties_in_situations_of_emergency.php.
176

Compromis, ¶18; Clarifications, ¶7.

177

Clarifications, ¶7.

178

See Wall Opinion, ¶127; Weisz/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/11/D/28/1978, ¶14 (1984);
Montejo/Colombia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/15/D/64/1979, ¶10.3 (1985); JAIME ORAÁ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (1992).
179

Silva/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/23/D/34/1978, ¶8.3 (1981).

180

Greek Case (Denmark/Greece), [ECHR] 12 Y.B. 1, ¶112 (1969).
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to the organised life of the community.”181 This standard is higher than, and
distinct from,182 exceptions in the ICCPR for reasons of “national
security.”183 Amestonia’s claims do not implicate any rights subject to such
exceptions. Large-scale massacres involving paramilitary groups,184
frequent fatal bombings by separatist forces,185 countrywide strikes and
protests,186 and violent seizures of hundreds of hostages from an embassy187
have been found not to warrant Article 4 derogations.
The planned contamination of honey by three college students on
Amestonian soil—even if it had resulted in “serious bodily injury”188 to
some consumers—would scarcely have affected the whole population and
organized life of Riesland, a developed country of approximately 100
million people.189 Riesland has made no showing of an actual or imminent
emergency since the neutralization of that threat on October 21, 2014, 190
despite twice reissuing Terrorism Alerts.
c.

The rights in question are non-derogable.

The rights not to be arbitrarily detained, to fair trial, and to be
presumed innocent are non-derogable because they are fundamental
rights191 and because they are essential to protect the ICCPR’s enumerated
non-derogable rights.192 Thus, while Riesland may be permitted to derogate
from certain procedural components of these rights, it cannot derogate from
the rights themselves.193
181

Lawless/Ireland, [ECtHR] No.332/57 (A/3), ¶28 (1961).

182

HRC General Comment No.29 (2001), U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, ¶4.2.

183

See, e.g., I.C.C.P.R. Art.14(1)(third sentence) (permitting exclusion of the public from trials
for “national security” and other reasons).
184

HRC Concluding Observations: Colombia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.76, ¶25 (1997).

185

HRC Concluding Observations: United Kingdom, U.N.Doc.CCPR/CO/73/UK, ¶4 (2001).

186

HRC Concluding Observations: Bolivia, U.N.DocCCPR/C/79/Add.74, ¶14 (1997).

187

HRC Concluding Observations: Peru, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.67, ¶11 (1996).

188

Clarifications, ¶1.

189

Compromis, ¶1.

190

Compromis, ¶19.

191

Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency, 79 AM. J. INT’L
L. 1072, §§(C)(5)&(7) (1985); Universal Declaration on Human Rights, U.N.Doc.A/810 (1948),
[hereinafter “UDHR”], arts. 9, 11; American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948),
Arts.18, 25, 26.
192

HRC Gen. Comm. 29, ¶15; Siracusa Principles, Prin.70; Concluding Observations: Israel,
CCPR/C/79/Add.93, ¶21 (1998); Aksoy/Turkey, [ECHR] 23 EHRR 553, ¶76 (1996).
193

Clémentine Olivier, Revisiting General Comment 29 of the UNHRC, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
405, 414 (2004).
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The derogation was not strictly required.

Even if some of Riesland’s claimed derogations are lawful, they must
comply with an objective standard of proportionality,194 which “varies in
proportion to the seriousness of the terrorist threat.”195 If derogation
continues for longer than necessary or actions taken under ordinary laws
would adequately address the threat, derogation becomes unlawful,196 even
in the wake of a catastrophic terrorist attack.197 In light of the low severity
of any threats posed by eco-terrorism against Riesland198 and the
importance of Kafker’s right to personal liberty, Kafker’s detention
pursuant to unfair hearings was—or became, upon Riesland’s second and
third derogations—disproportionate.
e.

Amestonia’s allegations are unaffected by any
claims regarding the existence of an armed
conflict.

The ICCPR applies in times of war, subject to its usual derogation
standards.199 In any event, an armed conflict, characterized by the existence
of organized armed groups engaged in fighting of some intensity,200 is not
in existence. Rieslandic police—if they were involved—are not an armed
group201 and did not clash with the disorganized membership of the antineonics movement. Opposition to neonics has consisted of “internal
disturbances” that do not trigger the application of the Geneva
Conventions.202 Furthermore, a 70-year-old retiree engaging in political
activism, who has not taken up arms or engaged in violence, cannot be said
to have “taken active part in hostilities.”203

194
Siracusa Principles, Prins.54, 57; Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards,
U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/55 (1990), Preamble; HRC Gen. Comm. 29, ¶6.
195

ROSALYN HIGGINS & MAURICE FLORY, TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 229 (1997).

196

Christopher Michaelsen, Derogating from International Human Rights Norms in the ‘War
Against Terrorism’?, 17 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 131, 141 (2007).
197

A and Others/Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2004 UKHL 56, ¶43.

198

See supra §III.A.3.b.

199

Nuclear Weapons Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶25; HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶64.

200

International Law Association, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in
International Law 2 (2010).
201

DIETRICH SCHINDLER, THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ARMED CONFLICTS ACCORDING TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS 147 (1979).
202

Protocol II (1978), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, Art.1(2).

203

Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), 75 U.N.T.S. 287, Art.3.
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Amestonia is entitled to Kafker’s immediate release,
disclosure of information which formed the basis of his
apprehension, and compensation.
1.

Amestonia is entitled to Kafker’s immediate
release.

The obligation to provide an effective remedy under Article 2(3) is
non-derogable.204 Reparation must restore the situation that would have
existed but for the wrongful acts.205 Release of a detainee is required when
no other remedy could cure the ongoing harm.206 Article 9(3) provides that
detainees are entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. This
Court has previously ordered the release of unlawfully detained persons.207
Mere reconsideration would be inappropriate here, given that the detention
itself—not a procedural error during an ongoing, lawful detention208—is
unlawful. Kafker is therefore entitled to the “most important remedy” for
victims of indefinite detention:209 restoration of the personal liberty he
would have enjoyed had he not been arbitrarily detained without a fair
hearing.
2.

Amestonia is entitled to disclosure of
information which formed the basis of Kafker’s
apprehension.

An effective remedy for arbitrary detention includes the release of
detailed information relating to the investigation of the detainee.210 When
detaining individuals for terrorism offenses, Riesland has an additional
obligation to inform interested States Parties of “the circumstances which
warrant that person’s detention.”211 Amestonia is therefore entitled to any
information justifying Kafker’s detention under the Terrorism Act.

204

HRC Gen. Comm. 29, ¶14.

205

Factory at Chorzow (Ger./Pol.), Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No.17, 47.

206

Cagas/Philippines, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/73/D/788/1997, Individual Opinion of Quiroga and
Posada, (c) (1996).
207

United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S./Iran), Provisional Measures
Order of December 15, 1979 I.C.J. 7, ¶47.
208

Cf. Avena, ¶123.

209

Alfred de Zayas, Human Rights and Indefinite Detention, 87 IRRC 15, 34 (2005).

210

Aboufaied/Libya, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/104/D/1782/2008, ¶9 (2012).

211

Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1998), 2149 U.N.T.S. 284, Art.9(6).
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3.

Amestonia is entitled to compensation.

Article 9(5) entitles victims of unlawful detentions to compensation.
Non-material injury, including mental suffering and reputational harm, is
compensable under international law;212 it is an “inevitable consequence” of
wrongful detention, specific proof of which is not required for the injured
national’s State to receive compensation on his behalf.213 Amestonia is
therefore entitled to receive compensation for the harm Kafker suffered
from his unlawful detention.
IV.

THE CYBER-ATTACKS AGAINST THE COMPUTER
SYSTEMS OF THE AMES POST AND CHESTER &
WALSINGHAM ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO RIESLAND,
AND CONSTITUTE AN INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL
ACT FOR WHICH AMESTONIA IS ENTITLED TO
COMPENSATION.
A.

The cyber-attacks against the computer systems of The
Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable
to Riesland.

As President Hale commented in relation to the 22 March 2015
attacks: “all of the evidence points back to the Bureau and to Riesland.” 214
To the extent that additional relevant evidence is under the exclusive
control of Riesland, the Court may have “more liberal recourse to
inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence.”215 The limited availability
of evidence in cyber-attacks necessitates a particularly relaxed standard of
proof.216
1.

The attacks were carried out by the Rieslandic
governments.

The conduct of State organs are attributable to that State.217 In the
cyber context, an “identifying line of code” can serve the same evidentiary
212

Lusitania Cases, 7 R.I.A.A. 35, 40 (1923).

213

Diallo, Merits, ¶21.

214

Compromis, ¶39.

215

Corfu Channel, 18.

216

Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence, and the Problem of Attribution, 17 J.
CONFLICT SEC. L. 229, 235 (2012).
217

Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts [ARSIWA], (I.L.C.
Yearbook 2001-I) Pt. II, Art.4.
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function as traditional markers of State authority.218 The origination of a
cyber-operation from a government’s technology systems is “an indication
that the State in question is associated with the operation.”219 Experts from
the Amestonian Institute of Technology, a highly-regarded research
institution specializing in computer science,220 found that “significant
segments of code” in the malware that brought down the computer systems
were identical to the codes used by the Bureau in the Blaster program,221
traceable to Rieslandic governmental computer infrastructures,222 and
unavailable to the general public,223 strongly suggesting that Rieslandic
government used its “world-renowned” IT capabilities224 to carry out the
attacks.
The Bureau had a compelling motive to engage once again in covert
action within Amestonia. Leading up to the cyber-attacks, Frost’s
disclosures—facilitated and circulated by the victim companies—led to the
exposure of confidential Bureau information, seizures of Bureau personnel
and facilities, and Amestonia’s provision of sanctuary to Frost, a former
Bureau employee whom Amestonia had declined to extradite a mere eight
days before the attack.225 Rieslandic Attorney General Deloponte also
pledged that Riesland would not “tolerate the publication of leaked
confidential information, and that it [would] do whatever is in its power to
disrupt any further threats to our national security.”226
2.

The attacks were carried out by a person or
entity acting under the control of Riesland.

Even if the above evidence does not establish that the Bureau carried
out the attacks, it is sufficient to prove that Riesland exercised control over
the person or entity carrying out the attacks.227 The standard of “overall
control” articulated by the ICTY in the Tadić case would attribute a cyberattack carried out by private actors to Riesland if it supplied technical and

218
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organizational support, “even if no specific involvement in the attack can be
proven.”228 The Court should decline to follow the heightened “effective
control” test articulated in the Genocide case,229 which is unduly restrictive
and not reflective of custom.230
B.

Riesland’s attacks constitute an internationally
wrongful act.
1.

The attacks constitute a violation of U.N.
Charter Article 2(4).

Whether an act—including a cyber-operation—amounts to an
unlawful use of force depends on the act’s scale and effects.231 Destruction
of life is not a prerequisite, provided that the computer-based operation
results in damage that would be illegal if inflicted by military units.232 The
loss of an object’s functionality constitutes damage if it requires
replacement of physical components, and some scholars have observed that
a “loss of usability” alone is sufficient.233 The 22 March attacks against
Amestonian targets caused tremendous damage of €45-50 million, resulting
in data loss, disabling of “communication switches,” and damage to
“infrastructure,”234 suggesting damage to the hardware’s functionality235
and other physical computing resources. Chester & Walsingham was unable
to access its files for months and The Ames Post was non-operational for
approximately three months.236 These large-scale and serious effects would
constitute an unlawful use of force if caused by military forces and thus are
equally prohibited in the cyber context.

228

Tsagourias, 237.

229

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina/Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶401.
230
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231
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232
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221

The attacks constitute a violation of the
principle of non-intervention.

Customary international law prohibits coercive intervention in matters
that the victim State is entitled to decide freely,237 including the use of
certain coercive economic measures.238 International instruments,239 State
practice,240 and scholarship241 indicate that cyber-operations—and the
provision of tools for use in such operations242—may qualify as coercive.
Riesland undertook or supported a cyber-operation against The Ames Post,
Amestonia’s most widely-circulated newspaper,243 in order to coerce
Amestonia to submit to Riesland’s demands in two matters Amestonia had
decided—and was entitled to decide—freely: its refusal to extradite Frost
under the political offense exception in the Extradition Treaty and its
refusal to release documents held by The Ames Post.244
3.

The attacks constitute violations of Riesland’s
human rights obligations.

In addition to ICCPR Article 17’s protection against interference with
correspondence, Article 19 recognizes the “freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds.” These rights apply to private
businesses.245 Cyber-attacks against private networks constitute violations
of these provisions,246 which States have a “positive obligation” to prevent,

237
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The Principle of Non-intervention, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L LAW 345, 371 (2009); Lori Damrosch, Politics
Across Borders, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 31-32 (1989).
239
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investigate, and punish.247 By interfering with—or failing to protect against
interference with—the rights of Amestonian corporations to engage freely
in both private and public correspondence, Riesland violated its obligations
under the ICCPR.248
C.

In any event, the attacks violated Riesland’s obligation
to prevent transboundary harm.

States are obligated to prevent activities within their jurisdictions that
adversely affect other States.249 Although the norm is applied primarily to
tangible resources, sovereign jurisdiction includes computer infrastructures
within a state’s territory,250 and the no-harm principle extends to adverse
effects in the shared environment of cross-border computer networks.251
Scholars have argued that Russia be held responsible for the 2007 cyberattacks against Estonia, given Russia’s tacit approval of the acts during an
ongoing dispute with Estonia.252 Statements by State representatives
regarding operations originating in the territories of Kyrgyzstan, Israel, and
China show that cyber-attacks are internationally-wrongful acts.253
Riesland’s refusal to respond to the attacks,254 technological sophistication,
extensive control over the “primary backbone” Amestonian
communications,255 and use of Rieslandic IP addresses and government
247

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, U.N.Doc.A/HRC/17/27 (2011), ¶52.
248
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1965 (1941); Corfu Channel, 22.
250
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software in the attacks show that Riesland failed to exercise due diligence
in preventing or punishing operations launched from its soil.
D.

The attacks are not justifiable under international law.
1.

The attacks were not a valid exercise of the
right to self-defense.
a.

Self-defense cannot be exercised against nonState actors.

This Court256 and scholars257 have found that non-State actors cannot
commit “armed attacks” under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter; thus, they
may be targeted without the territorial State’s consent only if their actions
are attributable to that State. Even if an exception exists for self-defense
within States “unable or unwilling” to prevent armed attacks,258 that test is
not met here. Following the arson attacks, President Hale announced a
police investigation and emphasized that Amestonia would “not tolerate
such provocations;”259 Amestonian police later apprehended would-be
attackers before they could cause any harm;260 finally, no attacks have
occurred in Amestonia or Riesland since the release of the Frost Files.
b.

Riesland was not the victim of an armed attack.

An armed attack, distinct from “less grave” uses of force,261 requires
“infliction of substantial destruction upon important elements of the target
State.”262 If non-State actors can commit armed attacks, a higher threshold
for what constitutes an “armed attack” applies to them263—which does not

256
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“large-scale attacks”).
257

IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES, 244-45 (1963);
TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER 485, 486-87 (2010); Antonio
Cassese, The International Community’s ‘Legal’ Response to Terrorism, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 589,
597 (1989).
258
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include extraterritorial terrorist attacks against a State’s nationals.264 Arson
committed on Amestonian soil, even if two Rieslandic nationals died from
smoke inhalation, does not satisfy even the most expansive definition of an
armed attack. Preventive self-defense is not recognized in international law,
including against terrorist attacks.265
2.

The attacks were not valid countermeasures.

Countermeasures that violate fundamental human rights
obligations266 and involve the use or threat of force267 are unlawful.268
Countermeasures must be necessary “to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril”269 and proportionate—including
quantitatively equivalent270—in response to an internationally wrongful act.
Amestonia’s seizures of VoR personnel and property were lawful.271 In any
event, Riesland’s rights under the Broadcasting Treaty are not an essential
interest and could have been asserted without recourse to unilateral action.
Finally, Amestonia seized property worth only €20 million that has not yet
been sold;272 by contrast, the Amestonian targets suffered €45-50 million in
irreversible losses.
E.

Amestonia is entitled to compensation for the attacks.

States are entitled to compensation for breaches of international law
resulting in harm to property.273 Amestonia is entitled to €45-50 million for
the harm caused to the two Amestonian companies.274

TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2013), Annex, ¶39.
264
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The State of Amestonia respectfully requests this Court to declare:
I.
The Ames Post documents are admissible, Riesland’s electronic
surveillance programs violate international law, and Amestonia is entitled
to their cessation and non-repetition; and
II.
Amestonia’s VoR seizures and arrests were lawful; and
III.
Riesland’s detention of Kafker violated international law, and
Amestonia is entitled to his release, disclosure of relevant documents, and
compensation; and
IV.
The cyber-attacks against Amestonian targets are attributable to
Riesland and constitute a wrongful act for which Amestonia is entitled to
compensation.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents of the Government of the State of Amestonia
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
BACKGROUND
Riesland and Amestonia are neighboring States with a common
language and similar ethnic composition. They enjoy healthy cross-border
economic, cultural, and security ties. Riesland is the top importer of
Amestonian agricultural products, which has contributed to Amestonia’s
rapid GDP growth. The States have concluded a number of bilateral treaties
on subjects such as tourism, extradition, and intelligence-sharing.
THE BROADCASTING TREATY
One bilateral agreement between the States is the 1992 Treaty on the
Establishment of Broadcasting Facilities (“the Broadcasting Treaty”). The
Broadcasting Treaty entitles each state to furnish and operate a television
station in the other’s territory. To accomplish this, the treaty provides
certain protections from interference in the receiving State and extends
privileges and immunities to the stations’ premises, property, and
employees. Voice of Riesland (“VoR”), a division of Riesland’s stateowned and -operated broadcasting corporation, Riesland National
Television (“RNT”), operates Riesland’s station in Amestonia. Since its
inaugural program in 1992, VoR has broadcasted a variety of awardwinning and highly acclaimed programs.
THE FROST FILES
In December 2014, Riesland national Frederico Frost, a former
Riesland Secret Service Bureau (“the Bureau”) intelligence analyst, gave a
law firm in Amestonia a USB drive containing nearly 100,000 documents
marked “top secret” (“the Frost Files”), which Frost claims were
downloaded from Bureau computers. Frost also gave a copy of the USB to
two reporters from The Ames Post, Amestonia’s most widely-circulated
newspaper. In January and February 2015, The Ames Post gradually
published thousands of these documents, unredacted, on its website.
Riesland requested the documents’ return and Frost’s extradition under the
States’ extradition treaty. Amestonia refused both requests.
The Frost Files contained information indicating that beginning May
2013, as part of a program called “Verismo,” the Bureau collected and
stored telecommunications metadata from Amestonian citizens through a
recording pod installed on an undersea fiber optic cable located in
Riesland’s exclusive economic zone. The documents also discuss
Riesland’s alleged operation of a program known as “Carmen.” This
operation allegedly entailed the collection of data from the phones of
Amestonian public and private leaders while those officials were guests on
“Tea Time with Margaret.” Authorizations and safeguards for these
intelligence operations were provided in the Secret Surveillance Bureau Act
(“SSBA”).
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VOR ARRESTS AND SEIZURES
On 16 February 2015, the day The Ames Post published the Carmen
documents, Amestonian police applied for and received a warrant to seize
VoR’s assets and property, citing the documents as probable cause. Upon
execution, the police seized the station’s property. At 3:15AM the
following morning, Amestonian border patrol arrested three VoR
employees, including Margaret Mayer, attempting to cross into Riesland by
train. The three refused to produce travel documents upon request and were
subsequently detained. Upon this development, the Amestonian police
sought and obtained an arrest warrant for all three on suspicion of
espionage. Amestonian investigators later determined that some confiscated
VoR property was used for surveillance. The Amestonian Ministry of
Justice obtained a forfeiture order against VoR’s real estate and property.
Amestonia intends to sell the property at public auction, pending the
resolution of this case.
THE HIVE
For several years, Rieslandic companies have supplied Amestonian
farmers with insecticides known as neocontinoids, or “neonics,” which
boost farmers’ yields. On 2 October 2012, the Institute for Land and
Sustainable Agriculture (“ILSA”) published the results of a study
identifying neonics’ negative effects on bees and other pollinators. ILSA
called on Riesland and Amestonia to reevaluate the use of this insecticide.
Sometime after 2 July 2013, an anonymous post appeared on
www.longlivethehive.com. The post condemned politicians for failing to
“respond to peaceful initiatives,” and called on the group to “command
attention.” The post expressed a need to respond “effectively and in kind.”
The website was primarily used by environmental activists to discuss ways
to stop neonic use, including occasional calls for violent action, including
sabotage and arson.
On the night of 2 February 2014, seven Amestonian warehouses,
which stored neonics, were simultaneously set on fire. The arson attacks
killed 5 people, including two Rieslandic nationals, and injured many
others. The attacks caused €75 million of damage, and are expected to have
long-term adverse health consequences for the local population. Police
found spray-painted images of a bee on the asphalt outside the warehouses.
On 7 March 2014, 263 envelopes containing white powder and
stamped with the image of a bee were sent to Ministries of Trade and
Agriculture officials in Riesland and Amestonia, prominent Amestonian
farmers, and board members of three Rieslandic neonic-producing
corporations. That night, an anonymous online tweet warned that the “threat
is real” and that “next time” the envelope recipients would “taste [their]
own poison.” Following the attacks and subsequent threats, Riesland’s
Prime Minister announced that she had ordered Riesland’s security and
intelligence services to direct operations against the threat.
On 16 October 2014, the Bureau Director informed the Amestonian
Government that Bureau intelligence identified a plot to contaminate a large
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shipment of honey bound for Riesland with toxic neonicontinoids. The next
day, Riesland issued a Terrorism Alert pursuant to the Terrorism Act 2003
(“Terrorism Act”). On 21 October 2014 Amestonian police arrested three
members of a group calling itself “The Hive” in possession of toxic neonics
and detailed maps of Amestonian honey extraction facilities. Riesland
reissued Terrorism Alerts in April 2015 and October 2015.
JOSEPH KAFKER
Riesland’s Attorney General announced that Rieslandic intelligence
linked Joseph Kafker, a vocal opponent of neonics, to the highest echelons
of the Hive. Documents show he was a “high level suspect” in the
attempted poisoning of honey bound for Riesland. On 7 March 2015,
Riesland detained Joseph Kafker in Riesland’s territory, announcing the
Terrorism Act as the basis for his detention. Kafker’s detention was
reviewed in a closed hearing on 10 March 2015 by the National Security
Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), comprising five Rieslandic judges. The Tribunal
granted the petition to detain Kafker for national security reasons and ruled
that evidence against Kafker was “closed material” pursuant to the
Terrorism Act. Kafker was represented at this proceeding by a Special
Advocate but was not able to attend, communicate with his lawyer, or
access the evidence presented. Kafker’s detention has been reviewed and
extended by the Tribunal every 21 days. Kafker was granted consular
assistance, given access to his family, and allowed communication with the
outside world throughout his detention.
CYBER ATTACKS
On 22 March 2015, malware similar to that used in the Carmen
program and traceable to the computer infrastructures of the Rieslandic
government was used to attack the networks and communication switches
at Chester & Walsingham and The Ames Post. As a result of the attacks, the
two targets suffered a combined €45-50 million in damages, The Ames Post
shut down operations for two months, and a significant number of
proceedings in Amestonian courts were delayed for months.
APPLICATION TO THE COURT
Amestonia and Riesland have agreed to refer this dispute to this Court
by Special Agreement. Riesland, however, does not consent to the
introduction of information derived from the Frost Files. The parties have
stipulated in Article 2(b) of the Special Agreement that the issue of the
admissibility of the documents is left for this Court to decide.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

FIRST PLEADING
The illicitly-obtained documents published in The Ames Post
(hereinafter “Frost Files”) are inadmissible before this Court. The Frost
Files violate this Court’s standards of relevance and proof of authenticity.
The documents do not derive from an independent body, result from
personal and direct confirmation, or have multiple, impartial sources to
verify their content. Because the documents are inadmissible, Amestonia
cannot meet its burden to prove that Riesland’s intelligence programs
violated international law. Even if this Court finds the documents to be
admissible, they do not evidence any breach of an international obligation
owed to Amestonia. Riesland’s intelligence programs did not violate its
treaty obligations under the ICCPR because the programs were not under
Riesland’s effective control, and in any event, did not constitute arbitrary
interference into Amestonians’ right to privacy. Riesland’s intelligence
programs also did not violate customary law because state practice and
opinio juris support states’ right to engage in intelligence collection.
SECOND PLEADING
By entering Riesland’s broadcasting station without permission,
ordering the forfeiture of its premises and property, and arresting and
detaining the station’s employees, Amestonia violated Articles 1, 14, and
15 of the Treaty on the Establishment of Broadcasting Facilities Between
the State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland (hereinafter
“Broadcasting Treaty”). The treaty’s privileges and immunities remained in
effect at the time of Amestonia’s breach because the station never ceased to
function as envisaged by the Treaty, and in any event, any cessation of
functions only impacted Article 15. Amestonia cannot declare the Treaty
invalid under a fraud defense because Amestonia was not induced to
conclude the treaty based on fraudulent conduct. Amestonia also cannot
declare the Treaty suspended or terminated under a material breach defense
because Riesland never acted to frustrate the Treaty’s object and purpose.
In any event, Amestonia’s expropriation of Rieslandic property violated the
customary norm of sovereign immunity because the station was a State
instrumentality engaged in sovereign acts, and Riesland never explicitly
waived its right to such immunity. As a result, Riesland is entitled to the
release of its nationals and compensation for the value of its expropriated
property, both of which are remedies within this Court’s power to order.
THIRD PLEADING
The detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism Act is consistent
with international law. Riesland’s preventive detention of Kafker complied
with its obligations under ICCPR Article 9. Kafker’s detention was not
arbitrary and was reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal, and
Riesland provided sufficient notice of the reasons for Kafker’s arrest. Even
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if this Court finds that Kafker’s detention violated Article 9, Riesland
lawfully derogated from the relevant Article 9 obligations. A state of
emergency was justified under ICCPR Article 4 due to the actual and
imminent threat to Riesland posed by Hive terrorists. Riesland’s derogation
was necessary and proportional to the harm averted, concerned provisions
that were lawfully derogable and followed proper procedure. ICCPR Article
14, concerning criminal trials, does not apply to Kafker’s detention. This
Court also has no authority to order Kafker’s release or disclosure of
information about his detention, as the detaining state has the choice of
means for compliance with this Court’s judgment, and in any event, the
disclosure of confidential information poses a threat to national security.
FOURTH PLEADING
The cyber-attacks against the Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham
computer systems cannot be attributed to Riesland. Circumstantial evidence
of Riesland’s involvement in these operations cannot be linked to an organ
of Riesland. Riesland also did not have effective control over the
perpetrators and cannot be held liable for knowingly or negligently
allowing the cyber-attacks. In any event, the cyber-attacks do not constitute
an internationally wrongful act. The cyber-attacks were not an unlawful use
of force because they did not meet the threshold of physical damage, and in
any event, the attacks constituted a legitimate exercise of Riesland’s right to
self-defense. The cyber-attacks also did not violate the norm of nonintervention because they were not coercive. The cyber-attacks were also a
valid countermeasure because Amestonia previously violated international
law by allowing confidential data to be disseminated on its territory, and
Riesland’s response was proportional to that violation.
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PLEADINGS

I.

THE ILLICITLY-OBTAINED DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED
ON THE WEBSITE OF THE AMES POST ARE
INADMISSIBLE BEFORE THE COURT, BUT IN THE
EVENT THAT THE COURT DOES FIND THEM TO BE
ADMISSIBLE, THEY DO NOT EVIDENCE ANY BREACH
BY RIESLAND OF AN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION
OWED TO AMESTONIA.
A.

The Frost Files are inadmissible.
1.

Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible before this
Court.

Only relevant evidence is admissible before this Court, and the
“burden of evidence” lies upon the party seeking to prove a claim.1 The ICJ
Statute requires relevance in requests for production of documents,2 and the
Court’s Rules extend this requirement to evidentiary submissions.3 This
Court, relying on practice from its Nicaragua4 and Tehran5 decisions, stated
in Armed Activities that it would “examine the facts relevant to each of the
component elements of the claims advanced by the Parties,” and “explain
what items it should eliminate from further consideration.”6 The practice of
requiring relevance is reflected in other international tribunals.7

1

Robert Kolb, General Principles of Procedural Law in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 818 (Zimmermann et al., eds. 2006).
2

Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 STAT. 1055 (1945), [hereinafter “I.C.J. Statute”],

Art.34.
3
I.C.J. Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts and Documents No. 6 (2007), Art.49(1)(memorials),
Art.50(1)&(2)(pleadings), Art.63(1) (testimony), Art.71(translations), Art.76(provisional measures
submissions).
4
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua/U.S.), Merits, 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶¶85-91.
5

United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S./Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3,

6

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C./Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168,

¶13.

¶59.
7
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Regarding the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Analytical
Index (2011), Art.XI(B)(3)(b)(ii)(599); Statute of the STL, Annex, U.N.Doc.S/RES/1757 (2007),
Art.16(5); ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N.Doc.IT/32/Rev.50 (2015), Rule 89(C).
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Documents are irrelevant if they cannot be
authenticated.

International tribunals such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,8
International Criminal Court,9 and International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia10 note that a document's prima facie reliability is essential in
determining whether the prerequisite of relevance is met. Regional11 and
State12 courts have similarly found that documents with questionable
authenticity lack the reliability required for admission.
This Court’s recent Genocide decision specifically noted the
importance of authenticity in determining relevance and admissibility.13
Although parties before the Court rarely question documents’ authenticity,
in its determination of relevance, the Court looks at factors such as whether
evidence stems from personal and direct confirmation,14 derives from
official, independent bodies;15 and emanates from identified,16 multiple
sources,17 demonstrating contemporaneous and direct knowledge.18 The
Court also examines the manner in which statements were made public19
and whether parties’ statements constitute acknowledgement of facts.20 This
acknowledgement must be explicit when the subject matter is classified.21

8

Ayyash et al., Decision on the Admissibility of Documents Published on the Wikileaks Website,
STL-11-01, ¶40.
9

Prosecutor/Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/07, ¶75.

10

Prosecutor/Prlic et al., Interlocutory Appeal Decision, IT-04-74, ¶33.

11
Prosecutor/Sary, Request Regarding Admission of Newly-Available U.S. Diplomatic Cables,
[Extraordinary Chambers, Courts of Cambodia] 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, ¶¶7, 11 (2013).
12

Am. Civil Liberties Union/Dep't of State, [U.S. District Court] 878 F. Supp. 2d 215, 221
(2012); Bancoult/Sec’y of State for Foreign &Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2), UKSC 2015/0021, ¶¶89,
93 (2015).
13

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina/Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶225-227.
14

Corfu Channel Case (U.K./Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 16-17 (regarding witness testimony).

15

Genocide Case, ¶227; Nicaragua, ¶¶65, 68.

16

Genocide Case, ¶227.

17

Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran/U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶60; Armed Activities,

18

Nicaragua, ¶¶62, 65.

19

Nicaragua, ¶65.

20

I.C.J. Rules of Court, Art 26(i).

21

Nicaragua, ¶74.

¶61.
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3.

The Frost Files cannot be authenticated, and are
therefore irrelevant.

The Frost Files do not derive from personal and direct confirmation
from the purported author, from an official, independent body, or from
multiple sources. Frost did not allege to have sent or received the original
documents himself, and the source of each document was never disclosed.22
No statements by Riesland could be interpreted as explicitly acknowledging
the classified documents’ veracity. Although reporters and lawyers
employed by The Ames Post reviewed these documents,23 they were not
sufficiently impartial to review authentication, as the corporation
employing them has a vested commercial interest in publishing the
documents.24 State alleging a violation of international law has the burden
to prove the existence and violation of that obligation;25 without the Frost
Files, Amestonia lacks competent evidence to prove that Riesland’s
intelligence programs violated international law.
B.

Even if the Court finds the documents to be admissible,
they do not evidence any breach of an international
obligation owed to Amestonia.26
1.

Riesland’s intelligence programs do not violate
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).

The ICCPR, to which Riesland and Amestonia are parties,27 protects
individuals from “arbitrary or unlawful interference” with “privacy, family,
home or correspondence.”28

22

Clarifications, ¶3.

23

Compromis, ¶22.

24

William Worster, The Effect of Leaked Information on the Rules of International Law, 28
AM.U.INT’L.L.R. 443, 445 (2013) (newspapers have a commercial interest in publishing documents).
25

Corfu Channel, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ečer,119-120, 129; GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 396 (1945); Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7,
¶79; See S.S. Lotus (Fr./Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), 18.
26
Riesland’s discussion hereinafter of evidence originating from the Frost Files does not indicate
acceptance of the documents’ authenticity.
27

28

Compromis, ¶43.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
“ICCPR”], Art.17(1).
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a. Surveillance did not occur in an area under
Riesland’s effective control.
The ICCPR requires states to respect and ensure the rights recognized
in the Covenant “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction.”29 Although some argue for a strictly territorial application of
the ICCPR,30 State practice indicates that the ICCPR applies, at most, only
to areas under a state’s effective control.31 Scholars generally agree that the
locus for determining effective control is the location of the interference
itself.32
Physical or legal control over a person or area is required to establish
effective control. This Court has only found that ICCPR applied
extraterritorially where a State’s security forces physically occupied the
relevant territory for an extended period.33 Instances in which other courts
have found extraterritorial application include the physical arrest of a
person,34 confiscation of property at a consulate,35 and failure to provide
state-owed pensions.36 The European Court of Human Rights similarly
outlined three exhaustive examples of extraterritorial jurisdiction: the use of
force by State agents, military action, and military occupation.37
The statute authorizing Rieslandic intelligence permits only the
collection of “foreign intelligence,” defined as “any information located or
emanating from outside Riesland’s territory.”38 Applicant has provided no
evidence that those surveilled under either program had any legal
relationship with Riesland or that the programs physically injured any
Amestonian citizens. Located in Riesland’s EEZ,39 the Verismo program’s
interception of communications occurred outside of any State’s territory.

29

ICCPR, Art.2(1).

30

Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 291,
307-8 (2015) (discussing statements of Israel, Australia, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom).
31

Bankovic et al./17 NATO Member States, [ECtHR] No. 52207/99, ¶71 (2001); Issa v Turkey,
[ECtHR] No. 31821/96, ¶58 (2004); Al-Skeini et al./U.K., [ECtHR] 53 EHRR 589, ¶¶133-137 (2011);
Harold Koh, Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the ICCPR, 4 (19 October 2010).
32

Deeks, 300.

33

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 110-111; Armed Activities, ¶59.
34

Lopez Burgos/Uruguay, CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, ¶¶12.2-12.3 (1981).

35

Montero/Uruguay, CCPR/C/OP/2, 136 (1990).

36

Gueye et al./France, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985, ¶¶9.4-9.5 (1989).

37

Al-Skeini, 27-32.

38

Compromis, ¶4.

39

Compromis, ¶22.
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Under UNCLOS Article 58, broadly considered custom,40 states may
engage in intelligence collection in any EEZ without other States’ notice or
consent.41 The Carmen program was located in Amestonia’s territory under
Amestonian control. No use of force, military action, or military occupation
occurred at the broadcasting station.42 Thus, the ICCPR cannot apply to
these programs.
b. In any event, Riesland’s actions did not violate
the ICCPR.
Courts frequently use a four-part test to determine whether
surveillance programs violate the ICCPR: whether there was an interference
with privacy or correspondence, whether the interference was in accordance
with the law, whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim, and
whether it was proportionate to that aim.43
i.

Verismo and Carmen did not
arbitrarily interfere with privacy.

Verismo only collected metadata of Amestonian citizens, filtering out
irrelevant results.44 Carmen surveilled only high-level public and private
officials.45 Monitoring electronic data of a large group of citizens is too
broadly directed and superficial to constitute arbitrary interference,46 and
targeted surveillance on high-level officials is too particularized to
constitute arbitrary interference because it does not implicate average
citizens.47

40

UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE LAW OF THE
SEA: PRACTICE OF STATES AT THE TIME OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF UNCLOS 133 (UN Sales
No.E.94.V.13, 1994); NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 45 (2011).
41

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S 3 (1982), Art.58(1); Raul
Pedrozo, Responding to Ms. Zhang’s Talking Points on the EEZ, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 207, 223
(2011) (noting activities of NATO, China, Japan, Australia, Russia, and South Africa).
42

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23(1).

43
Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.R.
81, 112 (2015); Gerhard Schmid, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Existence of a Global System for
the Interception of Private and Commercial Communications (ECHELON Interception System)
(2001/2098(INI), ¶7.2.1.
44

Compromis, ¶¶22, 23.

45

Compromis, ¶25.

46

Milanovic, 120.

47

Paul Stephan, The New International Law — Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and
Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1563 (1999); Milanovic, 319.
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Any interference was in accordance
with law.

The Human Rights Committee notes that interference must “take place
on the basis of law, which itself must comply with the provisions, aims and
objectives of the Covenant.”48 Any interference was in accordance with
Rieslandic law, explicitly outlined in the SSBA.49 Structural safeguards,
similar to those frequently used by States,50 limited Riesland’s
surveillance,51 including a “necessity” requirement, capacity for
independent investigations, judicial review, issuance of limiting regulations,
and a ban on surveillance implicating Rieslandic nationals. Riesland’s
surveillance programs were regularly reviewed.52
iii.

Any interference pursued a legitimate
aim.

States regularly use surveillance both to advance their foreign policy
interests53 and promote national security efforts.54 Rieslandic law limits
intelligence collection to the pursuit of these aims.55 The Verismo program
targeted potential threats to Riesland’s national security,56 and the Carmen
program advanced Riesland’s foreign policy interests.57
iv.

Any interference was proportionate to
its aim.

Both programs abided by the SSBA limitations, which prevented them
from exceeding the scope required by their objective. The Verismo program
relied on specifically tailored search terms to track potential ecoterrorists58

48

HRC, General Comment No.16, U.N.Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, ¶3 (1988).

49

Compromis, ¶4.

50

Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, 2008 CF 301, ¶24.

51

Compromis, ¶5.

52

Compromis, ¶23; Clarifications, ¶5.

53

See infra §I(B)(2).

54

See infra §I(B)(2); The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N.Doc.A/RES/68/167 (2003),
Preamble.
55

Compromis, ¶4.

56

Compromis, ¶25.

57

Compromis, ¶26.

58

Compromis, ¶22.
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and only stored information for a maximum of two years.59 The Carmen
program only surveilled approximately 100 individuals, all of whom were
high-ranking Amestonian leaders.60
2.

Riesland’s intelligence programs are consistent
with customary international law.

No customary restrictions on surveillance exist in international law,61
based either on a right to territorial sovereignty or privacy.62 The
widespread and long-standing practice of surveillance,63 the statements of
States about surveillance,64 and arrangements between States to limit
surveillance65 support the permissiveness of surveillance. Many scholars
interpret this widespread practice as an indication that states affirmatively
recognize a right to engage in such conduct66 because spying is an integral
part of a State’s right to protect itself.67 Neither specific type of intelligence
program undertaken by Riesland is customarily prohibited; this includes

59

Compromis, ¶23.

60

Compromis, ¶¶25, 26.

61
See Office of Gen. Counsel, U.S Dep’t of Def., An Assessment of International Legal Issues in
Information Operations, 29 (May 1999); Daniel Silver, Intelligence and Counterintelligence in
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 965 (Moore et al., eds. 2005); W. Hays Parks, The International Law of
Intelligence Collection in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 433–434 (Moore et al., eds. 1990); Geoffrey
Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 321 (1996); Afsheen
Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 595, 596
(2007); Roger Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L.
REV. 217, 217 (1999).
62
Julius Stone, Legal Problems of Espionage in Conditions of Modern Conflict in ESSAYS ON
ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 36 (Stranger et al., eds. 1962); Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who
Came in from the Cold War, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1098 (2007); Weber & Saravia/Germany, 2006
ECHR 1173, ¶81.
63

Deeks, 305.

64
Embassy Espionage: The NSA’s Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, DER SPIEGEL, (27 October 2013);
Tony Abbott, Comments Before Australian Parliament, 18 Nov. 2013.
65

See Paul Farrell, History of 5-Eyes, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013); W. Michael Reisman, Covert
Action, 20 YALE J.INT’L.L. 419, 421 n.3 (1995).
66
See, e.g. McDougal et al., The Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMPLE L.Q.
365, 394 (1973); See David Sanger, In Spy Uproar, ‘Everyone Does It’ Just Won’t Do, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 2013 (Modern examples of state spying).
67
See Craig Forcese, Spies without Borders: International Law and Intelligence Collection, 5 J.
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y, 179, 198–99 (2011); Christopher Baker, Tolerance of International
Espionage, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2004).
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tapping communications of diplomats,68 which no State or diplomat has
ever asserted was illegal,69 and mass telecommunications surveillance,70 a
practice engaged in by many States.71
II.

THE ARREST OF MARGARET MAYER AND THE OTHER
VOR EMPLOYEES, AND THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE
VOR FACILITY AND ITS EQUIPMENT, VIOLATED THE
BROADCASTING TREATY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
GENERALLY,
AND
RIESLAND
IS
THEREFORE
ENTITLED TO THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF ITS
NATIONALS AND COMPENSATION FOR THE VALUE OF
THE CONFISCATED PROPERTY.
A.

The Broadcasting Treaty was in effect at the time of
Amestonia’s breach.
1.

Riesland did not breach any VCLT provision
justifying invocation of invalidity, suspension,
or termination.
a. The Broadcasting Treaty is not invalidated by
fraud.

The VCLT, to which both States are parties,72 represents an
exhaustive list of methods for invalidating, suspending, or terminating a
treaty.73 Article 49 allows invalidation of a treaty if a State is “induced to
give consent to a treaty which it would not otherwise have given” due to the
other party’s fraudulent conduct.74 The term fraud includes “deceit or
willful misrepresentation”75 “in the formation of an international

68

Chesterman, 1086 (discussing U.S. and British intelligence services tapping communications
of UNSC members).
69

Id.

70

Milanovic, 82; Chesterman, 1081.

71

Deeks, 297.

72

Compromis, ¶43.

73

VCLT, Art.42

74

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter “VCLT”],
Art.49; Commentaries on the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook, [hereinafter
“VCLT Commentaries”], (1966-II), 245.
75

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 839 (Dorr et al, eds. 2012).
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agreement,”76 with the intention of “lead[ing] the other party into error.”77
A treaty between States has never been declared invalid due to fraud.78
There is no evidence that fraudulent conduct was used in the formation
of the Broadcasting Treaty. Unlike in the Timor-Leste arbitration, the only
currently pending case involving a fraud accusation,79 Applicant has
presented no evidence that espionage occurred during the Treaty
negotiation; in fact, the Frost Files suggest otherwise; the execution of the
Broadcasting Treaty predated the Carmen and Verismo programs by at least
seven months, when the Broadcasting station first operated.80 Additionally,
Applicant has presented no evidence that any statements made by Riesland
in treaty negotiation “induced” Amestonia to conclude the Treaty.
b. The treaty is not suspended or terminated due
to material breach.
The standard for material breach under VCLT Article 60 is objective,
independent of the determination by the party invoking the claim.81 For a
breach to be material, it must involve a provision essential to accomplishing
the treaty’s object and purpose82 and must be deliberate and persistent.83
The object and purpose can be determined by looking at the treaty’s text
and preamble.84
Riesland did not violate a principle essential to the object and purpose
of the Treaty. References to “friendship” and “cooperation” in the preamble
illustrate that the object and purpose is to promote friendship through the
broadcasting of television. The preamble directs the parties to “offer their

76
PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 137-38 (1989); Donald Anton, The
Timor Sea Treaty Arbitration: Timor-Lester Challenges Australian Espionage and Seizure of
Documents, 18 AM. SOC. INT’L L. BLOG 6 (26 February 2014).
77
Contract Principles, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law Principles, Art
3.2.5,cmt. 2 (2010).
78

Anton, 6; ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 254-55 (2000); Kate
Mitchell et al., Espionage & Good Faith in Treaty Negotiations: East Timor v. Australia, J. EUR. L.
BLOG (20 January 2014).
79

Anton, 6.

80

Compromis, ¶8.

81

SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES,1945–1986, 38 (1989); TacnaArica Question (Chile/Peru), 2 R.I.A.A. 921, 945–944 (1922).
82
VCLT Commentaries, 245; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶95; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros,
¶109.
83

Namibia, ¶95.

84

VCLT, Art.31(2).
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citizens television channels,”85 the title refers only to the “establishment of
broadcasting facilities,” and Articles I and II, outlining the stations’
functions, refer only to actions required for broadcasting. In Nicaragua, this
Court noted, “There must be a distinction, even in the case of a treaty of
friendship, between the broad category of unfriendly acts, and the narrower
category of acts tending to defeat the object and purpose of a Treaty.”86 In
that case, the Court found that certain unfriendly acts, such as cutting off
economic aid, did not breach a “friendship” treaty between states which
pertained to maritime commerce.87
Riesland broadcasted award-winning programs for 22 years and
continued to broadcast diverse content until Amestonia’s expropriation of
property and arrest of VoR employees.88 Even if this Court finds that the
intelligence program did not further friendship, such action, at the very
least, does not harm friendship between States. States commonly use their
property on foreign soil to conduct espionage,89 often with implicit
acceptance of host states.90 Although spies have sometimes been declared
persona non grata and expelled,91 in no instances has the operating treaty
for a mission, consulate, or other special entity, which commonly contain
“friendship” provisions,92 been resultantly declared invalid.93 Amestonia’s
acceptance of intelligence from Riesland’s intelligence programs on over
50 occasions,94 including intelligence on a terrorist plot to poison a large
shipment of honey95 supports the compatibility of Carmen and Verismo
with the Broadcasting Treaty.

85

Broadcasting Treaty, Preamble.

86

Nicaragua, ¶137

87

Nicaragua, ¶276.

88

Compromis, ¶8.

89

Jens Glüsing et al., Fresh Leak on US Spying: NSA Accessed Mexican President’s Email, DER
SPIEGEL (20 October 2013) (describing spying from U.S. Embassies in Mexico City and Brasilia);
George Roberts, Indonesia Summons Australian Ambassador to Jakarta Greg Moriarty over Spying
Reports, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORP. (1 November 2013).
90

Deeks, 312; Radsan, 621–622.

91

Deeks, 312; Radsan, 621–622.

92
See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (1964) Preamble; Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (1967) Preamble; Convention on Special Missions
(1985), 1400 U.N.T.S. 231, Preamble.
93

Radsan, 622.

94

Compromis, ¶23.

95

Compromis, ¶18.
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B.

Amestonia violated the Broadcasting Treaty.
1.

Broadcasting Treaty Article 36 does not
invalidate Riesland’s privileges and immunities.

Article 36 outlines the only method in which privileges and
immunities can be suspended, stating: “All privileges and immunities
provided for in this Treaty, save for those in Article 15(1)(c) above, shall
cease to have effect upon the cessation of the station’s functions as
envisaged in the Present Treaty.”96 Article 36 does not apply because the
station in Amestonia never ceased to function as envisaged in the Treaty.97
Articles 1 and 2 outline the planned functions of the broadcasting stations,
including the process for establishing stations, how they would be
established and managed, and how programming would commence. The
station continued to perform all of these functions until Amestonia’s
violation.98 Riesland’s only potential violation involves “respecting the laws
of the host state;” however, this Treaty provision specifically states that
such violations are “without prejudice to their privileges and immunities.”99
Even if privileges and immunities are invalidated under Article 36, this
provision cannot nullify any Treaty provision other than Article 15. Under
the treaty-interpretation principle of expressio unius, the specification of
one issue implies the exclusion of all others.100 Since the Treaty included
“immunities and privileges” language only in Article 15, the parties are
presumed to have intended only Article 15 to be subject to termination
under Article 36. Thus, even if the station ceases to function as envisaged,
Riesland can claim relief for Applicant’s other Treaty violations.
2.

Amestonia’s arrest of VoR employees and
seizure of VoR property violated the
Broadcasting Treaty.

A treaty is interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms in their context and in light of the treaty’s
object and purpose.101 Interpretation begins by examining the treaty’s text,
both the body and preamble.102
The text of the Broadcasting Treaty states that the station’s land is
96

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.36.

97

See supra §II(A)(1)(b).

98

See infra §II(B)(2).

99

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23.

100

MARK VILLIGER, II CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 160 (1997).

101

VCLT, Art.31(1-2).

102

VCLT, Art.31(2-3).
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procured and held in the operating state’s name,103 that the station’s
premises104 and documents105 are inviolable, and that agents of the host
state cannot enter the station without consent.106 The station’s premises and
property are immune from “search, requisition, attachment, expropriation,
or execution.”107 Similarly, station employees are immune from arrest,
attachment, and the receiving state’s criminal jurisdiction.108 The Treaty
also imposes a “special duty” on the host state to protect the station from
intrusion or damage, prevent impairment of the premises’ dignity,109 treat
the station’s employees “with due respect,” and prevent attack on
employees’ freedom or dignity.110
Based on the ordinary meaning given to these terms, Amestonia
breached each of these provisions. Amestonia entered the broadcasting
station without permission, catalogued and removed equipment and
documents,111 arrested and detained employees for criminal charges,112
ordered forfeiture of the premises and property,113 and attempted to auction
off the station’s real estate and property.114
C.

The expropriation of VoR property violated Riesland’s
sovereign immunity.
1.

State entities are entitled to a presumption of
State immunity.

The universally recognized principle of foreign sovereign immunity 115
creates a presumption of immunity for both States and state

103

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.1(2).

104

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(1).

105

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(4).

106

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(1).

107

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(2).

108

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.15(1)(b).

109

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(3).

110

Broadcasting Treaty, Art.15(1)(a).

111

Compromis, ¶27.

112

Compromis, ¶28.

113

Compromis, ¶40.

114

Compromis, ¶40.

115

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 326 (2003); ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (2005); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 697, 701 (2008).
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instrumentalities.116 Unless Amestonia can demonstrate the applicability of
an exemption,117 its exercise of jurisdiction through enforcement against a
Rieslandic instrumentality violates Riesland’s sovereign rights.118
2.

The Voice of Riesland is a state instrumentality.

To determine whether an entity is a state instrumentality, courts
consider whether the entity is indistinct or distinct from the State,119 or
“performing acts in the exercise of sovereign authority of the State.”120
Courts examine factors such as ownership and control of the entity;
appointment and dismissal of administrative personnel; degree and nature
of government control; constitution of the entity; and relationship between
the entity and government.121
VoR is a division of RNT, a state-owned and -operated corporation.122
VoR was created specifically by a treaty between States designed to
promote friendship through public broadcasting.123 The Rieslandic
government was responsible for “staffing, running, and funding the
station,” “procur[ing] at its own expense and in its own name” the station’s
equipment, and “establishing and operating” the station.124 The government,
through the Bureau, also provided direct oversight over VoR’s intelligence
activities and served as a conduit for interpreting the station’s intelligence.
3.

The commercial activity exemption does not
apply.

Only a state instrumentality’s commercial acts are subject to foreign

116

See United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property
(2005), 44 I.L.M. 801, [hereinafter “Immunities Convention”], Arts. 10–11, 13–17; European
Convention on State Immunity (1972), C.E.T.S. No. 074, Arts. 4–12; Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(1985), [Austl.] No. 196, §§11–12, 14–20; Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, [U.S.] 28 U.S.C.
1602–1611, Art.1605(a)(2)–(4), (6); State Immunities Act, [Can.] R.S.C., 1985, c. S-18, §§5, 7–8; State
Immunities Act, [U.K] 1978 c. 33, pt. I, §§2–4, 6–11.
117

Nicaragua, ¶101.

118

See BROWNLIE, 323, 325-26; CASSESE, 100, 102; SHAW, 697, 701; Prosecutor/Blaskic,
Judgment of 18 July 1997, [ICTY] IT-95-14, ¶72 (1997).
119
XIAODONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (2015) (citing cases in
England, Singapore, Germany, France, South Africa, and the U.S).
120

Immunities Convention, Art.2(1)(b)(iii).

121

Yang, 297.

122

Compromis, ¶8.

123

See supra §II(A)(1)(b).

124

Broadcasting Treaty, Arts. 1, 2.
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jurisdiction; all other acts are immune.125 To determine whether an act is
commercial, both its nature and purpose are considered.126 In Jurisdictional
Immunities, this Court ruled that the commercial activities exemption did
not apply to property serving as an Italian-German cultural exchange
center127 because it was “intended to promote cultural exchanges,” was
“organized and administered on the basis of an agreement between the two
Governments,” and involved State oversight in its “managing
structure.”128As in Jurisdictional Immunities, the broadcasting station
intended to promote cultural exchanges, was organized and administered
under an agreement between States, and was managed by Riesland
government agents. Additionally, the facility engaged in public
broadcasting, which, by its definition, serves to broadcast content without
making a profit. Riesland’s intelligence activities also did not intend to
procure any commercial value from Amestonian citizens, and the
information collected was not used for any commercial benefit to Riesland.
4.

Riesland did not waive immunity.

Although States may waive immunity,129 States’ intention to waive
must be clearly expressed and specific to the litigation at issue.130 Riesland
never explicitly or implicitly waived its right to privileges and immunities
for the VoR premises or property, and the only privileges and immunities
mentioned in the Broadcasting Treaty concern employees.
D.

Riesland is entitled to the immediate release of its
nationals and compensation for the value of the
confiscated property.
1.

Riesland is entitled to immediate release of its
nationals.

In circumstances where ceasing the wrongful act and restoring it to its
prior situation is possible, this Court131 and its predecessor132 have

125

CASSESE, 100; SHAW, 708.

126

Immunities Convention, Art.2(2); CASSESE, 101.

127

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany/Italy), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶120.

128

Jurisdictional Immunities, ¶119.

129

Yang, 316.

130

Immunities Convention, Art.7.

131

Nicaragua, p.145 ¶12; Tehran, p.45, ¶5.

132

Mavromatis Jerusalem Concessions, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 5, 51; Factory at Chorzów
(Ger./Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 9, 541.
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recognized restitution as a remedy in international law; reparations should
“re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if
that act had not been committed.”133 Although the remedy for wrongful
deprivations of liberty is typically “review and reconsideration,”134
immediate release of nationals is the proper remedy when State immunity is
violated, either by treaty or custom.135
2.

Riesland is entitled to compensation for the
value of its property.

A State may not expropriate foreign-owned property without
providing full compensation.136 Opinio juris evidenced in General
Assembly Resolution 1803137 illustrates this standard, and modern courts
reaffirm it.138 When Amestonia expropriated VoR property, Riesland
became entitled to full compensation for such property.
III.

THE DETENTION OF JOSEPH KAFKER UNDER THE
TERRORISM
ACT
IS
CONSISTENT
WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE COURT HAS NO
AUTHORITY TO ORDER KAFKER’S RELEASE OR
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION RELATED TO HIS
DETENTION.
A.

Riesland’s preventive detention of Joseph Kafker
complied with the ICCPR and customary law.

ICCPR Article 9 protects individuals from arbitrary detention.139
States can lawfully detain individuals preventively, without criminal
charges, in a manner fully consistent with the ICCPR.140 The practice of
133

Chorzow Factory, 541.

134

See infra §III(D).

135

See Tehran, ¶¶84-87, 91-92.

136

Chorzow Factory, 30; BROWNLIE, 54; BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 39 (1953); SAMMY FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (1953).
TO

137

Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, U.N.Doc.A/Res/1803, ¶4 (2008).

138
Christina Binder et al., Unjust Enrichment in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2007); Patrick Norton, A Law of the Future of the Future or of the Past?
Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 474, 476-477 (1991).
139

140

ICCPR, Art.9(1).

Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Practice of Administrative Detention,
U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990, [hereinafter “Joinet Report”], 29 (1990); CLAIRE MACKEN, COUNTER-
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ICCPR Parties, which this Court must consider,141 confirms this
interpretation.142 Though ICCPR substantive protections from deprivation
of liberty are coextensive with customary law, ICCPR procedural
protections are stricter than custom.143
1.

Kafker’s detention was not arbitrary.
a. Kafker’s detention accorded with procedures
established by law.

Preventive detention is arbitrary when it is not conducted according to
clear procedures established by domestic law.144 Specific authorization and
circumscribed procedure are required safeguards against arbitrariness.145
Kafker was detained pursuant to the Terrorism Act, which allows detention
only when it is “required for reasons of national security or public
safety,”146 and his detention was reviewed by the NST.147
b. Kafker’s preventive detention was necessary
and proportional to the threat he posed.
Preventive detention must be necessary and proportional to the threat
posed by the individual,148 such that the deprivation of liberty is not

DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 95 (2011); Schweizer/Uruguay,
CCPR/C/17/D/66/1980,
¶18.1
(1980);
See
HRC,
General
Comment
No.29,
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, ¶15 (2001).
TERRORISM AND THE

141

VCLT Art.31(3)(b).

142
PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND SECURITY LAW: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY (Harding et al., eds.
1993) (examining preventive detention in 17 African, Asian, and European States); S.B. Elias,
Rethinking “Preventive Detention” from a Comparative Perspective, 41 COL. H.R.L.R. 130
(2009)(citing preventive detention frameworks in 11 European and South American States).
143
Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N.Doc.A/HRC/22/44, [hereinafter
“Working Group Report”], ¶¶42-51 (2012); Joinet Report, 7.
144

HRC, General Comment No.35, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/GC/35, ¶¶22, 23 (2014); ICCPR, Art.9.

145

See SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY, 211 (2000).
146

Terrorism Act, §3(d).

147

Compromis, ¶33.

148
Arbitrary Detention, U.N.Doc.A/HRC/Res/6/4, ¶5(e) (2007); HRC, General Comment No.31,
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶6 (2004); A./Australia, CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, ¶9.2 (1997);
C./Australia, CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999, ¶14 (2002); See, e.g. Criminal Code Act 1995, [Austl.] No. 1995,
§105.4(5)(b-c).
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inappropriate, unpredictable, or substantively unjust.149 Courts require that
detention be reasonable under the circumstances150 and that no alternative
means could accomplish the objective.151 International152 and national153
courts grant significant deference to State authorities’ judgments on the
necessity and proportionality of detentions for security reasons.
i.

Kafker’s detention was reasonable
because he posed an imminent and
severe threat.

Preventive detention is an exceptional step,154 reasonable when the
detainee poses an imminent and severe threat to State security.155 Such a
threat exists when reasonable grounds156 indicate that an individual will
assist in preparation or planning for a terrorist act.157 Rieslandic intelligence
linked Kafker to the “senior echelons” of a terrorist group that had killed
Rieslandic citizens and threatened Reislandic officials.158 Furthermore,
Kafker was a “high-level” suspect in the plot to poison a large shipment of
honey.159 These ties justified his detention.

149

Van Alphen/Netherlands, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988, ¶5.8 (1989); Report of the Third
Committee on the ICCPR, U.N.Doc.A/4045, Annexes Agenda Item 32, ¶7 (1958)
150
Shafiq/Australia,
CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004,
CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, ¶6.1, (2005).

¶4.10

(2004);

Morais/Angola,

151
D. & E./Australia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/87/D/1050/2002, ¶ 7.2 (2006); MACKEN, 50; Principles
and Best Practices on the Protections of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, OAS
OEA/Ser/L/V/II 131 Doc.26, [hereinafter “IACHR Detention Principles”], Prin. III.2 (2008).
152

See Y. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR, 180(2002); Greece/U.K. (Cyprus Case), 2
Y.B.E.C.H.R. (1959-1960), 176.
153

Elias, 130 (referring to 13 State courts).

154

Mukong/Cameroon, CCPR/C/45/D/458/1991, ¶9.8 (1991);

155

General Comment No.35, ¶15; Schweizer/Uruguay, ¶114; Report on Terrorism and Human
Rights, [Inter-Am. Commission on Human Rights], OAS OEA/Ser.L/V/VII 116 Doc. 5, rev. 1, corr. 22,
[hereinafter “Terrorism Report”], ¶124 (2002).
156

Venice Commission Report on Counter-Terrorism Measures and Human Rights, CDLAD(2010)022, §D(50) (2010); See, e.g. Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, [Can.] Bill-36, §86.3.
157
See, e.g. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) Sub-S 105.4 (Australia); See also Martin Scheinin,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, UN.Doc.A/HRC/14/46 (2010), ¶42.
158

Compromis, ¶16,18.

159

Compromis, ¶36; See supra n.26.
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No alternative means existed to
mitigate the threat Kafker posed.

The HRC has observed that detention is necessary when a subject may
flee160 or could thwart an ongoing investigation.161 Detention was the only
means to monitor Kafker, eliminate his ability to coordinate with the Hive,
and prevent him from absconding to assist in an act of terrorism.
c. The length of Kafker’s detention was not
arbitrary.
The HRC has found a detention lasting 14 months not to violate
Article 9(4),162 and has only found violations where detentions persisted for
several years without trial.163 By comparison, Riesland has only detained
Kafker for 10 months, and the maximum allowed by the Terrorism Act is
only 540 days.164
2.
The National Security Tribunal satisfies
Kafker’s right to judicial review.
a. The NST is independent and impartial.
Prompt review of a detention by an independent tribunal–which enjoys
judicial independence from other branches to decide legal matters in
proceedings that are judicial in nature165–is necessary in all circumstances
to satisfy Article 9(4).166 Valid national security concerns justify holding a
review hearing without the detainee present,167 as in Kafker’s case. The
NST is independent from the executive and comprised of judges.

160

A./Australia, CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, ¶9.5 (1997).

161

Jalloh/Netherlands, CCPR/C/74/D/794/1998, ¶8.2 (2002)

162

Thomas/Jamaica, CCPR/C/65/D/614/1995, ¶9.6 (1999).

163
See Press Release, 26-01-2012, ECHR 032 (2012): Berasategi/France (29095/09), Esparza
Luri/France (29119/09), Guimon Esparza/France (29116/09), Sagarzazu/France (29109/09), Soria
Valderrama/France, 29101/09; See also Report of the Third Committee on the ICCPR, A/4045, 13
GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 32, 7 (1958-1959).
164

Terrorism Act, §3(h).

165

Vuolanne/Finland, 265/1987, U.N.Doc.Supp.No.40 A/44/40, ¶9.6 (1989); UN Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1, Prin. 2(1985);
Torres/Finland¸ CCPR/C/38/D/291/1988, ¶7.2(1990).
166

HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶¶39-41,46; Gavrilin/Belarus, CCPR/C/D/1342/2005¶7.4(2007);
Mulezi/DRC, CCPR/C/81/D/962/2001, ¶5.2(2004); Fjalkowska/Poland, CCPR/C/84/D/1061/2002,
¶8.4(2005).
167

See Ahani/Canada, UN.Doc.CCPR/C/1051/2002, ¶2.3 (2002).
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Specialized courts created by legislation, like the NST, satisfy Article 9 if
they meet the Article’s other criteria.168
b. Kafker’s detention was promptly reviewed.
The HRC and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention state that
prompt review of a detention must occur within “a few days.”169 The
Terrorism Act requires review within three days of arrest,170 and Kafker’s
detention complied.171
c. Kafker’s detention was adequately reviewed.
The essential components of review are: (1) that the reviewing court
have the power to order release if the detention is unlawful,172 and (2) that it
re-review regularly.173 The NST has the power to order release if evidence
is insufficient to support detention and reviews detention every 21 days.174
d. Kafker’s representation by a Special Advocate
satisfies Article 9.
Article 9 does not expressly confer a right to counsel outside of
criminal trials.175 ICCPR States Parties interpret Article 9 to allow
suspension of access to counsel if “it is deemed indispensable…to maintain
security and good order.”176 Though the HRC recognizes an absolute right
to counsel,177 the aforementioned interpretation of the parties and

168
HRC Gen Comm. 35, ¶¶18-22; Rameka/New Zealand, CCPR/C/79/D/1090/2002, ¶7.4 (2003);
Torres/Finland, ¶7.2, 9.6.
169
HRC Gen. Comm 35, ¶33; Working Group Report, ¶52; See Freemantle/Jamaica,
CCPR/C/68/D/625/1995 ¶7.4 (2000).
170

Terrorism Act §3(b).

171

Compromis, ¶.

172

ICCPR Art.9(4); See Cases of De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp/Belgium (2832/66) 1970 ECHR 2,
¶76 (1970); A./Australia, ¶9.5; Shafiq/Australia, ¶7.4 (2004).
173

HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶15.

174

Terrorism Act, §3(d),(g); Compromis, ¶33.

175

ICCPR, Art.9.

176

Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, GA Res. 43/173 (1988), Prin.18(3); See Bin Nasir/Kerajean Malaysia & Others, 2002-4
M.L.J.
617
[Malaysia][2002];
Report
of
the
Committee
Against
Torture,
G.A.O.R.Supp.No.44(A/67/44)(2012), 63-64,¶8(Morocco).
177

HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶15
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international tribunals contradict this view.178
3.

Kafker was sufficiently notified of the reasons of
his arrest.

Article 9(1) requires a State to promptly notify the detainee of the
reasons for his arrest.179 Oral notification satisfies this requirement180 if it is
precise enough to allow the grounds for detention to be challenged.181 The
Terrorism Act, stated as the authorization for Kafker’s arrest, includes a
specific definition of the suspected conduct, accompanied by relevant
factors for consideration.182 The purpose of Article 9’s notification
requirement was satisfied by Kafker’s Special Advocate, who did have
access to the “closed materials” forming the basis of his detention and
challenged detention on Kafker’s behalf.183
B.

If Kafker’s detention did violate Article 9, Riesland
lawfully derogated from the relevant obligations.
1.

The Hive posed a threat to the life and health of
the nation, justifying derogation during a state
of emergency.

International courts grant a measure of discretion to State authorities in
declaring states of emergency and determining how to respond.184 Threats
to state security from terrorism can be legitimate grounds for derogation,185

178
See, e.g., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, Advisory Opinion, 1990
IACtHR (Ser. A) No. 11, ¶28 (1990); Ocalan/Turkey (No. 2), ECtHR Nos. 24069/03, 197/04, 6201/06,
and 10464/07 (2014).
179

ICCPR, Art.9(1); See HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶25-30.

180

HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶¶24-27

181
Caldas/Uruguay, UN.Doc.CCPR/C/19/D/43/1979, ¶13.2(1983); Campbell/Jamaica,
UN.Doc.CCPR/C/47/D/307/1988, ¶6.3(1993); NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 174(2005)
182

Terrorism Act, §3(a),(d).

183

Compromis, ¶33.

184
J.F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 HARVARD
INT’L L. J. 25, 27 (1981); See Lawless/Ireland, [ECtHR] No. 332/57 (A/3), 15,28 (1961); Klass &
Others/Germany, 2 E.H.R.R. 214, ¶¶48-49(1979); Ireland/U.K., (5310/71)ECHR 1, ¶207 (1978); See
also ROZA PATI, DUE PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 20, n.69 (2009).
185
Case of Durand and Ugarte, I.A.Ct.H.R. Series C, No. 68, ¶99 (2000); Brannigan &
McBride/United Kingdom, ECHR Series A No. 258-B, ¶59(1993); IACHR Terrorism Report,
Executive Summary, ¶8.
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provided the threat is imminent186 and affects the “organized life of the
State” as a whole.187
Threats must be more concrete than “general terrorist activity” in a
region,188 which could otherwise be used to justify derogation in
perpetuity.189 Riesland derogated during a Terrorism Alert, which could
only be issued when the government of Riesland learned of a “credible
danger of an imminent terrorist act.”190
Threats must pertain to the entire populace.191 The Hive had already
killed two Rieslandic citizens and attempted to poison a large shipment of a
Riesland household good.192 Threats which harm the functioning of public
institutions, in particular, are threats to “organized life.”193 The Hive
threatened mass harm to Rieslandic government officials through mailing
letters filled with imitation poison.194
2.

Riesland derogated only to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation.

Derogations must be limited “to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation.”195 The existence of a state of emergency is also
considered in the necessity analysis for individual detainees.196 Following
ex ante procedures is the chief safeguard against disproportionality.197

186
See A. SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATES OF
EXCEPTION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE IN THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES AND CASE-LAW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONITORING ORGANS 292 (1992).
187
The Greek Case, 3321/67, 3322/67; 3323/67, 3344/67 [E.Comm.H.R.] ¶ 153 (1969);
Lawless/Ireland¸ ¶28; See HRC Gen Comm 29, ¶4.
188

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Opinion 1/2002 (Comm. DH (2002) 7,
28 August 2002), ¶33.
189

JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY 22 (1992); MACKEN 84.

190

Terrorism Act, §2.

191

Lawless/Ireland, ¶90; ORAA 29; See Askoy/Turkey, E.C.H.R. 21987/93, ¶70(1996).

192

Compromis, ¶14,18.

193

Lawless/Ireland, ¶29: SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, 294; Hartman, 16.

194

Compromis, ¶16.

195
ICCPR Art.4(1); HRC Gen Comm 29, ¶4; Working Group Report, ¶50-51; See A/Secretary of
State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, ¶¶39, 46.
196

HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶66.

197
See Concluding Observations: Phillipines (CCPR/CO.PHL.2003), ¶14, Mauritius
(CCPR/CO/83/MUS, 2005), ¶12, Russian Federation (CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6.2009), ¶24, Honduras
(CCPR/C/HND/CO/1/2006), ¶13.
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Riesland has adhered to the Terrorism Act during Kafker’s detention and
periodically reviewed that detention.198
3.

Riesland followed sufficient procedure for
derogation.

States wishing to derogate must announce that intention by declaring a
state of emergency.199 Riesland has notified the Secretary-General of each
Terrorism Alert, 200 which effectively declares a state of emergency in
Riesland. This notification comports with the practice of States Parties,201
despite the HRC’s stricter interpretation.202 In any event, failure to follow
proper notification does not preclude derogations from taking effect.203
4.

The relevant provisions are lawfully derogable.

The provisions of Article 9 are not listed as non-derogable in the
ICCPR204 and thus almost all can be lawfully derogated from during public
emergencies.205 The right to prompt judicial review, which is non-derogable
under any circumstances,206 was granted to Kafker.207
C.

Article 14 does not apply to Kafker’s detention.

Article 14 expressly refers to criminal proceedings.208 Preventive
detentions are not carried out in order to pursue criminal sanctions on the

198

Compromis, ¶33; See Campbell/Jamaica, ¶6.4.

199

Wall Opinion, ¶127.

200

Clarifications, ¶7.

201

JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS 3-5(1994); See, e.g. Concluding Observations:
Peru, CCPR/C/79/Add.8, ¶10(1992); Ireland, CCPR/C/79/Add.21, ¶11(1993); Cameroon,
CCPR/C/79/Add.33, ¶7(1994).
202

Gen. Comm. 29, ¶17.

203
Nabil Sayadi & Patricia Vinck v. Belgium, CCPR/C/78/933/2000, Concurring Op., Nigel
Rodley (2008); SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, 226.
204

ICCPR, Art.4(2).

205

MACKEN 90.

206

HRC Gen. Comm. 29, ¶¶16,31; Concluding Observations: Israel, CCPR/C/79/Add.93,
¶21(1998).
207

See supra §3(A)(2).

208

ICCPR, Art.14.
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basis of guilt,209 but rather are precautionary measures to mitigate a threat to
society.210 The HRC generally does not apply Article 14 to detentions that
are not preceding criminal charge.211 Scholars suggest indefinite detention
without criminal trial can violate Article 14,212 but Kafker’s detention is
limited to 540 days by law.213
D.
If Kafker’s detention is unlawful, Amestonia’s remedy
is “review and reconsideration,” not release.
This Court has stated that the choice of the specific method of
compliance with its judgments is for parties before the court, not the court
itself.214 Outside the context of a violation of State immunity, 215 the Court
has noted that the proper remedy for wrongful detention is “review and
reconsideration” of the action, and that the choice of means should be left to
the detaining state.216 In Avena, the Court reaffirmed the appropriateness of
allowing the detaining state to choose the means of compliance.217 Thus, the
appropriate remedy for a violation of Article 9 would be for Riesland to
review and reconsider Kafker’s detention, considering what response would
adequately address the violation of rights alleged.218
E.

The Court cannot compel Riesland to disclose the
confidential information forming the basis of Kafker’s
arrest.

The Court does not have authority to compel States to disclose

209
H. Cook, Preventive Detention – International Standards on Protection of the Individual, in
PREVENTIVE DETENTION: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW Perspective 1 (Frankowski &
Shelton, eds. 1992); See also International Committee of Jurists, States of Emergency: Their Impact on
Human Rights (Geneva 1983), 394.
210

R/Halliday (1917) AC 216 [Canada]; International Committee of Jurists, 394; Union of
India/Paul Nanicakn & Anr, Appeal(Crl)[India] 21 of 2002(2003).
211

Ahani/Canada, ¶¶4.15, 4.16.

212

See Alfred de Zayas, Human Rights and Indefinite Detention, 87 INT’L R. RED CROSS 15, 19
(2005); See also Perterer/Austria, CCPR/C/81/D/1015/2001, ¶9.2(2004).
213

Terrorism Act, §3(h).

214

Haya de la Torre Case, 1951 I.C.J. REP. 71, p.79; Northern Cameroons Case, Preliminary
Objections, 1963 I.C.J. REP. 15, p.37.
215

See Tehran, ¶84-87, 91-92; See also supra §I(D)(1).

216

LaGrand, 2000 ICJ Rep. 4, ¶125.

217

Case Concerning Avena & Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶120, ¶127-132.

218

See Avena ¶¶138-143; LaGrand, ¶128.
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confidential information threatening national security.219 Such disclosure
risks irreparable injury to States.220 Furthermore, though the Court can
request evidence from parties in evidentiary proceedings,221 it cannot
compel that production, given that “the parties are sovereign states.”222 This
limitation also applies to remedial production of documents implicating
State security.223 The evidence for Kafker’s arrest was “closed material”
from confidential sources in the intelligence community,224 which justifies
maintaining its confidentiality.
IV. THE CYBER-ATTACKS AGAINST THE COMPUTER
SYSTEMS OF THE AMES POST AND THE LAW FIRM
CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO RIESLAND, AND, IN ANY
EVENT, THE CYBER-ATTACKS DO NOT CONSTITUTE
AN INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT.
A.

Circumstantial evidence of Rieslandic involvement in
the cyber-activities must meet a heightened burden of
proof.

This court’s jurisprudence has consistently reflected a heightened
degree of proof for claims based primarily on circumstantial evidence
without direct evidence.225 This Court in Corfu Channel distinguished
“indirect evidence” from direct evidence, requiring that inferences of fact
from indirect evidence “leave no room for reasonable doubt.”226 In
Cameroon v. Nigeria¸ this Court rejected a claim when the indirect
evidence did not provide a “clear and precise picture” of the facts.227 The

219

See Genocide Case ¶¶44, 205-206., Corfu Channel, p. 32.

220
See Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (TimorLeste/Australia), Provisional Measures, 2014 I.C.J. 147, ¶¶46-49.
221

ICJ Statute, Art.49.

222
Michael Scharf & Margeaux Day, The International Court of Justice’s Treatment of
Circumstantial Evidence, 13 CHICAGO J. INT’L LAW 123, 127 (2012).
223

See Timor-Leste, Provisional Measures, Memorial of Australia, ¶75(c).

224

Compromis, ¶33-34.

225

Scharf & Day, 149; See Nicaragua, ¶¶109-16; Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadon Islands, 2002
I.C.J 666, ¶¶85, 90; Oil Platforms, ¶60; See also Brownlie, State Responsibility and the International
Court of Justice, in ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS
13, 17 (Fitzmaurice & Sarooshi, eds. 2004).
226

227

Corfu Channel, p.18.

Cameroon/Nigeria, ¶¶232, 234; Rosalyn Higgins, Issues of State Responsibility before the
International Court of Justice, in STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1, 9.
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more serious the charges, the higher the degree of proof of attribution
required from circumstantial evidence.228 Applicant’s evidence of
Rieslandic involvement in the cyberattacks rests entirely on circumstantial
evidence, comprising an academic report and general facts about Riesland’s
telecommunications infrastructure.
B.

The cyber-attacks cannot be linked to an organ of
Riesland.

Acts of an organ of a state are attributable to that state.229 Even if the
AIT report is correct,230 cyber-activity originating from or transmitted
through Riesland’s cyber infrastructure is not sufficient to prove
attribution.231 Modern cyber-attackers are able to use proxy servers and
virtual private networks to mask their true origin.232 Cyber-attackers can
assume the identity of another by infiltrating and controlling computers
through “zombie” networks.233 Once these computers are infected, a cyberattacker can control the zombies while masking the perpetrator’s true
identity.234 Even without directly utilizing another’s hardware, sophisticated
cyber-attackers can feign the identity of an individual or organization using
proxy servers, virtual private networks, or by electronically falsifying
data.235 Cyber-attackers in 1998 successfully misdirected the United States
by creating the impression that an attack launched on the Department of
Defense from California and Israel originated in countries from 5 different
time zones.236 Given these various methods of obscuring an attacker’s
identity in cyberspace, the circumstantial evidence in the Compromis237 is
insufficient to prove attribution through a Rieslandic government organ.
228
Genocide Case, ¶¶209-210, 373; See Island of Palmas Case (US/Neth.), 2. R.I.A.A. 829, 852
(P.C.A. 1928); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 567 (2014).
229
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts [ARSIWA], (I.L.C.
Yearbook 2001-I)Pt. II, Art.4(1); TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER WARFARE, Rule 6, ¶6 (M.Scmhitt, ed. 2013).
230

Compromis

231

See TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 7, 8.

232

See Mauno Pihelgas, Back-Tracing in Cyberspace, in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE
ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE 42-46 (Katharina Ziolkowski, ed., 2013).
233

Pihelgas, 46-47.

234
TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 6, ¶11; See also Evan Cooke, The Zombie Roundup: Understanding,
Detecting, and Disrupting Botnets, SRUTI 05 Technical Paper, Univ. of Mich. (2005).
235

TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 7, ¶4. See Christopher C. Joyner & Catherine Lotrionte, Information
Warfare as International Coercion, 12 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 825, 839 (2001); Pihelgas, 42-49.
236

JONATHON ZITRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 37-45 (2008).

237

Compromis, ¶38; Clarifications, ¶8.¶
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Riesland did not have effective control over the cyberattackers.
a. Effective control is the appropriate standard.

Attribution of an act taken by non-state actors to a state requires
“instruction,” “direction,” or “control” over the acts.238 This Court interprets
customary law to require that a State had “effective control” over the actors
at the time of the allegedly wrongful act.239 NATO’s committee of experts
convened to summarize customary cyber-law decided that, in the electronic
realm, “the State needs to have issued specific instructions or directed or
controlled a particular operation to engage State responsibility.”240 The
“overall control” test for attribution, adopted by the majority in the Tadic
case,241 is not the appropriate standard. Tadic addressed individual criminal
responsibility under international humanitarian law rather than State
responsibility under customary law of attribution.242 This Court
distinguished Tadic in the Genocide judgment.243
b. There is insufficient evidence of effective
control.
Applicant can provide no evidence that Riesland provided instruction
or direction to the perpetrators of the Amestonian attacks. In Nicaragua,
this Court held that the indirect evidence of U.S. involvement in Contra
activities was insufficient to prove attribution absent direct evidence,244 in
spite of evidence that every Contra offensive had been preceded by an
infusion of United States funding245 and reports of CIA training for
paramilitary operatives.246 Evidence of origination in Riesland of an attack
by unknown actors, with no direct evidence of support from Rieslandic
238

ARSIWA, Art.8; GEORG KERSCHENSCHNIG, CYBERTHREATS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 149151 (2012).
239

Nicaragua ¶¶109, 115; Nicaragua, Sep. Op. Judge Ago, ¶17.

240

TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 6, ¶11.

241

Prosecutor/Dusko Tadic¸I.C.T.Y., Case IT-94-1-A (1999), 38 ILM 1518, ¶1117 (November

1999).
242

See Commentaries to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (I.L.C. Yearbook 2001-II) Pt.
II, Art.8, p.72.
243

Genocide Case, ¶¶403-405.

244

Nicaragua, ¶111.

245

Nicaragua, ¶¶109-111.

246

Nicaragua, ¶¶103-04, 110.
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officials, provides even less proof than the facts of Nicaragua.
D.

Riesland cannot be held liable merely because the
cyber-attacks originated from its territory.

No evidence exists that Riesland failed to exercise due diligence to
prevent the cyber-attacks.247 To hold Riesland strictly liable without such
evidence would flagrantly contravene customary law. Strict liability has
been consistently rejected in the law of State responsibility outside of
“ultra-hazardous activities.”248
E.

In any event, the cyber-operations were not an
internationally wrongful act.
1.

The cyber-operations were not an unlawful use
of force.

Cyber-attacks do not violate Article 2(4) unless their scale and effects
are comparable to traditional uses of force,249 which generally requires
physical damage.250 This flows from the Court’s focus on scale and effects
to determine whether force had been used in its Nicaragua judgment.251
The scale of the attacks was too small to be classified as a use of force,
only affecting computers at two Amestonian organizations.252 The
disruption in Amestonia was far less severe than in Estonia in 2008, and the
attack on Estonia was not condemned by the international community as a
use of force.253
The effects of the cyber-attacks on Amestonia were not comparable to
traditional uses of force. The attacks exclusively targeted computer
systems, and resulted merely in the elimination of data at private

247

See TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 8, ¶2; Michael Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in
Cyberspace, YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM 68, 73 (2015).
248
Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, (I.L.C.
Yearbook 2010-II) Pt.2, Art.3 & Cmt.3; See Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resource Activities, 27 I.L.M. 868 (1988) Art.8.
249

YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 88 (2010); TALLINN MANUAL,

Rule 11.
250
Michael Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 917 (1999).
251

Nicaragua, ¶195.

252

Compromis, ¶37,38.

253

See Scott Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 209-10

(2009).

2016]

Distinguished Brief

275

organizations and disruption of electronic infrastructure.254 The
international community does not regard mere economic loss as a violation
of Article 2(4).255
2.

If the cyber-operations were a use of force, they
were justified under Riesland’s right to selfdefense.

States have the right to use force in self-defense to repel an imminent
armed attack,256 which can include an ongoing threat from a pattern of
terrorist activity.257 Customary law supports the existence of such a right,258
evidenced by the lack of condemnation, and even support, from the
international community for uses of force against alleged terrorist groups,259
and other non-state actors.260 The Armed Activities Court explicitly left
open the question of whether the right exists.261 The right can also justify
force affecting States harboring non-state actors.262 Uses of force in selfdefense must be both necessary to prevent further damage and proportional
to harm averted.263 Riesland’s cyber-attacks were necessary to prevent the
Hive’s use of confidential information, such as the kind of information that
prevented the honey attack, which Amestonia refused to confiscate.264 The
cyber-attacks were proportionate to the threat of harm from large-scale
254

Compromis,¶37,38.

255

Tom Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law, 79
AM.J.INT’L.L. 405, 411 (1985).
256

Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, Art.51 (1945).

257

Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against
an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM.J.INT’L.L. 1,6 (Prin. 4&5) (2012).
258
See Armed Activities, Sep. Ops., Simma, ¶12, Koojimans, ¶30; Wall Opinion, Decl., Judge
Buergenthal, ¶30.
259
See Thomas Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 A.J.I.L 839 (2001); See, e.g.
Yihdego, Ethiopia’s Military Action Against the Union of Islamic Courts and Others in Somalia, 56
I.C.L.Q. 666, 673 (2007); Ruys, Quo Vadit Jus ad Bellum? A Legal Analysis of Turkey’s Military
Operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq, 12 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 334, 354 (2008).
260

Tams, 381 (cross-border anti-terrorism operations by Rwanda, Tajikstan, and Burma).

261

Armed Activities, ¶147; See Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20
E.J.INT’L L. 359, 385(2009).
262
Ruys & Verhoeven, Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence, 10 CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 285, 315 (2005); UNSC Res. 1373, U.N.Doc.S/Res/1373 (2001).
263
Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, Eighth
U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7, ¶120(1979); DINSTEIN, 184.
264

Compromis, ¶35.
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terrorist attacks from the Hive following a pattern of activity.
3.

The cyber-operations were not an unlawful
intervention.

States violate the norm of non-intervention when they interfere in
other States’ internal affairs using coercion.265 That interference must be of
a level that “subordinates the sovereign will” of the target state over a
matter that the victim state is rightfully entitled to decide.266 The vast
majority of State action within another State’s territory does not violate this
norm.267 The attacks on Amestonia temporarily disrupted the activities of a
law firm and removed stolen information from a private newspaper.268 The
scale of these effects is not sufficient to amount to coercion.
4.

Alternatively, the cyber-attacks were lawful
countermeasures.

States injured by internationally wrongful acts may resort to
proportional269 cyber countermeasures.270 States must notify the violating
State of intent to pursue countermeasures,271 though this requirement is
flexible when a state must act urgently to prevent injury.272
a. Amestonia violated international law by
allowing Riesland’s confidential data to be
disseminated on its territory.
The Security Council identified acts of international terrorism as
threats to international peace and security,273 and declared that all states are
obliged to prevent the use of their territory for planning or facilitating

265

Nicaragua, ¶205; H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (1952).

266
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, UN Doc. A/Res/20/2131 (1965) ¶2; Maziar
Jamnejad & Michael Wood, The Principle of Non-Intervention, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 345, 348 (2009).
267

Lori F. Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over
Domestic Affairs, 83 AM.J.INTL.L. 1 (1989) 14-17.
268

Compromis, ¶37-38.

269

ARSIWA, Art.51; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, ¶¶85, 87.

270

TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 9; See ARSIWA, Art.49(1).

271

ARSIWA Art.52(1).

272

ARSIWA Art.52(2).

273

UNSC Res.1373, U.N.Doc.S/Res/1373(2001).
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terrorist acts.274 Furthermore, Amestonia violated the object and purpose of
two anti-terrorism treaties obliging Amestonia’s cooperation to prevent
terrorist attacks.275
Riesland called on Amestonia to cease allowing Amestonian entities to
possess and publish Riesland’s stolen, confidential, documents, which
contained information that the Hive could use to counter Riesland’s
intelligence operations.276 Riesland notified Amestonia it would take
measures to prevent the leaked documents from causing harm.277
b. The countermeasures were proportional.
Countermeasures must be “directed against”278 the violating state and
“equivalent with the alleged breach,”279 and must be temporary and
reversible.280 The attacks on Amestonia targeted exclusively the data that
was the cause of Amestonia’s breach.281 The damage caused by the breach,
which was entirely non-physical, was reversed in months.

274

Resolution 1373, ¶2(d).

275

See Terrorist Bombings Convention, 149 U.N.T.S. 284 (1998) Preamble; Terrorism Financing
Convention, T.I.A.S.No. 13075 (2000) Preamble.
276

Compromis, ¶¶22-27,35.

277

Compromis, ¶35.

278

Gabcikovo, ¶83; ARSIWA Cmt 22,n.5.

279

See Air Services Agreement, 18 R.I.A.A. 416, ¶83(1946).

280

ARSIWA, Art.49, n.7.

281

Compromis, ¶37.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The Federal Republic of Riesland respectfully requests this Court to
adjudge and declare:
I.
The illicitly-obtained documents published on the Ames Post are not
admissible evidence, and, if the Court does find them admissible, they do
not evidence a breach of international law; and
II.
The arrest of VoR employees and expropriation of VoR property
violated the Broadcasting Treaty and international law generally, and
therefore Riesland is entitled to the release of its nationals and
compensation for its confiscated property; and
III.
Riesland’s detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism Act is
consistent with international law, and the Court has no authority to order his
release or disclosure of information relating to his apprehension; and
IV.
The cyber attacks against the computer systems of Amestonian
corporations cannot be attributed to Riesland, and in any event, were not an
internationally wrongful act.
Respectfully Submitted,
Agents of the Government of the Federal Republic of Riesland
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